@techreport{Dawson, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Dawson, Mark}, title = {New Governance in the EU after the Euro Crisis: Retired or Re-born?}, series = {EUI Working Papers AEL 2015/01}, journal = {EUI Working Papers AEL 2015/01}, publisher = {Academy of European Law / European University Institute}, issn = {ISSN 1831-4066}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-23350}, pages = {19}, abstract = {This working paper discusses the future of the EU's 'new governance' paradigm, as a particular category of the EU's legal acts in light of developments in EU economic governance following the Euro crisis. [...]}, language = {en} } @article{DawsonAugenstein, author = {Dawson, Mark and Augenstein, Daniel}, title = {After Brexit: Time for a Further De-coupling of National and European Citizenship?}, series = {Verfassungsblog}, journal = {Verfassungsblog}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.17176/20160714-114950}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-20999}, language = {en} } @article{DawsonBobić, author = {Dawson, Mark and Bobić, Ana}, title = {Quantitative easing at the Court of Justice - Doing whatever it takes to save the euro: Weiss and Others}, series = {Common Market Law Review}, volume = {56}, journal = {Common Market Law Review}, number = {4}, issn = {0165-0750}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-30368}, pages = {1005 -- 1040}, language = {en} } @incollection{Dawson, author = {Dawson, Mark}, title = {How Can EU Law Contain Economic Discretion?}, series = {EU Executive Discretion and the Limits of Law}, booktitle = {EU Executive Discretion and the Limits of Law}, editor = {Mendes, Joana}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, isbn = {9780198826668}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-29889}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {64 -- 84}, language = {en} } @article{DawsonMuir2013, author = {Dawson, Mark and Muir, Elise}, title = {Hungary and the Indirect Protection of EU Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law}, series = {German Law Journal}, volume = {14}, journal = {German Law Journal}, number = {10}, issn = {2071-8322}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-2971}, pages = {1959 -- 1979}, year = {2013}, language = {en} } @article{Dawson, author = {Dawson, Mark}, title = {Re-generating Europe through Human Rights? Proceduralism in European Human Rights Law}, series = {German Law Journal}, volume = {14}, journal = {German Law Journal}, number = {5}, issn = {2071-8322}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-5169}, pages = {651 -- 672}, language = {en} } @article{BobićDawson, author = {Bobić, Ana and Dawson, Mark}, title = {Making sense of the "incomprehensible": The PSPP Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court}, series = {Common Market Law Review}, volume = {57}, journal = {Common Market Law Review}, number = {6}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-36925}, pages = {1953 -- 1998}, language = {en} } @article{DawsonMaricutAkbik, author = {Dawson, Mark and Maricut-Akbik, Adina}, title = {Accountability in the EU's para-regulatory state: The case of the Economic and Monetary Union}, series = {Regulation \& Governance}, journal = {Regulation \& Governance}, doi = {10.1111/rego.12442}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-42704}, pages = {1 -- 16}, abstract = {This article revisits Majone's famous argument about accountability in the regulatory state in reference to the European Union's (EU) Economic and Monetary Union. We show that the EU has entered the stage of a "para-regulatory state" marked by increasing EU regulation in areas linked to core state powers. Despite the redistributive and politicized nature of these policy areas, the EU's "para-regulatory state" has continued to rely on its regulatory model of accountability, focused on decisionmaking processes, and interest mediation. In line with Majone, we describe the model as procedural and contrast it to substantive accountability - which is necessary when regulation has clear redistributive implications. Using two case studies from fiscal policy and monetary affairs, we illustrate the predominance of procedural accountability as exercised by the European Parliament and EU Courts. We complement the empirical analysis with a normative discussion of how substantive accountability could potentially be rendered in both fields.}, language = {en} }