@article{HallerbergScartascini, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Scartascini, Carlos}, title = {Explaining changes in tax burdens in Latin America: Do politics trump economics?}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {48}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, issn = {1873-5703}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.07.004}, pages = {162 -- 179}, abstract = {This paper examines whether elections, which are generally held on fixed dates, and banking crises explain the timing of tax reforms and the allocation of the additional tax burden. Using an original fine-grained data set of tax reforms, the paper finds support for the role of these two sources of variation. In particular, the probability of reform is higher during banking crises. During electoral periods, increasing taxes becomes highly unlikely, even if the government is facing financing problems. Interestingly, politics seem to trump economics: banking crises do not affect the probability of having a reform during electoral times. Moreover, the presence of an IMF program affects the tax instruments chosen: countries with a program increase the value-added tax, while those without raise the personal income tax. Finally, the ideology of the president does not explain who bears the additional tax burden.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergGandrud, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Gandrud, Christopher}, title = {Interpreting fiscal accounting rules in the European Union}, series = {Journal of European Public Policy}, volume = {24}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, number = {6}, issn = {1466-4429}, doi = {10.1080/13501763.2017.1300182}, pages = {832 -- 851}, abstract = {In the European Union, the creation of public debt statistics starts with member state governments' reports. The EU's statistical agency - Eurostat - then revises. How do these actors' incentives shape reported numbers? Governments have incentives to take a more favourable view of often ambiguous accounting rules than Eurostat. Lower debt improves governments' performance with domestic and external audiences. Eurostat is tasked with monitoring budgets for 'excessive' debts. We expect governments to present debt figures that Eurostat then revises upwards. This is more likely when governments have high debts, especially when in the eurozone, and prior to elections. Financial crises heighten the number of policies needing interpretation and both actors have more incentives to shape the numbers. We examine these propositions using Eurostat's debt revisions. We find debts are revised upwards more for eurozone countries with higher debt levels and years with unscheduled elections. Financial stress strengthens these effects.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergBaerg, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Baerg, Nicole}, title = {Explaining Instability in the Stability and Growth Pact The Contribution of Member State Power and Euroskepticism to the Euro Crisis}, series = {Comparative Political Studies}, volume = {49}, journal = {Comparative Political Studies}, number = {7}, issn = {1552-3829}, doi = {10.1177/0010414016633230}, pages = {968 -- 1009}, abstract = {The Stability and Growth Pact clearly failed to prevent the euro crisis. We contend that the failure was due largely to the ability of the Member States to undermine the Pact's operation. The European Commission served as a "watchdog" to monitor fiscal performance. The Member States themselves, however, collectively had the ability to change the content of the reports for individual states. We confirm the expectation that powerful Member States had the most success in undermining the role of the Commission. Perhaps more surprisingly, we find supporting evidence for our argument that governments with euroskeptic populations behind them were also more successful in weakening the Commission's warnings. These results have broader theoretical implications concerning which mechanisms explain country-specific outcomes under a shared rule. Another contribution is the creation of a new data set of European Commission assessments of Member State economic programs and Council of Minister revisions.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergScartascini, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Scartascini, Carlos}, title = {When Do Governments Improve Fiscal Institutions? Lessons from Financial Crisis and Fiscal Reform in Latin America}, series = {Economia}, volume = {16}, journal = {Economia}, number = {1}, issn = {1529-7470}, pages = {41 -- 76}, abstract = {Do crises really lead to more institutional reforms? This paper explores the connection between financial crises and one type of reform frequently advocated during the recent global financial crisis, namely, fiscal institutional reforms. Some authors expect that crises lead to reforms, but we demonstrate that the relationship is not so straightforward. Using a data set of Latin American countries that experienced several crises and also several periods of reform in the period from 1990 to 2005, we find that the type of crisis and its duration matter. We argue that reforms are less likely during a banking crisis, whereas fiscal crises are most likely to lead to fiscal reforms. This means that the type of economic crisis is important for explaining the likelihood of reforms. We explore other possible explanations for reform, such as the partisanship of the president and whether a country is under an IMF program, and do not find confirming evidence for alternative explanations.