@article{FellnerSausgruberTraxler, author = {Fellner, Gerlinde and Sausgruber, Rupert and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information}, series = {Journal of the European Economic Association}, volume = {11}, journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association}, number = {3}, doi = {10.1111/jeea.12013|}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-19704}, pages = {634 -- 660}, abstract = {We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailings, a threat treatment which makes a high detection risk salient has a significant deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others' behavior enhances compliance on aggregate. However, the information condition has a weak positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common.}, language = {en} } @article{TraxlerBergerFellnerRoehlingetal., author = {Traxler, Christian and Berger, Melissa and Fellner-R{\"o}hling, Gerlinde and Sausgruber, Rupert}, title = {Higher Taxes, more Evasion? Evidence from Border Differentials in TV License Fees}, series = {Journal of Public Economics}, volume = {135}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, publisher = {Elsevier B.V.}, issn = {0047-2727}, doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.01.007}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21571}, pages = {74 -- 86}, abstract = {This paper studies the evasion of TV license fees in Austria. We exploit border differentials to identify the effect of fees on evasion. Comparing municipalities at the low- and high-fee side of state borders reveals that higher fees trigger significantly more evasion. Our preferred estimator indicates that a one percent increase in fees raises the evasion rate by 0.3 percentage points. The positive effect of fees on evasion is confirmed in different parametric and non-parametric approaches and survives several robustness checks.}, language = {en} }