@article{Henke, author = {Henke, Marina}, title = {Buying Allies: Payment Practices in Multilateral Military Coalition-Building}, series = {International Security}, volume = {43}, journal = {International Security}, number = {4}, doi = {10.1162/ISEC_a_00345}, pages = {128 -- 162}, abstract = {Many countries serving in multilateral military coalitions are "paid" to do so, either in cash or in concessions relating to other international issues. This article examines whether these payment practices follow a systematic pattern. It suggests that 'pivotal states' provide the means to cover such payments. These states reason that rewarding third parties to serve in multilateral coalitions holds important political benefits. Moreover, two distinct types of payment schemes exist: deployment subsidies and political side-deals. Three types of states are most likely to receive such payments: (1) states that are inadequately resourced to deploy; (2) states that are perceived by the pivotal states as critical contributors to the coalition endeavor; and (3) opportunistic states that perceive a coalition deployment as an opportunity to negotiate a quid pro quo. Using hundreds of declassified archival sources as well as elite interviews, the article illustrates these practices with historical examples from the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the U.S. intervention in Iraq, the NATO intervention in Afghanistan, the UN-AU mission in Darfur, and the AU mission in Somalia. The theory and evidence presented in this article generate new insights into how security cooperation comes about, and how burden-sharing works in practice. Moreover, it raises important questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of such payment schemes in multilateral military deployments.}, language = {en} } @book{Henke, author = {Henke, Marina}, title = {Constructing Allied Cooperation: ​​Diplomacy, Payments and Power in Multilateral Military Coalitions}, publisher = {Cornell University Press}, address = {Ithaca, New York}, isbn = {9781501739699}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {258}, abstract = {This book examines how diplomatic networks allow states to organize collective action. It thereby focuses on one of the areas of international cooperation where such collective action is the most difficult to achieve: multilateral military coalitions. The book argues that such coalitions seldom emerge naturally due to common interests, norms, values, or alliance commitments. Rather, coalitions are purposefully constructed by pivotal states. These states instrumentalize bilateral and multilateral networks, or what I term diplomatic embeddedness, to bargain fellow states into a specific coalition. Via these networks, pivotal states have access to private information on deployment preferences of potential coalition participants. Moreover, these connections facilitate issue-linkages and side-payments. Finally, pivotal states can use common institutional contacts (i.e., IO officials) as cooperation brokers and convert common institutional venues into coalition negotiation fora. The theory and evidence presented in this book generate new insights on how states cooperate in international affairs and the importance of diplomacy and diplomatic ties therein.}, language = {de} } @article{Henke, author = {Henke, Marina}, title = {Networked Cooperation: How the European Union Mobilizes Peacekeeping Forces to Project Power Abroad}, series = {Security Studies}, volume = {28}, journal = {Security Studies}, number = {5}, issn = {1556-1852}, doi = {10.1080/09636412.2019.1662480}, pages = {901 -- 934}, abstract = {How does the European Union (EU) recruit troops and police to serve in EU peacekeeping missions? This article suggests that pivotal EU member states and EU officials make strategic use of the social and institutional networks within which they are embedded to bargain reluctant states into providing these forces. These networks offer information on deployment preferences, facilitate side-payments and issue-linkages, and provide for credible commitments. EU operations are consequently not necessarily dependent on intra-EU preference convergence—as is often suggested in the existing literature. Rather, EU force recruitment hinges on highly proactive EU actors, which use social and institutional ties to negotiate fellow states into serving in an EU missions.}, language = {en} } @article{Henke, author = {Henke, Marina}, title = {Tony Blair's Gamble: The Middle East Peace Process and British Participation in the Iraq Campaign in 2003}, series = {British Journal of Politics and International Relations}, volume = {20}, journal = {British Journal of Politics and International Relations}, doi = {10.1177/1369148118784708}, pages = {1 -- 17}, abstract = {Tony Blair tried throughout the preparatory phase of the US-led Iraq intervention in 2003 to influence US policy on the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). This article tries to understand how Blair fared in this endeavor. Using newly declassified documents, it examines the circumstances under which the US administration listened and engaged with British ideas regarding the MEPP and when and why it ignored British requests. The study shows that Blair was able to extract the greatest US concessions on the MEPP in moments when Great Britain's participation in the Iraq campaign was the most uncertain. The findings promote fresh thinking on how, when and why the UK can influence US decision-making.