@techreport{EhrhartEickeHirthetal., type = {Working Paper}, author = {Ehrhart, Karl-Martin and Eicke, Anselm and Hirth, Lion and Ocker, Fabian and Ott, Marion and Schlecht, Ingmar and Wang, Runxi}, title = {Analysis of a Capacity-Based Redispatch Mechanism}, publisher = {ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Europ{\"a}ische Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH}, address = {Mannheim}, doi = {10.2139/ssrn.4830366}, pages = {23}, abstract = {This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market design that prevents so-called "inc-dec gaming" when including flexible consumers with a market-based approach. We conduct a game-theoretical analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism. Our analysis reveals that despite its intention, the capacity-based redispatch is prone to undesirable behavior of market participants. The reason is that the availability payment incentivizes participants to change their energy consumption (generation) behavior. However, this also applies to undesired participants who increase the redispatch requirement through participation. Under certain assumptions, the additional redispatch potential equals the additional redispatch demand it creates. Consequently, the mechanism does not resolve network constraints, while causing costs for the compensation payments. Furthermore, we study three alternative implementation options, none of which resolves the underlying problem. It follows from our analysis that a mechanism can only be promising if it is capable to distinguish between the potential participants to exclude the undesirable ones.}, language = {en} } @article{SchlechtMaurerHirth, author = {Schlecht, Ingmar and Maurer, Christoph and Hirth, Lion}, title = {Financial contracts for differences: The problems with conventional CfDs in electricity markets and how forward contracts can help solve them}, series = {Energy Policy}, volume = {186}, journal = {Energy Policy}, doi = {10.1016/j.enpol.2024.113981}, abstract = {Contracts for differences are widely seen as a cornerstone of Europe's future electricity market design. This paper is about designing such contracts. We identify the dispatch and investment distortions that conventional CfDs cause, the patches used to overcome these shortcomings, and the problems these fixes introduce. We then propose an alternative contract we call "financial" CfD. This hybrid between conventional CfDs and forward contracts mitigates revenue risk to a substantial degree while providing undistorted incentives. Like conventional CfDs, it is long-term and tailored to technology-specific (wind, solar, nuclear) generation patterns but, like forwards, decouples payments from actual generation. The proposed contract mitigates volume risk and avoids margin calls by accepting physical assets as collateral.}, language = {en} } @article{WinzerRamirezMolinaHirthetal., author = {Winzer, Christian and Ram{\´i}rez-Molina, H{\´e}ctor and Hirth, Lion and Schlecht, Ingmar}, title = {Profile contracts for electricity retail customers}, series = {Energy Policy}, volume = {195}, journal = {Energy Policy}, publisher = {Elsevier BV}, issn = {0301-4215}, doi = {10.1016/j.enpol.2024.114358}, abstract = {Decarbonization involves a large-scale expansion of low-carbon generators such as wind and solar and the electrification of heating and transport. Both space heating and battery-electric cars have significant embedded flexibility potential. Granular price signals that convey abundance or scarcity of electricity are a precondition for customers or aggregators acting on their behalf to exploit this flexibility. However, unmitigated real-time prices expose customers to electricity price risks. To tackle the dual need of providing flexibility incentives while protecting customers from cost shocks, real-time tariffs with a hedging component can be a solution. In such contracts customers pre-agree an amount of energy and a consumption profile, while hourly deviations are charged at spot prices. In this paper we analyze design options by using a dataset of anonymized smart meter data and show that profile tariffs can bring electricity bill volatility to similarly low levels as fixed tariffs while providing full flexibility incentives from spot prices.}, language = {en} }