@article{Mejia, author = {Mej{\´i}a, Luis E.}, title = {Judicial review of regulatory decisions: Decoding the contents of appeals against agencies in Spain and the United Kingdom}, series = {Regulation \& Governance}, journal = {Regulation \& Governance}, publisher = {John Wiley \& Sons Australia, Ltd}, address = {Melbourne}, doi = {10.1111/rego.12302}, pages = {n/a -- n/a}, abstract = {Abstract Despite the important role that courts play to supervise the legality of regulatory agencies' actions, only few comparative studies analyze the contents of judicial appeals against regulatory decisions within European countries. This paper builds on the comparative administrative law scholarship and administrative capacities literature to analyze the content of 2,040 rulings against decisions issued by competition and telecommunications regulators in Spain and the United Kingdom. To understand the substance of the appeals, the study classifies cases according to the alleged administrative principles under breach and the regulatory capacities under challenge. Findings show a clear country-sector variation regarding the information contained in judicial disputes for both dimensions of analysis, which can be explained as a result of existing differences between the institutional settings of courts. These results offer a more in depth understanding of the political role of judicial oversight over regulatory agencies embedded in different institutional arrangements and policy sectors.}, subject = {-}, language = {en} } @article{Mejia, author = {Mej{\´i}a, Luis E.}, title = {Regulatory policy choice in post-reform contexts: The case of industrial safety regulation in Mexico's oil and gas industry}, series = {Regulation \& Governance}, journal = {Regulation \& Governance}, doi = {10.1111/rego.12548}, abstract = {How do the systemic features of a developing country shape regulatory policy choices? This paper examines the rationale behind the regulatory strategy adopted by Mexico's Safety, Energy, and Environment Agency (the ASEA), established after the country's 2013 energy reform to oversee the environmental and industrial safety of the entire national oil and gas sector. Building on the literature on high-hazard regulation and the necessary conditions for effective regulatory design, we examine 24 core regulatory-oversight instruments implemented by the agency in its initial years of operation. Our evidence suggests that the ASEA's regulatory strategy was shaped by the disparities in resources across different sectors of the country's oil and gas industry and the agency's limited capacity to oversee every stage of the industrial process systematically. These findings provide a greater understanding of the challenges faced by agencies seeking to oversee high-hazard industries in post-reform and developing contexts.}, language = {en} }