@article{WieseSchlechtBunkeetal., author = {Wiese, Frauke and Schlecht, Ingmar and Bunke, Wolf-Dieter and Gerbaulet, Clemens and Hirth, Lion and Jahn, Martin and Kunz, Friedrich and Lorenz, Casimir and M{\"u}hlenpfordt, Jonathan and Reimann, Juliane and Schill, Wolf-Peter}, title = {Open Power System Data - Frictionless data for electricity system modelling}, series = {Applied Energy}, volume = {236}, journal = {Applied Energy}, doi = {10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.11.097}, pages = {409}, abstract = {The quality of electricity system modelling heavily depends on the input data used. Although a lot of data is publicly available, it is often dispersed, tedious to process and partly contains errors. We argue that a central provision of input data for modelling has the character of a public good: it reduces overall societal costs for quantitative energy research as redundant work is avoided, and it improves transparency and reproducibility in electricity system modelling. This paper describes the Open Power System Data platform that aims at realising the efficiency and quality gains of centralised data provision by collecting, checking, processing, aggregating, documenting and publishing data required by most modellers. We conclude that the platform can provide substantial benefits to energy system analysis by raising efficiency of data pre-processing, providing a method for making data pre-processing for energy system modelling traceable, flexible and reproducible and improving the quality of original data published by data providers.}, language = {en} } @techreport{HirthSchlecht, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Hirth, Lion and Schlecht, Ingmar}, title = {Redispatch Markets in Zonal Electricity Markets: Inc-Dec Gaming as a Consequence of Inconsistent Power Market Design (not Market Power)}, series = {EconStor}, journal = {EconStor}, publisher = {ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics}, language = {en} } @techreport{EhrhartEickeHirthetal., type = {Working Paper}, author = {Ehrhart, Karl-Martin and Eicke, Anselm and Hirth, Lion and Ocker, Fabian and Ott, Marion and Schlecht, Ingmar and Wang, Runxi}, title = {Congestion Management Games in Electricity Markets}, publisher = {ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Europ{\"a}ische Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH}, address = {Mannheim}, doi = {10.2139/ssrn.4300874}, pages = {36}, abstract = {This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information about competitors' costs and a finite set of providers. We find that these extensions do not dissolve inc-dec gaming, which already occurs in our setup of two regions. We also benchmark market-based redispatch against grid investment, cost-based redispatch, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. The comparison highlights a significant inefficiency of market-based redispatch and inflated redispatch payments. Finally, we study seven variations of our basic model to assess whether different market fundamentals or market design changes mitigate inc-dec gaming. None of these variations eliminate inc-dec gaming entirely.}, language = {en} } @techreport{EhrhartEickeHirthetal., type = {Working Paper}, author = {Ehrhart, Karl-Martin and Eicke, Anselm and Hirth, Lion and Ocker, Fabian and Ott, Marion and Schlecht, Ingmar and Wang, Runxi}, title = {Analysis of a Capacity-Based Redispatch Mechanism}, publisher = {ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Europ{\"a}ische Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH}, address = {Mannheim}, doi = {10.2139/ssrn.4830366}, pages = {23}, abstract = {This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market design that prevents so-called "inc-dec gaming" when including flexible consumers with a market-based approach. We conduct a game-theoretical analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism. Our analysis reveals that despite its intention, the capacity-based redispatch is prone to undesirable behavior of market participants. The reason is that the availability payment incentivizes participants to change their energy consumption (generation) behavior. However, this also applies to undesired participants who increase the redispatch requirement through participation. Under certain assumptions, the additional redispatch potential equals the additional redispatch demand it creates. Consequently, the mechanism does not resolve network constraints, while causing costs for the compensation payments. Furthermore, we study three alternative implementation options, none of which resolves the underlying problem. It follows from our analysis that a mechanism can only be promising if it is capable to distinguish between the potential participants to exclude the undesirable ones.