@incollection{BachJuglKoehleretal., author = {Bach, Tobias and Jugl, Marlene and K{\"o}hler, Dustin and Wegrich, Kai}, title = {Reputational threats and democratic responsiveness of regulatory agencies}, series = {The Accountability of Expertise}, booktitle = {The Accountability of Expertise}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London, New York}, isbn = {9781003175490}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {81 -- 98}, abstract = {This chapter studies decision-making behaviour of independent regulatory agencies. Theoretical accounts of delegation to regulatory agencies emphasise that losses of political accountability of regulators are traded off against potential gains in regulatory efficiency. The theory of credible commitment suggests that independent (non-majoritarian) regulatory agencies are more effective in regulating markets than organisations under direct political control. However, independent regulatory agencies operate in a political context and need to demonstrate their benefit to a diverse set of stakeholders, including elected politicians. We are hence confronted with a 'paradox of autonomisation' according to which more autonomous public organisations have to take into consideration external demands to a greater degree than less autonomous organisations. Independent regulatory agencies will thus be subjected to high …}, language = {en} } @article{BachJuglKoehleretal., author = {Bach, Tobias and Jugl, Marlene and K{\"o}hler, Dustin and Wegrich, Kai}, title = {Regulatory agencies, reputational threats, and communicative responses}, series = {Regulation \& Governance}, journal = {Regulation \& Governance}, doi = {10.1111/rego.12421}, pages = {1 -- 16}, abstract = {A key claim in bureaucratic reputation literature is that reputation has several dimensions. This presents agencies with a difficult choice concerning which dimension(s) they should emphasize in the management of their reputation. This paper analyzes how regulatory agencies manage their reputation through communicative responses to public judgments, based on a singlecase study of the German financial regulator BaFin. Our theoretical argument underscores the importance of different reputational dimensions for regulatory agencies that simultaneously considers their distinct reputation reserves. Our main finding was that BaFin prioritizes responses to public judgments targeting reputational dimensions that are central to its mission and for which the agency has a weak reputation, as opposed to judgments targeting dimensions that are central to its mission and for which it has a strong reputation, or judgments targeting peripheral dimensions. The paper demonstrates the importance of agency missions for reputation management and suggests directions for further research.}, language = {en} }