@article{HallerbergCopelovitchGandrud, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Copelovitch, Mark and Gandrud, Christopher}, title = {Financial Data Transparency, International Institutions, and Sovereign Borrowing Costs}, series = {International Studies Quarterly}, volume = {62}, journal = {International Studies Quarterly}, number = {1}, issn = {1468-2478}, doi = {10.1093/isq/sqx082}, pages = {23 -- 41}, abstract = {Recent events in international finance illustrate the close connection between the viability of a country's major private financial institutions and the sustainability of its sovereign debt. We explore the precise nature of this connection and the ways in which it shapes investors' expectations of sovereign creditworthiness. We consider how investors use the overall level of information available about the private financial sector—and the potential risks it poses to government finances—when making decisions about investing in sovereign debt. We expect that governments providing more information about the private financial sector will have lower, and less volatile, borrowing costs. In order to test this argument, we create a new Financial Data Transparency (FDT) Index measuring governments' willingness to release credible financial system data. Using the FDT and a sample of high-income OECD countries, we find that such transparency reduces sovereign borrowing costs. The effects are conditional on the level of public indebtedness. Transparent countries with low debt enjoy lower and less volatile borrowing costs.}, language = {en} } @article{GandrudHallerberg, author = {Gandrud, Christopher and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {When all is said and done: updating "Elections, special interests, and financial crisis"}, series = {Research and Politics}, volume = {2}, journal = {Research and Politics}, number = {3}, publisher = {Sage}, address = {London [u.a.]}, issn = {2053-1680}, doi = {10.1177/2053168015589335}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-15509}, pages = {1 -- 9}, abstract = {How do elections affect the costliness of financial crises to taxpayers? Previous research contends that more electorally competitive countries choose policies that are less costly to taxpayers. In this paper, we update Keefer's seminal 2007 article published in International Organization with revised data. The original article found that more electorally competitive countries had lower fiscal costs from responding to crises. The commonly used IMF/World Bank data set Keefer employed has since been extensively corrected and expanded. We update the original analysis with the newest version of this data set. After doing so, we find no evidence for an association between electoral competitiveness and the fiscal costs of responding to financial crises both within the original sample and outside of it. Our update highlights a broader methodological lesson: that the costs of responding to financial crises can take many years to be settled. Future research should explicitly address and model this delayed cost resolution.}, language = {en} } @article{GandrudHallerberg, author = {Gandrud, Christopher and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Does Banking Union Worsen the EU's Democratic Deficit? The Need for Greater Supervisory Data Transparency}, series = {Journal of Common Market Studies}, volume = {53}, journal = {Journal of Common Market Studies}, number = {4}, publisher = {Blackwell}, address = {Oxford [u.a.]}, issn = {0021-9886}, doi = {10.1111/jcms.12226}, pages = {769 -- 785}, abstract = {Does banking union exacerbate the European Union's democratic deficit? Using Scharpf's 'input' and 'output' legitimacy concepts, it is argued in this article that its design does worsen the democratic deficit. There are good reasons to limit 'input legitimacy' for politically independent institutions. 'Output legitimacy' is then even more relevant. Transparency is a key part of 'output legitimacy'. It enables actors to judge whether the regulator is acting in the public's interest and can improve their outputs. This article focuses on the banking data that the supervisors collect. Data available to the European public is evaluated and compared to America's banking union. European practices are not comparable in terms of availability or detail. An original survey of relevant officials is conducted, which results in the finding that only 11 of 28 Member States release any information on the banks they supervise. Both EU and national supervisors should provide publicly available, timely and consistent individual bank data.}, language = {en} } @article{GandrudHallerbergDeoetal., author = {Gandrud, Christopher and Hallerberg, Mark and Deo, Sahil and Franz, Christian}, title = {Preventing German Bank Failures: Federalism and decisions to save troubled banks}, series = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift}, volume = {56}, journal = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift}, number = {2}, publisher = {Westdt. Verl.}, address = {K{\"o}ln [u.a.]}, issn = {0032-3470}, doi = {10.5771/0032-3470-2015-2-159}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-15475}, pages = {159 -- 181}, abstract = {We examine government decisions to support troubled banks. Our contribution is the examination of how federalism can affect decisions to classify banks as systemically important. Whether a bank is viewed by politicians as 'systemically important' varies based on how its failure would affect supporters of the government. How a federation is designed has a strong influence on which banks are given public assistance. Where the top level of government is solely responsible for banks, there will be fewer systemically important institutions and so more banks will be allowed to fail. Where lower levels are responsible, governments will allow fewer failures. We use this approach to understand government support for failing banks in Germany. Our findings are relevant for the European Banking Union.