@article{GleditschHugSchubigeretal., author = {Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede and Hug, Simon and Schubiger, Livia I. and Wucherpfennig, Julian}, title = {International Conventions and Non-State Actors: Selection, Signaling and Reputation Effects}, series = {Journal of Conflict Resolution}, volume = {62}, journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution}, number = {2}, issn = {0022-0027}, doi = {10.1177/0022002716650924}, pages = {346 -- 380}, abstract = {Whether international humanitarian norms are respected during and after civil conflict depends on the behavior of both governments and nonstate actors (NSAs). However, international conventions on the protection of civilians generally do not address NSAs, as such conventions are open only to the representatives of states. In a pioneering initiative, the nongovernmental organization Geneva Call has started to address this problem by soliciting NSAs to sign "deeds of commitment" to ban particular activities violating humanitarian norms. Focusing on the case of antipersonnel mines, we examine why NSAs would choose to sign conventions that limit their autonomy, and whether such conventions can change the behavior of governments and nonstate armed groups. We propose a game-theoretic model of how the interaction between governments and NSAs shape their incentives to commit to and comply with international humanitarian norms. Our empirical evidence highlights the importance of these interdependencies between governments and NSAs in the realm of humanitarian engagements.}, language = {en} } @article{BormannCedermanGatesetal., author = {Bormann, Nils-Christian and Cederman, Lars-Erik and Gates, Scott and Graham, Benjamin A.T. and Hug, Simon and Strom, Kaare and Wucherpfennig, Julian}, title = {Power Sharing: Institutions, Behavior, and Peace}, series = {American Journal of Political Science}, volume = {63}, journal = {American Journal of Political Science}, number = {1}, doi = {10.1111/ajps.12407}, pages = {84 -- 100}, language = {en} } @book{CedermanHugWucherpfennig, author = {Cederman, Lars-Erik and Hug, Simon and Wucherpfennig, Julian}, title = {Sharing Power, Securing Peace? Ethnic Inclusion and Civil War.}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, address = {Cambridge}, isbn = {9781108418140}, publisher = {Hertie School}, language = {en} } @article{GleditschWucherpfennigHugetal., author = {Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede and Wucherpfennig, Julian and Hug, Simon and Garnes Reigstad, Karina}, title = {Polygyny or Misogyny? Reexamining the "First Law of Intergroup Conflict"}, series = {The Journal of Politics}, volume = {73}, journal = {The Journal of Politics}, number = {1}, issn = {0022-3816}, doi = {10.1017/S0022381610001003}, pages = {265 -- 270}, abstract = {Kanazawa (2009) proposes a "first law of intergroup conflict," suggesting that polygyny and its impact on access to reproductive women provides "the ultimate cause" for civil war. This controversial claim is supported by an empirical analysis at odds with most existing studies of civil wars. We reconsider the influence of polygyny in a more conventional statistical model. We fail to find evidence that ethnic groups with polygyny engage more frequently in civil wars, although it is possible to find results indicating that civil wars may be more common in states with legal polygamy. We detail how these findings seem at odds with Kanazawa's theory and argue that misogyny seems a more plausible source of insights into the context for civil war and peace. We then show that civil wars are less common when women's rights are better established and that legal polygamy has no discernable residual effect once women's rights are considered.}, language = {en} }