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergWeber, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Weber, Katja}, title = {German Unification 1815-1871 and Its Relevance for Integration Theory}, series = {Journal of European Integration}, volume = {24}, journal = {Journal of European Integration}, number = {1}, issn = {1477-2280}, doi = {10.1080/07036330290014633}, pages = {1 -- 21}, abstract = {This paper reconsiders German unification during the period 1815-1871. First, it makes explicit the comparison between the German Empire and the European Union. Actors faced remarkably similar institution-building problems in both organisations. The second part of the paper evaluates the usefulness of three arguments from two theoretical traditions in European Union integration studies to explain the course of German unification. Following an analytic narrative approach, it considers the relevant actors and the relevant decision points to evaluate two versions of intergovernmentalism, one focused on the security concerns of actors and one focused on economic concerns, as well as neo-functionalism. Economic interests did play a role even in the geopolitically heavy 19th century. Neo-functionalism was less useful, although some structures like pan-German interest groups in support of further integration did develop as neo-functionalists would predict.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergWeber, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Weber, Katja}, title = {Explaining variation in institutional integration in the European Union: why firms may prefer European solutions}, series = {Journal of European Public Policy}, volume = {8}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, number = {2}, issn = {1466-4429}, doi = {10.1080/13501760110041532}, pages = {171 -- 191}, abstract = {We offer a theoretical framework that sheds light on firm preferences for more co-operative structures at the European level. We argue that the magnitude of external threat to the industry, combined with the level of the industry's transaction costs, plays a crucial role in determining firms' preferences for greater integration at the European level. Firms in industries where both the level of threat from abroad and transaction costs are high are likely to favor more binding institutions at the European level. To illustrate our argument we examine the institutional choices of EU-based firms in three different industrial sectors: aerospace, pharmaceuticals, and automobiles.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergRobertsClark, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Roberts Clark, William}, title = {Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy}, series = {American Political Science Review}, volume = {94}, journal = {American Political Science Review}, number = {2}, issn = {1537-5943}, doi = {10.2307/2586015}, pages = {323 -- 346}, abstract = {The literature on global integration and national policy autonomy often ignores a central result from open economy macroeconomics: Capital mobility constrains monetary policy when the exchange rate is fixed and fiscal policy when the exchange rate is flexible. Similarly, examinations of the electoral determinants of monetary and fiscal policy typically ignore international pressures altogether. We develop a formal model to analyze the interaction between fiscal and monetary policymakers under various exchange rate regimes and the degrees of central bank independence. We test the model using data from OECD countries. We find evidence that preelectoral monetary expansions occur only when the exchange rate is flexible and central bank independence is low; preelectoral fiscal expansions occur when the exchange rate is fixed. We then explore the implications of our model for arguments that emphasize the partisan sources of macroeconomic policy and for the conduct of fiscal policy after economic and monetary union in Europe.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergBasinger, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Basinger, Scott}, title = {Globalization and Tax Reform: An Updated Case for the Importance of Veto Players}, series = {Politische Vierteljahreszeitschrift}, volume = {40}, journal = {Politische Vierteljahreszeitschrift}, number = {4}, issn = {2364-9976}, pages = {618 -- 627}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergBasinger, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Basinger, Scott}, title = {Internationalization and Changes in Tax Policy in OECD Countries}, series = {Comparative Political Studies}, volume = {31}, journal = {Comparative Political Studies}, number = {3}, issn = {1552-3829}, doi = {10.1177/0010414098031003003}, pages = {321 -- 353}, abstract = {This article examines the role that economic and political factors played in tax reform in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries from 1986 to 1990. Some writers argue that economic integration forced states to reform their tax systems. The authors' findings indicate that economic openness had an indirect effect on the level of change in marginal tax rates. The institutional structure of a country was most important—countries that had only one veto player or only one institution or party whose approval was necessary for a bill to become law enacted more sweeping reform than states that had more than one veto player. These results suggest that even when international or domestic economic factors might dictate a change in policy, reform will not be as sweeping in countries in which agreement among several institutions and/or parties is necessary.}, language = {en} } @article{Hallerberg, author = {Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Tax Competition in Wilhelmine Germany and Its Implications for the European Union}, series = {World Politics}, volume = {48}, journal = {World Politics}, number = {3}, issn = {0043-8871}, pages = {324 -- 357}, abstract = {The twenty-five German states from 1871 to 1914 present a useful data set for examining how increasing economic integration affects tax policy. After German unification the national government collapsed six currencies into one and liberalized preexisting restrictions on capital and labor mobility. In contrast, the empire did not directly interfere in the making of state tax policy; while states transferred certain indirect taxes to the central government, they maintained their own autonomous tax and political systems through World War I. This paper examines the extent to which tax competition forced the individual state tax systems to converge from 1871 to 1914. In spite of a diversity of political systems, tax competition did require states to harmonize their rates on mobile factors like capital and high income labor, but it did not affect tax rates on immobile factors. In states where the political system guaranteed agricultural dominance, taxes on land were reduced, while in states with more open systems, tax rates remained higher. One unexpected result is that tax rates on capital and income converged upward instead of downward. The most dominant state, Prussia, served as the lowest-common-denominator state, but pressure from the national government, especially to increase expenditures, forced all states to raise their tax rates. These results suggest possible ways for the European Union to avoid a forced downward convergence of member state tax rates on capital and mobile labor.