}, language = {en} } @article{BearceHallerberg, author = {Bearce, David and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Democracy and De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes}, series = {Economics and Politics}, volume = {23}, journal = {Economics and Politics}, number = {2}, issn = {0954-1985}, doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0343.2011.00381.x}, pages = {172 -- 194}, language = {en} } @article{Hallerberg, author = {Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Fiscal federalism reforms in the European Union and the Greek crisis}, series = {European Union Politics}, volume = {12}, journal = {European Union Politics}, number = {1}, issn = {1465-1165}, doi = {10.1177/1465116510387652}, pages = {127 -- 142}, language = {en} } @article{GandrudHallerberg, author = {Gandrud, Christopher and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Statistical Agencies and Responses to Financial Crises : Eurostat, Bad Banks and the ESM}, series = {West European Politics}, journal = {West European Politics}, language = {en} } @article{StolfiHallerberg, author = {Stolfi, Francesco and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Clientelistic budget cycles: evidence from health policy in the Italian regions}, series = {Journal of European Public Policy}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, doi = {10.1080/13501763.2015.1075577}, pages = {1 -- 18}, language = {en} } @article{ClarkHallerbergKeiletal., author = {Clark, William R. and Hallerberg, Mark and Keil, Manfred and Willett, Thomas D.}, title = {Measures of financial openness and interdependence}, series = {Journal of Financial Economic Policy}, volume = {4}, journal = {Journal of Financial Economic Policy}, number = {1}, issn = {1757-6385}, doi = {10.1108/17576381211206497}, pages = {58 -- 75}, language = {en} } @article{BurdekinBanaianHallerbergetal., author = {Burdekin, Richard C.K. and Banaian, King and Hallerberg, Mark and Siklos, Pierre L.}, title = {Fiscal and monetary institutions and policies: onward and upward?}, series = {Journal of Financial Economic Policy}, volume = {3}, journal = {Journal of Financial Economic Policy}, number = {4}, issn = {1757-6385}, doi = {10.1108/17576381111182918}, pages = {340 -- 354}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergWehner, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Wehner, Joachim}, title = {When do you get Economists as Policy-Makers?}, series = {British Journal of Political Science}, journal = {British Journal of Political Science}, issn = {1469-2112}, doi = {10.1017/S0007123417000801}, pages = {1 -- 13}, abstract = {We analyze when economists become top-level "economic policy-makers", focusing on financial crises and the partisanship of a country's leader. We present a new dataset of the educational and occupational background of 1200 political leaders, finance ministers, and central bank governors from 40 developed democracies from 1973 to 2010. We find that left leaders appoint economic policy-makers who are more highly trained in economics and finance ministers who are less likely to have private finance backgrounds but more likely to be former central bankers. Finance ministers appointed during financial crises are less likely to have a financial services background. A leader's exposure to economics training is also related to appointments. This suggests one crucial mechanism for affecting economic policy is through the selection of certain types of economic policy-makers.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergGandrud, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Gandrud, Christopher}, title = {The Measurement of Real-Time Perceptions of Financial Stress: Implications for Political Science}, series = {British Journal of Political Science}, journal = {British Journal of Political Science}, doi = {10.1017/S0007123417000291}, pages = {1 -- 13}, abstract = {How do politicians and voters respond to financial market stress, and with what political effects? Previous research addressing these questions lacks a crucial variable: a continuous, real-time indicator of the level of financial market stress that policy makers and voters perceived. We need a measure of actors'contemporary perceptions of financial market conditions to understand why they made a given choice and with what effects. Previous binary crisis measures are constructed post hoc, so tend to be biased towards severe crises and away from circumstances in which governments effectively responded to emerging trouble. As such, they suffer from clear selection bias. Annual post hoc measures do not necessarily capture conditions as they were perceived at the time of events such as elections. As dichotomous indicators, they do not measure crisis severity or how it varies over time. They use ad hoc methods to determine when crises have ended. Previous continuous measures of financial market stress are less common and suffer from other problems. They capture quantities whose importance, measurement, and reporting varies significantly across countries and over time. To overcome these issues, we develop a continuous measure of real-time perceptions of financial market stress with a kernel principal component analysis (KPCA) of detailed qualitative data, namely monthly Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) reports. We call it the EIU Perceptions of Financial Market Stress Index, or FinStress for short. FinStress enables new political research possibilities. As a continuous measure, it could be used to examine which policies can effectively prevent or reduce extreme stress, and which political conditions are conducive to implementing these policies. As a comparable continuous monthly indicator, FinStress could be used to test hypotheses that rely on sub-annual data and follow the intensity of stress over time. Here we provide examples for studying the impact of financial market stress on voters'choices and on revisions to European Union government budget figures. We thus contribute to the wider methodological toolkit by showing how KPCA can be used to summarize vast quantities of similarly formatted qualitative texts into continuous cross-sectional time-series indicators.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergGandrud, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Gandrud, Christopher}, title = {Explaining variation and change in supervisory confidentiality in the European Union}, series = {West European Politics}, volume = {41}, journal = {West European Politics}, number = {4, Secrecy in Europe}, issn = {0140-2382}, doi = {10.1080/01402382.2017.1389421}, pages = {1025 -- 1048}, abstract = {Some European Union member states' financial regulators choose to make some of the data they routinely collect on individual banks publicly available. Others treat this data as confidential. What explains this difference? This paper considers the possible effects of crises, path-dependent legal institutions, and the design of deposit insurance schemes. At the national level, the paper focuses on contrasting German and Dutch cases. After the recent economic crisis, the Dutch released more data while the German authorities maintained strict confidentiality rules. The design of deposit insurance schemes provides a key reason why the level of secrecy varies, with the Dutch move from an ex post to an ex ante scheme where the government served as the ultimate backstop leading to questions about the accounts of individual banks while the German system favoured continued secrecy. The paper also describes the level of transparency at the EU level. Multilevel legal restrictions and bureaucratic capacity tilt EU banking union practices towards member states that treat financial supervisory data as confidential.