@article{AlbrechtKubeTraxler, author = {Albrecht, Felix and Kube, Sebastian and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Cooperation and norm enforcement - The individual-level perspective}, series = {Journal of Public Economics}, volume = {165}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.06.010}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-25853}, pages = {1 -- 16}, abstract = {We explore the relationship between individuals' disposition to cooperate and their inclination to engage in peer punishment as well as their relative importance for mitigating social dilemmas. Using a modified strategy-method approach we identify individual punishment patterns and link them with individual cooperation patterns. Classifying N = 628 subjects along these two dimensions documents that cooperation and punishment patterns are aligned for most individuals. However, the data also reveal a sizable share of free-riders that punish pro-socially and conditional cooperators that do not engage in punishment. Analyzing the interplay between types in an additional experiment, we show that pro-social punishers are important for achieving cooperation. Incorporating information on punishment types explains large amounts of the between- and within-group variation in cooperation.}, language = {en} }