}, language = {en} } @incollection{AnheierCingolaniHallerbergetal., author = {Anheier, Helmut K. and Cingolani, Luciana and Hallerberg, Mark and Kaufmann, Sonja and List, Regina}, title = {Global Crise and Governance - Lessons, Implications, Recommendations}, series = {The Governance Report 2018}, booktitle = {The Governance Report 2018}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, address = {Oxford}, isbn = {0198821492}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {105 -- 118}, abstract = {The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008-9 was the greatest economic stress test since the 1940s. It put not only financial markets and currencies at risk; entire economies and political systems were threatened as the GFC soon revealed major governance shortcomings and weaknesses felt across a wide spectrum of policy fields. Globalization seemed in jeopardy, the Washington Consensus of neoliberal policies broken, and democratic backsliding set in as populism and protectionism began to take root. The GFC triggered many responses to improve governance through reforms and regulatory measures of many kinds across a wide range of fields: most prominently in finance and banking, but also in fiscal policy, trade, labor markets and social security. Ten years after the GFC, the 2018 Governance Report takes stock and asks: How have countries fared, and are they better prepared to avoid or withstand another crisis of GFC proportions? To answer this question, the 2018 Report focuses on the performance of countries before and after the GFC. Using elaborate indicator and data systems, applying state-of-the-art analytics, and covering a wide range of countries, it offers a systematic comparison of governance performance from three perspectives: What public goods are being provided, at what quality and to what effect? How ready are countries to address governance challenges in the context of globalization? What are the administrative capacities of the public sector? With measures taken before the GFC and today, these perspectives on governance performance provide important benchmarks for measuring both resilience and progress and can assist policymakers in designing effective solutions.}, language = {en} } @article{RedondadeSarraldeHallerbergetal., author = {Redonda, Agustin and de Sarralde, Santiago Diaz and Hallerberg, Mark and Johnson, Lise and Melamud, Ariel and Rozemberg, Ricardo and Schwab, Jakob and von Haldenwang, Christian}, title = {Tax Expenditure and the Treatment of Tax Incentives for Investment}, series = {Economics - The Open Access Open-Assessment E-Journal}, volume = {13}, journal = {Economics - The Open Access Open-Assessment E-Journal}, number = {2019-12}, doi = {10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2019-12}, abstract = {Governments use tax expenditures to boost investment, innovation and employment. However, these schemes are largely opaque, costly and often ineffective in reaching their stated goals. They also frequently trigger unwanted side effects. In order to improve the performance of these tools, we present three concrete policy proposals: First, governments should increase transparency on tax benefits. G20 members should take the lead on this with frequent and comprehensive tax expenditure reports. Second, G20 governments should improve the design of tax incentives with the aim of minimizing the generation of windfall profits and negative spillover effects within and across (in particular, on poorer) countries. Third, governments should phase out tax expenditures that are environmentally harmful, including tax incentives for fossil fuels and other schemes that promote an unsustainable use of natural resources.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergMarkgraf, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Markgraf, Jonas}, title = {The Corporate Governance of Public Banks before and after the Global Financial Crisis}, series = {Global Policy}, volume = {9}, journal = {Global Policy}, number = {Special Issue}, issn = {1758-5899}, doi = {10.1111/1758-5899.12562}, pages = {43 -- 53}, abstract = {During the 2008-09 financial crisis, many states were forced to nationalize faltering private banks. But also public banks ran into trouble and market actors continue to worry about their stability and crisis resilience. During the crisis, German public Landesbanken and Spanish public Cajas were hit hard. Yet, German public Sparkassen emerged strengthened from the crisis. This calls for a closer examination of the regulatory framework and corporate governance of public banks. We compare how corporate governance choices affected the financial crisis performance of public banks in three countries. Italy that had privatized its extensive public banking sector over the past decades; Spain that had problems with its savings banks during the crisis, which were eventually privatized or shut down; and Germany whose public savings banks navigated the financial crisis relatively well while its public Landesbanken got into serious trouble, and where calls for privatizing public banks resurface periodically. The paper considers the question whether Italy's banking crisis is partly rooted in the legacies of its formerly public banks and how the privatization of public banks in Spain and Italy can inform the debate in Germany and in other European Union countries with significant public banking sectors.