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergStrauchvonHagen, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Strauch, Rolf and von Hagen, J{\"u}rgen}, title = {The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {23}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {2}, issn = {1873-5703}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.11.005}, pages = {338 -- 359}, abstract = {This paper uses a new data set on budgetary institutions in Europe to examine the impact of fiscal rules and budget procedures in EU countries on public finances. It briefly describes the main pattern of budgetary institutions and their determinants across the EU 15 member states. Empirical evidence for the time period 1985-2004 suggests that the centralisation of budgeting procedures restrains public debt. In countries with one-party governments or coalition governments where parties are closely aligned and where political competition among them is low, this is achieved by the delegation of decision-making power to the minister of finance. Fiscal contracts that require countries to set multi-year targets and that reinforce those targets increase fiscal discipline in countries with ideologically dispersed coalitions and where parties regularly compete against each other.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergBasinger, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Basinger, scott}, title = {Remodeling the Competition for Capital: How Domestic Politics Erases the Race to the Bottom}, series = {American Political Science Review}, volume = {98}, journal = {American Political Science Review}, number = {2}, issn = {1537-5943}, doi = {10.1017/S0003055404001133}, pages = {261 -- 276}, abstract = {This paper proposes and tests a new formal model of the competition for capital, using the analogy of a "tournament" as a substitute for the "race-to-the-bottom" model. Our key insight is that political costs that accompany legislating have both direct and indirect effects on the likelihood and scale of reforms. While countries with higher political costs are less likely themselves to enact reforms, the presence of these costs also reduces competing countries' incentives to reform regardless of their own political costs. Domestic politics therefore mitigates the pressures for downward convergence of tax policy despite increased capital mobility. We examine the capital tax policies in OECD countries during the period from 1980 to 1997 and find that states are sensitive to tax reforms in competitor countries, although their responses to reforms are mediated by their own domestic costs to reform. We define two potential sources of political costs of reform: transaction costs, due to the presence of multiple veto players in the legislative process, and constituency costs, due to ideological opposition to policy changes that benefit capital. Our evidence reveals that a reduction in these costs either domestically or abroad increases the likelihood that a country enacts tax reforms.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergMarier, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Marier, Patrik}, title = {Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries}, series = {American Journal of Political Science}, volume = {48}, journal = {American Journal of Political Science}, number = {3}, issn = {1540-5907}, doi = {10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00088.x}, pages = {571 -- 587}, abstract = {Recent scholarship on budgeting in Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries indicates that political institutions impact the level of budget discipline. Building upon this previous research, we argue that the principal problem that must be addressed in both the government and the legislature to insure strong fiscal discipline is the common pool resource (CPR) problem. At the cabinet level, the CPR problem arises because ministers consider the implications of decisions on their ministries only. The level of the CPR problem in the legislature depends upon the electoral system. Using a data set of LAC countries for the period 1988-97, we find that executive power in the budget process is most effective in reducing budget deficits when electoral incentives for the personal vote is high in the legislature, while strengthening the president (or prime minister) in countries where the personal vote is low in the legislature has no effect.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergStrauchvonHagen, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Strauch, Rolf and von Hagen, J{\"u}rgen}, title = {Budgeting in Europe after Maastrichtpatterns of reform and their effectiveness}, series = {Hacienda Publica Espanola}, journal = {Hacienda Publica Espanola}, edition = {Nº Extra 2004}, issn = {0210-1173}, pages = {203 -- 228}, abstract = {Este trabajo analiza el desarrollo de las reglas e instituciones fiscales en los pa{\´i}ses europeos durante la {\´u}ltima d{\´e}cada. Hallamos que el grado de cambios de los procesos presupuestarios y de las reglas fiscales difiere mucho entre los distintos pa{\´i}ses. Se eval{\´u}a el patr{\´o}n de los cambios con respecto a los diferentes tipos ideales de gobernabilidad fiscal. Nuestro an{\´a}lisis muestra que los pa{\´i}ses que adoptan reglas en consonancia con sus instituciones fiscales predichas consiguen mayores logros en el plano fiscal que otras naciones que no hacen eso. Tenemos, pues, una explicaci{\´o}n parcial de por qu{\´e} raz{\´o}n el efecto del marco fiscal europeo ha sido asim{\´e}trico en relaci{\´o}n con los pa{\´i}ses miembros.