@article{HallerbergCopelovitchGandrud, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Copelovitch, Mark and Gandrud, Christopher}, title = {Financial Data Transparency, International Institutions, and Sovereign Borrowing Costs}, series = {International Studies Quarterly}, volume = {62}, journal = {International Studies Quarterly}, number = {1}, issn = {1468-2478}, doi = {10.1093/isq/sqx082}, pages = {23 -- 41}, abstract = {Recent events in international finance illustrate the close connection between the viability of a country's major private financial institutions and the sustainability of its sovereign debt. We explore the precise nature of this connection and the ways in which it shapes investors' expectations of sovereign creditworthiness. We consider how investors use the overall level of information available about the private financial sector—and the potential risks it poses to government finances—when making decisions about investing in sovereign debt. We expect that governments providing more information about the private financial sector will have lower, and less volatile, borrowing costs. In order to test this argument, we create a new Financial Data Transparency (FDT) Index measuring governments' willingness to release credible financial system data. Using the FDT and a sample of high-income OECD countries, we find that such transparency reduces sovereign borrowing costs. The effects are conditional on the level of public indebtedness. Transparent countries with low debt enjoy lower and less volatile borrowing costs.}, language = {en} } @article{GandrudHallerberg, author = {Gandrud, Christopher and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {When all is said and done: updating "Elections, special interests, and financial crisis"}, series = {Research and Politics}, volume = {2}, journal = {Research and Politics}, number = {3}, publisher = {Sage}, address = {London [u.a.]}, issn = {2053-1680}, doi = {10.1177/2053168015589335}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-15509}, pages = {1 -- 9}, abstract = {How do elections affect the costliness of financial crises to taxpayers? Previous research contends that more electorally competitive countries choose policies that are less costly to taxpayers. In this paper, we update Keefer's seminal 2007 article published in International Organization with revised data. The original article found that more electorally competitive countries had lower fiscal costs from responding to crises. The commonly used IMF/World Bank data set Keefer employed has since been extensively corrected and expanded. We update the original analysis with the newest version of this data set. After doing so, we find no evidence for an association between electoral competitiveness and the fiscal costs of responding to financial crises both within the original sample and outside of it. Our update highlights a broader methodological lesson: that the costs of responding to financial crises can take many years to be settled. Future research should explicitly address and model this delayed cost resolution.}, language = {en} } @article{GandrudHallerberg, author = {Gandrud, Christopher and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Does Banking Union Worsen the EU's Democratic Deficit? The Need for Greater Supervisory Data Transparency}, series = {Journal of Common Market Studies}, volume = {53}, journal = {Journal of Common Market Studies}, number = {4}, publisher = {Blackwell}, address = {Oxford [u.a.]}, issn = {0021-9886}, doi = {10.1111/jcms.12226}, pages = {769 -- 785}, abstract = {Does banking union exacerbate the European Union's democratic deficit? Using Scharpf's 'input' and 'output' legitimacy concepts, it is argued in this article that its design does worsen the democratic deficit. There are good reasons to limit 'input legitimacy' for politically independent institutions. 'Output legitimacy' is then even more relevant. Transparency is a key part of 'output legitimacy'. It enables actors to judge whether the regulator is acting in the public's interest and can improve their outputs. This article focuses on the banking data that the supervisors collect. Data available to the European public is evaluated and compared to America's banking union. European practices are not comparable in terms of availability or detail. An original survey of relevant officials is conducted, which results in the finding that only 11 of 28 Member States release any information on the banks they supervise. Both EU and national supervisors should provide publicly available, timely and consistent individual bank data.}, language = {en} } @article{GandrudHallerbergDeoetal., author = {Gandrud, Christopher and Hallerberg, Mark and Deo, Sahil and Franz, Christian}, title = {Preventing German Bank Failures: Federalism and decisions to save troubled banks}, series = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift}, volume = {56}, journal = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift}, number = {2}, publisher = {Westdt. Verl.}, address = {K{\"o}ln [u.a.]}, issn = {0032-3470}, doi = {10.5771/0032-3470-2015-2-159}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-15475}, pages = {159 -- 181}, abstract = {We examine government decisions to support troubled banks. Our contribution is the examination of how federalism can affect decisions to classify banks as systemically important. Whether a bank is viewed by politicians as 'systemically important' varies based on how its failure would affect supporters of the government. How a federation is designed has a strong influence on which banks are given public assistance. Where the top level of government is solely responsible for banks, there will be fewer systemically important institutions and so more banks will be allowed to fail. Where lower levels are responsible, governments will allow fewer failures. We use this approach to understand government support for failing banks in Germany. Our findings are relevant for the European Banking Union.}, language = {en} } @article{BearceHallerberg, author = {Bearce, David and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Democracy and De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes}, series = {Economics and Politics}, volume = {23}, journal = {Economics and Politics}, number = {2}, issn = {0954-1985}, doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0343.2011.00381.x}, pages = {172 -- 194}, language = {en} } @article{Hallerberg, author = {Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Fiscal federalism reforms in the European Union and the Greek crisis}, series = {European Union Politics}, volume = {12}, journal = {European Union Politics}, number = {1}, issn = {1465-1165}, doi = {10.1177/1465116510387652}, pages = {127 -- 142}, language = {en} } @book{HallerbergScartasciniStein, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Scartascini, Carlos G. and Stein, Ernesto Hugo}, title = {Who decides the budget? : a political economy analysis of the budget process in Latin America}, publisher = {Inter-American Development Bank [u.a.]}, address = {Washington, DC [u.a.]}, isbn = {1-59782-089-x}, pages = {XI, 320 S.}, language = {en} } @book{Hallerberg, author = {Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Domestic Budgets in a United Europe : Fiscal Governance from the End of Bretton Woods to EMU}, publisher = {Cornell Univ. Press}, address = {Ithaca [u.a.]}, isbn = {0801442710}, pages = {X, 245 S.}, language = {en} } @book{DoeringHallerberg, author = {D{\"o}ring, Herbert and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Patterns of parliamentary behavior : Passage of legislation across Western Europe}, publisher = {Ashgate}, address = {Aldershot [u.a.]}, isbn = {0-7546-3936-3}, pages = {IX, 240 S.}, language = {en} } @article{GandrudHallerberg, author = {Gandrud, Christopher and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Statistical Agencies and Responses to Financial Crises : Eurostat, Bad Banks and the ESM}, series = {West European Politics}, journal = {West European Politics}, language = {en} } @article{StolfiHallerberg, author = {Stolfi, Francesco and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Clientelistic budget cycles: evidence from health policy in the Italian regions}, series = {Journal of European Public Policy}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, doi = {10.1080/13501763.2015.1075577}, pages = {1 -- 18}, language = {en} } @techreport{FocantiHallerbergScartascini, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Focanti, Diego and Hallerberg, Mark and Scartascini, Carlos}, title = {Tax Reforms in Latin America in an Era of Democracy IDB Working Paper No. IDB-WP-457}, language = {en} } @article{ClarkHallerbergKeiletal., author = {Clark, William R. and Hallerberg, Mark and Keil, Manfred and Willett, Thomas D.}, title = {Measures of financial openness and interdependence}, series = {Journal of Financial Economic Policy}, volume = {4}, journal = {Journal of Financial Economic Policy}, number = {1}, issn = {1757-6385}, doi = {10.1108/17576381211206497}, pages = {58 -- 75}, language = {en} }