}, language = {en} } @periodical{AnheierEichengreenLombardietal., author = {Anheier, Helmut K. and Eichengreen, Barry and Lombardi, Domenico and Malkin, Anton and Hallerberg, Mark and Markgraf, Jonas and Zettelmeyer, Jeromin and Knight, Malcolm D. and Davies, Howard and Zhivitskaya, Maria and V{\´e}ron, Nicolas and Buchheit, Lee C. and Gulati, G. Mitu and Haley, James A.}, title = {Ten Years after the Global Financial Crisis: Lessons Learned, Opportunities Missed}, series = {Global Policy}, volume = {9}, journal = {Global Policy}, number = {S1}, editor = {Anheier, Helmut K.}, publisher = {University of Durham and John Wiley \& Sons, Ltd}, pages = {1 -- 79}, language = {en} } @techreport{SalazarMoralesHallerberg, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Salazar-Morales, Diego and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Shaping a New International Trade Order: Competition and Co-operation among the European Union, the United States, and China}, series = {Dahrendorf Forum IV: Working Paper No. 12}, journal = {Dahrendorf Forum IV: Working Paper No. 12}, pages = {31}, abstract = {Following the establishment of the World Trade Organisationin January 1995, American and European trade relationships werefor a timecharacterised by 'competitive interdependence',astheUS and EUsimultaneously aimedtoadvance their commercial interests inthird countries. Under conditions of competitive interdependence, trade actorsresort to certain policy choices to gain advantage for their producers while restricting others' ability to enter a market (Sbragia, 2010).In the last decade, however, European and American trade policymakers have facedthe challenges of a more competitive world and the emergence of newer trade powers such as China. Both actors have veered away frommultilateral deals as their preferred trade policy choices. In this paper, weuse the Sbragia (2010) framework to analyse the trade policy shifts made bythe EU and the US in the last decade. We argue that what had been a competitive interdependence relationship has recently changed toa trilateral structure in which both the EU and the US have focused their attention on countering Chinese competition. Moreover, China's emergence has also pushed the USto reinvigorate the role of unilateralism and the EU to bolsterbilateralism as they both seek to secure their commercial shares worldwide.}, language = {en} } @incollection{HallerbergScartascini, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Scartascini, Carlos}, title = {Particularistic Political Institutions and Tax Neutrality in Latin America}, series = {The Political Economy of Taxation in Latin America}, booktitle = {The Political Economy of Taxation in Latin America}, editor = {Flores-Mac{\´i}as, Gustavo A.}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, isbn = {9781108655934}, doi = {10.1017/9781108655934}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {144 -- 171}, language = {en} } @techreport{HallerbergYlaeoutinen2008, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Yl{\"a}outinen, Sami}, title = {Fiscal Governance in Central and Eastern Europe before and after European Union Accession: What Role Europeanisation?}, publisher = {Hertie School of Governance}, address = {Berlin}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-1667}, pages = {28}, year = {2008}, abstract = {Our paper focuses on the development of fiscal institutions in Central and East European countries from 1998 to 2007. Following the Europeanisation literature as well as the expectations that the European Union established in its dialogue with prospective members through annual "Preaccession Economic Programmes," one would anticipate that there would have been reform of fiscal institutions in the run-up to EU accession. Unlike in most other policy fields, there is an additional incentive to continue reform once a country has joined the EU, which is eurozone membership. This paper explains how we measure fiscal institutions and fiscal reforms. We provide time series data on the fiscal institutions each country has had in place, and, based on a new set of surveys and interviews we conducted, we compare the state of these fiscal institutions in 2007, or after the countries had acceded to the EU, with the institutions in place before accession. We find that preparations for the EU accession prior to 2004 did lead to some changes in budget process in this set of countries. The carrot of EMU membership after acceding to the EU, however, has so far not had the same effect--the pace of reform has since stalled, with most countries leaving the same fiscal institutions in place.In some countries further reforms to develop medium-term fiscal frameworks are either planned or are in a process of being initiated but it is too early to say if the reforms will truly materialise and transform the frameworks into a vehicle that would impose a serious constraint for government spending.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergWolff2008, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Wolff, Guntram B.}, title = {Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in EMU}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {136}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3-4}, pages = {379 -- 396}, year = {2008}, abstract = {We investigate the effect of fiscal institutions such as the strength of the finance minister in the budget process and deficits on interest rate spreads of Eurozone countries. Deficits significantly increase risk premia measured by relative swap spreads. The effect of deficits is significantly lower under EMU. This effect partly results from neglecting the role of fiscal institutions. After controlling for institutional changes, fiscal policy remains a significant determinant of risk premia in EMU. Better institutions are connected with lower risk premia. Furthermore deficits matter less for risk premia in countries with better institutions. Markets acknowledge that better institutions reduce fiscal difficulties rendering the monitoring of annual developments less important.}, language = {en} }