}, language = {en} } @article{Hallerberg, author = {Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions}, series = {International Organization}, volume = {56}, journal = {International Organization}, number = {4}, issn = {1531-5088}, doi = {10.1162/002081802760403775}, pages = {775 -- 802}, abstract = {I argue that two types of veto players matter in the choice of monetary institutions: party veto players and subnational governments, which are strong in federal systems but weak in unitary systems. A crucial issue is whether voters can readily identify the manipulation of the economy with party players. A second issue concerns the national party veto player's ability to control either fiscal or monetary policy. In one-party unitary governments identification and control are clear; parties where such governments are common prefer flexible exchange rates and dependent central banks. In multiparty coalition governments in unitary systems, identification is traditionally difficult, and the ability to target benefits to specific constituencies under fiscal policy makes fiscal policy autonomy more attractive for coalition governments. Such governments prefer central banks that are politically independent but that finance government debt. Under federalism, parties that constitute the central government have less control over fiscal policy and they prefer flexible exchange rates. Subnational governments do not support a dependent central bank that gives more power to the central government.}, language = {en} } @article{Hallerberg, author = {Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {The political economy of taxation in Prussia, 1871-1914}, series = {Jahrbuch f{\"u}r Wirtschaftsgeschichte}, volume = {2002}, journal = {Jahrbuch f{\"u}r Wirtschaftsgeschichte}, number = {2}, issn = {0075-2800}, pages = {11 -- 33}, abstract = {This paper examines the political economy of taxation in the Bundesstaat of Prussia during the Kaiserreich period. It examines how different factors of production with different levels of relative mobility, organized roughly along party lines, interacted with one another on taxation issues. It pays particular attention to the institutional composition of the Prussian state and how the institutions affected the mix of taxes the state levied. In particular, several elements of Prussia's electoral system, including the use of a three-class system, the distribution of electoral districts, and an indirect vote, guaranteed that large agricultural landowners would hold most of the power in spite of increasing industrialization. The parliament therefore consistently changed the tax code to reduce the burden on large agriculture.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergStrauch, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Strauch, Rolf}, title = {On the Cyclicality of Public Finances in Europe}, series = {Empirica}, volume = {29}, journal = {Empirica}, number = {3}, issn = {1573-6911}, pages = {183 -- 207}, abstract = {Under EMU, monetary policy is oriented toward the euro area as a whole and fiscal policy is an important instrument remaining in the hands of national governments to cushion economic shocks to individual countries. The current paper analyses the cyclical pattern of public finances in Europe and addresses the question of whether fiscal policies have been geared towards this stabilising role. Although taxes fluctuate countercyclically in a conventional manner, we find that discretionary measures have tended to undermine automatic stabilisers. On the expenditure side, we find that public investment also displays a consistent procyclical pattern. Dynamic analysis reveals that a permanent shock to output induces asynchronous fluctuations in taxes and expenditures in the year of the shock and in periods thereafter. Finally, we examine political and institutional factors. The political fragmentation of the government as well as the partisan hue of the government do not interfere with the cyclical response of public finances, but we do find evidence of a pronounced electoral cycle.}, language = {en} } @article{Hallerberg, author = {Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Fiscal Policy in the European Union}, series = {European Union Politics}, volume = {3}, journal = {European Union Politics}, number = {2}, issn = {1741-2757}, doi = {10.1177/1465116502003002001}, pages = {139 -- 150}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergVinhasdeSouzaRobertsClark, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Vinhas de Souza, Lucio and Roberts Clark, William}, title = {Political Business Cycles in EU Accession Countries}, series = {European Union Politics}, volume = {3}, journal = {European Union Politics}, number = {2}, issn = {1741-2757}, doi = {10.1177/1465116502003002005}, pages = {231 -- 250}, abstract = {This paper considers whether political business cycles existed in East European accession countries during the period 1990-9. Based on the Mundell-Fleming model expanded in Clark and Hallerberg (2000), we argue that the type of exchange rate regime and the relative independence of the central bank affects the instruments governments use to influence the economy before elections. In our empirical analysis, we find that accession countries with dependent central banks and flexible exchange rates have looser monetary policies in electoral periods than in non-electoral periods. If a country has a fixed exchange rate regime, it manipulates its economy in election years through running larger budgets instead of through looser monetary policy. The presence of such cycles in Eastern Europe has implications for the introduction of the euro in EU accession countries.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergMarzinottoWolff, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Marzinotto, Benedicta and Wolff, Guntram}, title = {Explaining the evolving role of national parliaments under the European Semester}, series = {Journal of European Public Policy}, volume = {25}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, number = {2}, issn = {1466-4429}, doi = {10.1080/13501763.2017.1363273}, pages = {250 -- 267}, abstract = {This contribution examines and explains the role of national parliaments in the European Semester process. It builds on original survey-based evidence and traces whether national parliaments discuss and vote on Stability/Convergence and on National Reform Programmes; how their involvement changed over time; and what might condition national varieties of parliamentary scrutiny over European Union (EU) affairs. We find significant cross-country variation in whether the debate is taking place at the parliamentary level; whether it is European Affairs or finance committees that are involved; and whether there is involvement ex ante (before submission) and/or ex post (after country-specific recommendations). From 2012 to 2015, finance committees played an increasingly prominent role. Traditional measures of the strength of parliament do not explain what we observe. We do find that non-euro area member states were most likely to monitor EU recommendations under the European Semester and that this effect increased over time.