}, language = {en} } @article{HenkeMaher, author = {Henke, Marina and Maher, Richard}, title = {The populist challenge to European defense}, series = {Journal of European Public Policy}, volume = {28}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, number = {3}, doi = {10.1080/13501763.2021.1881587}, pages = {389 -- 406}, language = {en} } @article{Henke, author = {Henke, Marina}, title = {A tale of three French interventions: Intervention entrepreneurs and institutional intervention choices}, series = {Journal of Strategic Studies}, volume = {43}, journal = {Journal of Strategic Studies}, number = {4}, doi = {10.1080/01402390.2020.1733988}, pages = {583 -- 606}, abstract = {What factors explain the institutional shape of military interventions spearheaded by France? This article suggests that Intervention Entrepreneurs are the deciding agents. To secure the viability of their intervention proposal, they select an intervention venue based on pragmatic grounds. Most importantly, they carefully study possible domestic and international opposition to their intervention plans and conceive institutional intervention choices accordingly. The result is an ad hoc selection of intervention venues with little impact of political ideology, norms, organizational interests, or historical learning. Moreover, on many occasions, little attention is paid to the question: Which intervention format would most benefit the peace and prosperity in the conflict theatre in the medium to long term? The article illustrates this argument by tracing French institutional decision-making for interventions in Chad/CAR, Mali and Libya.}, language = {en} } @article{Henke, author = {Henke, Marina}, title = {F{\"u}r uns oder gegen uns? Zwingt Amerika Deutschland zu einer Entscheidung zwischen den USA und China?}, series = {Der Hauptstadtbrief}, journal = {Der Hauptstadtbrief}, language = {de} } @incollection{Henke, author = {Henke, Marina}, title = {Great Power Involvement in Peace Operations}, series = {The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Peace and Conflict Studies}, booktitle = {The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Peace and Conflict Studies}, editor = {Richmond, Oliver and G{\"e}zim, Visoka}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmilian UK}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-11795-5_55-1}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {1 -- 6}, language = {en} } @article{Henke, author = {Henke, Marina}, title = {The Rotten Carrot: Reexamining U.S.-Turkish Bargaining Failure over Iraq in 2003}, series = {Security Studies}, volume = {27}, journal = {Security Studies}, doi = {10.1080/09636412.2017.1360077}, abstract = {Side-payments are commonly used in international relations to alter the foreign policies of states. Despite their frequent usage, however, our understanding is very limited when it comes to why certain side-payment negotiations succeed while others fail. This article tries to remedy this shortcoming. It argues that social embeddedness between actors involved in the negotiations has a major bearing on bargaining outcomes. Under ideal circumstances, social relationships can be used to reduce information asymmetries and increase trust. Nevertheless, in the presence of fractured social networks, social ties can foster information bias and distrust thus ultimately increasing the likelihood of bargaining failure. This article uses U.S.-Turkish bargaining failure over the Iraq intervention in 2003 to illustrate and test this theory.}, language = {en} } @article{Henke, author = {Henke, Marina}, title = {The Politics of Diplomacy: How the United States builds Multilateral Military Coalitions}, series = {International Studies Quarterly}, volume = {61}, journal = {International Studies Quarterly}, doi = {10.1093/isq/sqx017}, pages = {1 -- 15}, abstract = {The conventional wisdom advances that formal alliance structures guide military coalition-building processes: allies band together because they share threat perceptions, political ideology, norms and values. This article suggests otherwise. It proposes that U.S.-led coalition-building is first and foremost a diplomatic process influenced by bilateral and multilateral institutions other than formal alliances. The breadth of institutions matters because it allows accessing information on the potential coalition partner's deployment preferences that are not only related to the security aspect of the operation but also its political, economic and other facets. In addition, diplomatic embeddedness offers linkage opportunities between military and non-military interests, which facilitates the construction of side-payments.}, language = {en} }