}, language = {en} } @article{SchlechtMaurerHirth, author = {Schlecht, Ingmar and Maurer, Christoph and Hirth, Lion}, title = {Financial contracts for differences: The problems with conventional CfDs in electricity markets and how forward contracts can help solve them}, series = {Energy Policy}, volume = {186}, journal = {Energy Policy}, doi = {10.1016/j.enpol.2024.113981}, abstract = {Contracts for differences are widely seen as a cornerstone of Europe's future electricity market design. This paper is about designing such contracts. We identify the dispatch and investment distortions that conventional CfDs cause, the patches used to overcome these shortcomings, and the problems these fixes introduce. We then propose an alternative contract we call "financial" CfD. This hybrid between conventional CfDs and forward contracts mitigates revenue risk to a substantial degree while providing undistorted incentives. Like conventional CfDs, it is long-term and tailored to technology-specific (wind, solar, nuclear) generation patterns but, like forwards, decouples payments from actual generation. The proposed contract mitigates volume risk and avoids margin calls by accepting physical assets as collateral.}, language = {en} } @article{WinzerRamirezMolinaHirthetal., author = {Winzer, Christian and Ram{\´i}rez-Molina, H{\´e}ctor and Hirth, Lion and Schlecht, Ingmar}, title = {Profile contracts for electricity retail customers}, series = {Energy Policy}, volume = {195}, journal = {Energy Policy}, publisher = {Elsevier BV}, issn = {0301-4215}, doi = {10.1016/j.enpol.2024.114358}, abstract = {Decarbonization involves a large-scale expansion of low-carbon generators such as wind and solar and the electrification of heating and transport. Both space heating and battery-electric cars have significant embedded flexibility potential. Granular price signals that convey abundance or scarcity of electricity are a precondition for customers or aggregators acting on their behalf to exploit this flexibility. However, unmitigated real-time prices expose customers to electricity price risks. To tackle the dual need of providing flexibility incentives while protecting customers from cost shocks, real-time tariffs with a hedging component can be a solution. In such contracts customers pre-agree an amount of energy and a consumption profile, while hourly deviations are charged at spot prices. In this paper we analyze design options by using a dataset of anonymized smart meter data and show that profile tariffs can bring electricity bill volatility to similarly low levels as fixed tariffs while providing full flexibility incentives from spot prices.}, language = {en} } @article{EhrhartEickeHirthetal., author = {Ehrhart, Karl-Martin and Eicke, Anselm and Hirth, Lion and Ocker, Fabian and Ott, Marion and Schlecht, Ingmar and Wang, Runxi}, title = {Analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism}, series = {Energy Economics}, volume = {149}, journal = {Energy Economics}, publisher = {Elsevier BV}, doi = {10.1016/j.eneco.2025.108751}, abstract = {This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market design that prevents so-called "inc-dec gaming" when including flexible consumers with a market-based approach. We conduct a game-theoretical analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism. Our analysis reveals that despite its intention, the capacity-based redispatch is prone to undesirable behavior of market participants. The reason is that the availability payment incentivizes participants to change their energy consumption or generation behavior. However, this also applies to undesired participants who increase the redispatch requirement through participation. Under certain assumptions, the additional redispatch potential equals the additional redispatch requirement it creates. Consequently, the mechanism does not resolve network constraints, while causing costs for the compensation payments. Furthermore, we study three alternative implementation options, none of which resolves the underlying problem. It follows from our analysis that a mechanism can only be promising if it is capable to distinguish between the potential participants to exclude the undesired ones.}, language = {en} } @article{EhrhartEickeHirthetal., author = {Ehrhart, Karl-Martin and Eicke, Anselm and Hirth, Lion and Ocker, Fabian and Ott, Marion and Schlecht, Ingmar and Wang, Runxi}, title = {Congestion Management Games in Electricity Markets}, series = {The Energy Journal}, volume = {47}, journal = {The Energy Journal}, number = {1}, doi = {10.1177/01956574251365606}, pages = {77 -- 108}, abstract = {This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information about competitors' costs and a finite set of providers. We find that these extensions do not dissolve inc-dec gaming, which already occurs in our setup of two regions. We also benchmark market-based redispatch against grid investment, cost-based redispatch, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. The comparison highlights a significant inefficiency of market-based redispatch and inflated redispatch payments. Finally, we study seven variations of our basic model to assess whether different market fundamentals or market design changes mitigate inc-dec gaming. None of these variations eliminate inc-dec gaming entirely.}, language = {en} }