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergScartascini, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Scartascini, Carlos}, title = {Explaining changes in tax burdens in Latin America: Do politics trump economics?}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {48}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, issn = {1873-5703}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.07.004}, pages = {162 -- 179}, abstract = {This paper examines whether elections, which are generally held on fixed dates, and banking crises explain the timing of tax reforms and the allocation of the additional tax burden. Using an original fine-grained data set of tax reforms, the paper finds support for the role of these two sources of variation. In particular, the probability of reform is higher during banking crises. During electoral periods, increasing taxes becomes highly unlikely, even if the government is facing financing problems. Interestingly, politics seem to trump economics: banking crises do not affect the probability of having a reform during electoral times. Moreover, the presence of an IMF program affects the tax instruments chosen: countries with a program increase the value-added tax, while those without raise the personal income tax. Finally, the ideology of the president does not explain who bears the additional tax burden.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergGandrud, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Gandrud, Christopher}, title = {Interpreting fiscal accounting rules in the European Union}, series = {Journal of European Public Policy}, volume = {24}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, number = {6}, issn = {1466-4429}, doi = {10.1080/13501763.2017.1300182}, pages = {832 -- 851}, abstract = {In the European Union, the creation of public debt statistics starts with member state governments' reports. The EU's statistical agency - Eurostat - then revises. How do these actors' incentives shape reported numbers? Governments have incentives to take a more favourable view of often ambiguous accounting rules than Eurostat. Lower debt improves governments' performance with domestic and external audiences. Eurostat is tasked with monitoring budgets for 'excessive' debts. We expect governments to present debt figures that Eurostat then revises upwards. This is more likely when governments have high debts, especially when in the eurozone, and prior to elections. Financial crises heighten the number of policies needing interpretation and both actors have more incentives to shape the numbers. We examine these propositions using Eurostat's debt revisions. We find debts are revised upwards more for eurozone countries with higher debt levels and years with unscheduled elections. Financial stress strengthens these effects.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergBaerg, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Baerg, Nicole}, title = {Explaining Instability in the Stability and Growth Pact The Contribution of Member State Power and Euroskepticism to the Euro Crisis}, series = {Comparative Political Studies}, volume = {49}, journal = {Comparative Political Studies}, number = {7}, issn = {1552-3829}, doi = {10.1177/0010414016633230}, pages = {968 -- 1009}, abstract = {The Stability and Growth Pact clearly failed to prevent the euro crisis. We contend that the failure was due largely to the ability of the Member States to undermine the Pact's operation. The European Commission served as a "watchdog" to monitor fiscal performance. The Member States themselves, however, collectively had the ability to change the content of the reports for individual states. We confirm the expectation that powerful Member States had the most success in undermining the role of the Commission. Perhaps more surprisingly, we find supporting evidence for our argument that governments with euroskeptic populations behind them were also more successful in weakening the Commission's warnings. These results have broader theoretical implications concerning which mechanisms explain country-specific outcomes under a shared rule. Another contribution is the creation of a new data set of European Commission assessments of Member State economic programs and Council of Minister revisions.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergScartascini, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Scartascini, Carlos}, title = {When Do Governments Improve Fiscal Institutions? Lessons from Financial Crisis and Fiscal Reform in Latin America}, series = {Economia}, volume = {16}, journal = {Economia}, number = {1}, issn = {1529-7470}, pages = {41 -- 76}, abstract = {Do crises really lead to more institutional reforms? This paper explores the connection between financial crises and one type of reform frequently advocated during the recent global financial crisis, namely, fiscal institutional reforms. Some authors expect that crises lead to reforms, but we demonstrate that the relationship is not so straightforward. Using a data set of Latin American countries that experienced several crises and also several periods of reform in the period from 1990 to 2005, we find that the type of crisis and its duration matter. We argue that reforms are less likely during a banking crisis, whereas fiscal crises are most likely to lead to fiscal reforms. This means that the type of economic crisis is important for explaining the likelihood of reforms. We explore other possible explanations for reform, such as the partisanship of the president and whether a country is under an IMF program, and do not find confirming evidence for alternative explanations.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergWeber, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Weber, Katja}, title = {German Unification 1815-1871 and Its Relevance for Integration Theory}, series = {Journal of European Integration}, volume = {24}, journal = {Journal of European Integration}, number = {1}, issn = {1477-2280}, doi = {10.1080/07036330290014633}, pages = {1 -- 21}, abstract = {This paper reconsiders German unification during the period 1815-1871. First, it makes explicit the comparison between the German Empire and the European Union. Actors faced remarkably similar institution-building problems in both organisations. The second part of the paper evaluates the usefulness of three arguments from two theoretical traditions in European Union integration studies to explain the course of German unification. Following an analytic narrative approach, it considers the relevant actors and the relevant decision points to evaluate two versions of intergovernmentalism, one focused on the security concerns of actors and one focused on economic concerns, as well as neo-functionalism. Economic interests did play a role even in the geopolitically heavy 19th century. Neo-functionalism was less useful, although some structures like pan-German interest groups in support of further integration did develop as neo-functionalists would predict.