@article{DušekTraxler2022, author = {Dušek, Libor and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Learning from Law Enforcement}, series = {Journal of the European Economic Association}, volume = {2}, journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association}, edition = {20}, issn = {1542-4766}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvab037}, pages = {739 -- 777}, year = {2022}, abstract = {This paper studies how punishment affects future compliance behavior and isolates deterrence effects mediated by learning. Using administrative data from speed cameras that capture the full driving histories of more than a million cars over several years, we evaluate responses to punishment at the extensive (receiving a speeding ticket) and intensive margins (tickets with higher fines). Two complementary empirical strategies—a regression discontinuity design and an event study—coherently document strong responses to receiving a ticket: The speeding rate drops by a third and re-offense rates fall by 70\%. Higher fines produce a small but imprecisely estimated additional effect. All responses occur immediately and are persistent over time, with no backsliding toward speeding even two years after receiving a ticket. Our evidence rejects unlearning and temporary salience effects. Instead, it supports a learning model in which agents update their priors on the expected punishment in a coarse manner.}, language = {en} } @article{TraxlerDušekPardo, author = {Traxler, Christian and Dušek, Libor and Pardo, Nicolas}, title = {Salience and Timely Compliance: Evidence from Speeding Tickets}, series = {Journal of Policy Analysis and Management}, volume = {2}, journal = {Journal of Policy Analysis and Management}, edition = {41}, doi = {10.1002/pam.22387}, pages = {426 -- 449}, abstract = {This paper studies the enforcement of fines, and, in particular, the effects of simplification and salience nudges on timely payments. In a randomized controlled trial, we add cover letters to 80,000 payment notifications for speeding. The letters increase the salience of the payment deadline, the late penalty, or both. Emphasizing only the deadline is not effective. Stressing the late penalty significantly and persistently increases payment rates. The effect is largest if both parameters are made salient. The most effective treatment yields a net revenue gain that covers approximately 25 percent of the labor costs of the ticket administration personnel. A survey experiment documents how the salience nudges alter prior (mis)perceptions about the communicated parameters. The survey results rationalize the differential effects of the treatments and, together with the evidence from the RCT, offer a broader framework for explaining why certain nudges are effective in some contexts but fail in others.}, language = {en} } @techreport{DušekPardoTraxler, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Dušek, Libor and Pardo, Nicolas and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Salience, Incentives, and Timely Compliance: Evidence from Speeding Tickets}, series = {MPI Collective Goods Discussion Paper}, journal = {MPI Collective Goods Discussion Paper}, edition = {No. 2020/9}, pages = {50}, abstract = {This paper studies the enforcement of fines. We randomly assign 80,000 speeding tickets to treatments that increase the salience of the payment deadline, late penalties, or both. Stressing the penalties significantly and persistently increases payment rates. Emphasizing only the deadline is not effective. The findings from the RCT are consistent with a survey experiment which documents the treatments' impact on priors about parameters of the compliance problem. Exploiting discontinuous variation in fines, we then document a strong price responsiveness: a 1\% increase in the payment obligation induces a 0.23 percentage point decrease in timely compliance. This semi-elasticity suggests that the impact of the salience nudges is equivalent to the effect of a 4-9\% reduction in fines.}, language = {en} } @techreport{TraxlerDušek, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Traxler, Christian and Dušek, Libor}, title = {Fines, Non-Payment, and Revenues: Evidence from Speeding Tickets}, doi = {10.2139/ssrn.4281384}, pages = {29}, abstract = {We estimate the effect of the level of fines on payment compliance and revenues collected from speeding tickets. Exploiting discontinuous increases in fines at speed cutoffs, we implement a regression discontinuity design. The results document small payment responses: a 10 percent increase in the fine (i.e. the payment obligation) induces a 1 percentage point decline in timely payments. The implied revenue elasticity is about 0.9. Expressed in absolute terms, a one euro increase in the fine translates into a roughly 60 cent increase in payments collected.}, language = {en} } @techreport{TraxlerDušekPardo, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Traxler, Christian and Dušek, Libor and Pardo, Nicolas}, title = {Jak zlepšit v{\´y}běr pokut? Experiment se zjednodušen{\´i}m informac{\´i}}, number = {Studie 2/2023}, publisher = {Legal Data Hub}, pages = {13}, language = {mul} } @article{TraxlerDušek, author = {Traxler, Christian and Dušek, Libor}, title = {Fines, nonpayment, and revenues: evidence from speeding tickets}, series = {The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization}, journal = {The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization}, doi = {10.1093/jleo/ewad025}, abstract = {We estimate the effect of the level of fines on payment compliance and revenues collected from speeding tickets. Exploiting discontinuous increases in fines at speed cutoffs and reform-induced variation in these discontinuities, we implement two complementary regression discontinuity designs. The results consistently document small payment responses: a 10\% increase in the fine (i.e., the payment obligation) induces a 1.2 percentage point decline in timely payments. The implied revenue elasticity is about 0.9. Expressed in absolute terms, a one-dollar increase in the fine translates into a roughly 60-cent increase in payments collected within 15 days (JEL H27, H26, K42).}, language = {en} } @techreport{TraxlerDušek, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Traxler, Christian and Dušek, Libor}, title = {Fines, Non-Payment, and Revenues: Evidence from Speeding Tickets}, series = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, journal = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, edition = {No. 23}, doi = {10.48462/opus4-5046}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-50461}, pages = {38}, abstract = {We estimate the effect of the level of fines on payment compliance and revenues collected from speeding tickets. Exploiting discontinuous increases in fines at speed cutoffs and reform induced variation in these discontinuities, we implement two complementary regression discontinuity designs. The results consistently document small payment responses: a 10\% increase in the fine (i.e. the payment obligation) induces a 1.2 percentage point decline in timely payments. The implied revenue elasticity is about 0.9. Expressed in absolute terms, a one dollar increase in the fine translates into a roughly 60 cent increase in payments collected within 15 days.}, language = {en} } @techreport{DušekTraxler, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Dušek, Libor and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Swiftness and Delay of Punishment}, series = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, journal = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, edition = {No. 32}, doi = {10.48462/opus4-5239}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-52391}, pages = {61}, abstract = {This paper studies how the swiftness and delay of punishment affect behavior. Using rich administrative data from automated speed cameras, we exploit two (quasi-)experimental sources of variation in the time between a speeding offense and the sending of a ticket. At the launch of the speed camera system, administrative challenges caused delays of up to three months. Later, we implemented a protocol that randomly assigned tickets to swift or delayed processing. We identify two different results. First, delays have a negative effect on payment compliance: the rate of timely paid fines diminishes by 7 to 9\% when a ticket is sent with a delay of four or more weeks. We also find some evidence that very swift tickets - sent on the first or second day following the offense - increase timely payments. These results align with the predictions of expert scholars that we elicited in a survey. Second, speeding tickets cause a strong, immediate, and persistent decline in speeding. However, we do not detect any robust, differential effects of swiftness or delay on speeding. This challenges widely held beliefs, as reflected in our survey. Yet, we document large mechanical benefits of swift punishment and provide a theoretical framework of learning and updating that explains our findings.}, language = {en} }