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergWeber, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Weber, Katja}, title = {Explaining variation in institutional integration in the European Union: why firms may prefer European solutions}, series = {Journal of European Public Policy}, volume = {8}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, number = {2}, issn = {1466-4429}, doi = {10.1080/13501760110041532}, pages = {171 -- 191}, abstract = {We offer a theoretical framework that sheds light on firm preferences for more co-operative structures at the European level. We argue that the magnitude of external threat to the industry, combined with the level of the industry's transaction costs, plays a crucial role in determining firms' preferences for greater integration at the European level. Firms in industries where both the level of threat from abroad and transaction costs are high are likely to favor more binding institutions at the European level. To illustrate our argument we examine the institutional choices of EU-based firms in three different industrial sectors: aerospace, pharmaceuticals, and automobiles.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergRobertsClark, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Roberts Clark, William}, title = {Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy}, series = {American Political Science Review}, volume = {94}, journal = {American Political Science Review}, number = {2}, issn = {1537-5943}, doi = {10.2307/2586015}, pages = {323 -- 346}, abstract = {The literature on global integration and national policy autonomy often ignores a central result from open economy macroeconomics: Capital mobility constrains monetary policy when the exchange rate is fixed and fiscal policy when the exchange rate is flexible. Similarly, examinations of the electoral determinants of monetary and fiscal policy typically ignore international pressures altogether. We develop a formal model to analyze the interaction between fiscal and monetary policymakers under various exchange rate regimes and the degrees of central bank independence. We test the model using data from OECD countries. We find evidence that preelectoral monetary expansions occur only when the exchange rate is flexible and central bank independence is low; preelectoral fiscal expansions occur when the exchange rate is fixed. We then explore the implications of our model for arguments that emphasize the partisan sources of macroeconomic policy and for the conduct of fiscal policy after economic and monetary union in Europe.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergBasinger, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Basinger, Scott}, title = {Globalization and Tax Reform: An Updated Case for the Importance of Veto Players}, series = {Politische Vierteljahreszeitschrift}, volume = {40}, journal = {Politische Vierteljahreszeitschrift}, number = {4}, issn = {2364-9976}, pages = {618 -- 627}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergBasinger, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Basinger, Scott}, title = {Internationalization and Changes in Tax Policy in OECD Countries}, series = {Comparative Political Studies}, volume = {31}, journal = {Comparative Political Studies}, number = {3}, issn = {1552-3829}, doi = {10.1177/0010414098031003003}, pages = {321 -- 353}, abstract = {This article examines the role that economic and political factors played in tax reform in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries from 1986 to 1990. Some writers argue that economic integration forced states to reform their tax systems. The authors' findings indicate that economic openness had an indirect effect on the level of change in marginal tax rates. The institutional structure of a country was most important—countries that had only one veto player or only one institution or party whose approval was necessary for a bill to become law enacted more sweeping reform than states that had more than one veto player. These results suggest that even when international or domestic economic factors might dictate a change in policy, reform will not be as sweeping in countries in which agreement among several institutions and/or parties is necessary.}, language = {en} } @article{Hallerberg, author = {Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Tax Competition in Wilhelmine Germany and Its Implications for the European Union}, series = {World Politics}, volume = {48}, journal = {World Politics}, number = {3}, issn = {0043-8871}, pages = {324 -- 357}, abstract = {The twenty-five German states from 1871 to 1914 present a useful data set for examining how increasing economic integration affects tax policy. After German unification the national government collapsed six currencies into one and liberalized preexisting restrictions on capital and labor mobility. In contrast, the empire did not directly interfere in the making of state tax policy; while states transferred certain indirect taxes to the central government, they maintained their own autonomous tax and political systems through World War I. This paper examines the extent to which tax competition forced the individual state tax systems to converge from 1871 to 1914. In spite of a diversity of political systems, tax competition did require states to harmonize their rates on mobile factors like capital and high income labor, but it did not affect tax rates on immobile factors. In states where the political system guaranteed agricultural dominance, taxes on land were reduced, while in states with more open systems, tax rates remained higher. One unexpected result is that tax rates on capital and income converged upward instead of downward. The most dominant state, Prussia, served as the lowest-common-denominator state, but pressure from the national government, especially to increase expenditures, forced all states to raise their tax rates. These results suggest possible ways for the European Union to avoid a forced downward convergence of member state tax rates on capital and mobile labor.}, language = {en} } @article{RedondadeSarraldeHallerbergetal., author = {Redonda, Agustin and de Sarralde, Santiago Diaz and Hallerberg, Mark and Johnson, Lise and Melamud, Ariel and Rozemberg, Ricardo and Schwab, Jakob and von Haldenwang, Christian}, title = {Tax Expenditure and the Treatment of Tax Incentives for Investment}, series = {Economics - The Open Access Open-Assessment E-Journal}, volume = {13}, journal = {Economics - The Open Access Open-Assessment E-Journal}, number = {2019-12}, doi = {10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2019-12}, abstract = {Governments use tax expenditures to boost investment, innovation and employment. However, these schemes are largely opaque, costly and often ineffective in reaching their stated goals. They also frequently trigger unwanted side effects. In order to improve the performance of these tools, we present three concrete policy proposals: First, governments should increase transparency on tax benefits. G20 members should take the lead on this with frequent and comprehensive tax expenditure reports. Second, G20 governments should improve the design of tax incentives with the aim of minimizing the generation of windfall profits and negative spillover effects within and across (in particular, on poorer) countries. Third, governments should phase out tax expenditures that are environmentally harmful, including tax incentives for fossil fuels and other schemes that promote an unsustainable use of natural resources.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergMarkgraf, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Markgraf, Jonas}, title = {The Corporate Governance of Public Banks before and after the Global Financial Crisis}, series = {Global Policy}, volume = {9}, journal = {Global Policy}, number = {Special Issue}, issn = {1758-5899}, doi = {10.1111/1758-5899.12562}, pages = {43 -- 53}, abstract = {During the 2008-09 financial crisis, many states were forced to nationalize faltering private banks. But also public banks ran into trouble and market actors continue to worry about their stability and crisis resilience. During the crisis, German public Landesbanken and Spanish public Cajas were hit hard. Yet, German public Sparkassen emerged strengthened from the crisis. This calls for a closer examination of the regulatory framework and corporate governance of public banks. We compare how corporate governance choices affected the financial crisis performance of public banks in three countries. Italy that had privatized its extensive public banking sector over the past decades; Spain that had problems with its savings banks during the crisis, which were eventually privatized or shut down; and Germany whose public savings banks navigated the financial crisis relatively well while its public Landesbanken got into serious trouble, and where calls for privatizing public banks resurface periodically. The paper considers the question whether Italy's banking crisis is partly rooted in the legacies of its formerly public banks and how the privatization of public banks in Spain and Italy can inform the debate in Germany and in other European Union countries with significant public banking sectors.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergWolff2008, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Wolff, Guntram B.}, title = {Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in EMU}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {136}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3-4}, pages = {379 -- 396}, year = {2008}, abstract = {We investigate the effect of fiscal institutions such as the strength of the finance minister in the budget process and deficits on interest rate spreads of Eurozone countries. Deficits significantly increase risk premia measured by relative swap spreads. The effect of deficits is significantly lower under EMU. This effect partly results from neglecting the role of fiscal institutions. After controlling for institutional changes, fiscal policy remains a significant determinant of risk premia in EMU. Better institutions are connected with lower risk premia. Furthermore deficits matter less for risk premia in countries with better institutions. Markets acknowledge that better institutions reduce fiscal difficulties rendering the monitoring of annual developments less important.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergYlaeoutinen2010, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Yl{\"a}outinen, Sami}, title = {Political Power, Fiscal Institutions and Budgetary Outcomes in Central and Eastern Europe}, series = {Journal of Public Policy}, volume = {30}, journal = {Journal of Public Policy}, number = {1}, issn = {0143-814X}, doi = {10.1017/S0143814X09990213}, pages = {45 -- 62}, year = {2010}, abstract = {This paper considers the effects of fiscal governance in Central and East European countries 1998-2008. The first part makes predictions about which form of fiscal governance fits which form of government. Under multi-party coalition governments, fiscal contracts where governments make political commitments to multi-annual fiscal plans work well. In countries where two political blocks face off against one another, delegation based around a strong finance ministry should be most effective. The second part examines electoral and party systems, which affect the form of government in place. The third part documents norms, rules, and institutions in place. The final section considers the joint effects of fiscal governance on fiscal outcomes. On balance, the underlying political climate is crucial for determining what types of fiscal norms, institutions, and rules function best. The more countries diverge from their expected form of fiscal governance, the greater the increase in a country's debt burden.}, language = {en} } @article{WehnerHallerberg, author = {Wehner, Joachim and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Regimes, Leaders, and Lockdowns: Who Responded More Quickly to the COVID-19 Pandemic?}, series = {The Journal of Politics}, journal = {The Journal of Politics}, issn = {0022-3816}, doi = {10.1086/739403}, abstract = {Do institutions or individuals shape policy in a crisis? We examine the timing of COVID-19 lockdowns in relation to regime type and leader characteristics. One view emphasizes institutional structure: were autocracies, with fewer constraints, quicker to lock down? Another highlights individual traits: did the speed of response depend on whether those in charge were doctors, scientists, women, or populists? Using a global dataset for 188 countries of political leaders and health ministers in office at the start of the pandemic, we find that democracies implemented lockdowns faster than autocracies. Individual traits of leaders mattered little, though countries with doctors heading health ministries were less likely to lock down—suggesting their presence may have helped hesitant leaders delay action. Our design addresses concerns about reciprocal causation and sample selection bias and proves robust to potential confounders. Political institutions, more than individual attributes, shaped the initial pandemic response}, language = {en} } @article{ArdanazHallerbergScartascini, author = {Ardanaz, Mart{\´i}n and Hallerberg, Mark and Scartascini, Carlos}, title = {Fiscal consolidations and electoral outcomes in emerging economies: Does the policy mix matter? Macro and micro level evidence from Latin America}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {Volume 64}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {September 2020, 101918}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101918}, abstract = {Do voters punish governments that introduce fiscal "austerity" measures? If so, does voter response vary according to the composition of fiscal adjustments? The empirical literature on the political economy of fiscal adjustments, which is mostly OECD-based, argues that consolidations do not have significant electoral consequences. In contrast, we find that voters punish fiscal consolidations at the polls in Latin America. To explain this result, we focus on the way fiscal adjustments episodes are implemented, both in terms of their design (taxes vs. spending) and timing. Such episodes rely fundamentally on increasing tax rates and bases of indirect taxes (such as the VAT) that hit broad segments of the population. Moreover, these policies are often implemented when politicians have no choice but to consolidate, that is, under severe economic circumstances. These macro results are corroborated with micro evidence from an original survey experiment that measures voter's fiscal policy preferences over the business cycle in seven countries across Latin America. The experimental evidence shows that respondents prefer expenditure cuts to tax increases during downturns, which is the opposite of the type of consolidations that countries typically pursue.}, language = {en} } @article{SalazarMoralesHallerberg, author = {Salazar-Morales, Diego A and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {The role of fiscal coordination and partisanship in the Spanish fiscal federalist system}, series = {Regional \& Federal Studies}, volume = {32}, journal = {Regional \& Federal Studies}, number = {5}, doi = {10.1080/13597566.2021.1915778}, pages = {617 -- 639}, abstract = {During the euro crisis, the sustainability of Spain's debt burden was called into question. By 2019, however, Spain had successfully navigated its own crisis and reduced its debt burden. What role did Spain's emerging fiscal federal system play in this recovery? We analyze the performance of Spain's fiscal federalist framework and how it affected the country's budgetary balance, with a special emphasis on its coordination and on political relationships within the autonomous regions. Contrary to what advocates of the benefits of fiscal coordination argue, we find that coordination does not prevent the erosion of fiscal discipline in regions. Our results show that politics, rather than fiscal rules and frameworks, play an important role and have led to differing fiscal performance. In regions where incumbents were re-elected, coordination is employed to ensure more positive budgetary balances. Conversely, in regions with changing incumbents, coordination serves as an indicator of future fiscal problems.}, language = {en} } @article{BaergHallerberg, author = {Baerg, Nicole and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Council Checks of the Commission under the European Semester: Does Member State Power and Euroscepticism Still Matter?}, series = {Journal of Common Market Studies}, volume = {60}, journal = {Journal of Common Market Studies}, number = {1}, doi = {10.1111/jcms.13268}, pages = {58 -- 80}, abstract = {The European Commission recommends evaluations of the economic plans of member states. The Council then provides final text. Previous research suggests that the Council selectively edits the Commission's recommendations. Both large member states and those with eurosceptic populations are likely to have the Council weaken what the Commission writes about them. We examine the determinants of the Council's editing of these texts after the introduction of the European Semester in the period 2011-18. We also account for different varieties of euroscepticism as the literature has become more differentiated. Using metrics of textual changes based on automated and hand-coding, we find little evidence of a systematic relationship between euroscepticism and textual editing. We do, however, find evidence that member state's voting power and euro status matters. Our findings suggest that eurosceptic no longer affects textual editing of such documents under the European Semester.}, language = {en} } @article{Hallerberg, author = {Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Der Markt als Umverteilungsinstrument und die Rolle des Staates}, series = {Zur Kritik des liberalen Skripts: Innere Spannungen, gebrochene Versprechen und die Notwendigkeit der Selbsttransformation (Leviathan Sonderband)}, volume = {Sonderband 42}, journal = {Zur Kritik des liberalen Skripts: Innere Spannungen, gebrochene Versprechen und die Notwendigkeit der Selbsttransformation (Leviathan Sonderband)}, editor = {Z{\"u}rn, Michael}, publisher = {Nomos}, address = {Baden-Baden}, isbn = {ISBN 978-3-7560-1829-1}, pages = {216 -- 239}, language = {de} } @article{WehnerHallerberg, author = {Wehner, Joachim and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Regimes, Leaders, and Lockdowns: Who Responded More Quickly to the COVID-19 Pandemic?}, doi = {10.31235/osf.io/9pazw}, pages = {73}, abstract = {Explanations of the speed of policy responses to COVID-19 highlight two sets of arguments. One focuses on regime type. Did autocracies, with fewer institutional constraints and high coercive power, lock down more quickly than democracies? The second concerns the "type" of health policymaker. Did governments led by doctors or natural scientists respond more quickly, and did men and populists delay lockdown? We examine these relationships with a global dataset of political regimes and relevant traits of 188 political leaders and health ministers in office at the start of the pandemic. Our setup addresses concerns about reciprocal causation and sample selection bias and proves robust to potential confounders. We find autocracies locked down more slowly than democracies, while leader traits appear not to matter. However, medical doctors in the health portfolio are associated with lower likelihood of lockdown, suggesting they may have provided cover for leaders hesitant to do so.}, language = {en} }