@article{KoopReh, author = {Koop, Christel and Reh, Christine}, title = {Europe's Bank and Europe's Citizens: Accountability, transparency - legitimacy?}, series = {Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law}, volume = {26}, journal = {Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law}, number = {1}, doi = {10.1177/1023263X19827906}, pages = {63 -- 80}, abstract = {Since the Eurozone crisis, critique of the European Central Bank (ECB) has centred on the Bank's lack of acceptance by Europe's citizens. One prominent strand of the debate argues that such acceptance can be enhanced by ensuring higher levels of compliance with the democratic standards of accountability and transparency. This article critically assesses this 'standards-support nexus' and its underlying assumptions. We suggest that three conditions need to be fulfilled for the argument to hold: (i) citizens are aware of the ECB and its design; (ii) citizens prioritise democratic standards over alternative motivations for acceptance; and (iii) citizens are able to differentiate between the ECB and the European Union's wider multilevel system. Drawing from the established literature on support for European integration and trust in the ECB and from descriptive Eurobarometer data, we conclude that these three conditions are unlikely to bear out empirically. Moreover, increasing the ECB's accountability and transparency in times of crisis and heightened politicisation could adversely affect the Bank's policy-performance and public image. Hence, whilst not questioning the normative desirability of accountability and transparency, we caution against assuming too easily that such democratic standards alone will enhance citizen support, and against assuming that they come without trade-offs.}, language = {en} } @article{BronieckiObholzerReh, author = {Broniecki, Philipp and Obholzer, Lukas and Reh, Christine}, title = {Legislation Against the Odds: Overcoming Ideological Gridlock in EU Decision-Making}, series = {Legislative Studies Quarterly}, journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly}, doi = {10.1111/lsq.70020}, abstract = {Negotiations in bicameral settings face the risk of gridlock when veto players' preferences diverge on the ideological (left-right) dimension. In the European Union (EU), a high proportion of legislation appears gridlocked yet is nevertheless adopted. We argue that ideological gridlock is resolved through the supply of and trust in legislative concessions. These are made to uphold supranational cooperation, to use issue linkage, and under "permissive consensus" across EU member states. We test our argument using a new dataset on amendments and repeals of existing EU laws (1999-2015). Our results demonstrate that elites' preferences on supranational cooperation as well as the potential for issue linkage help explain legislative success despite gridlock. High public Euroskepticism decreases the likelihood of compromise because lawmakers fear domestic electoral backlash to EU-level concessions. We contribute to established debates about legislative bargaining under complexity and propose that politicized cooperation can diminish problem-solving capacity across federations, multi-level states, and international organizations.}, language = {en} } @article{BressanelliKoopReh, author = {Bressanelli, Edoardo and Koop, Christel and Reh, Christine}, title = {The impact of informalisation: Early agreements and voting cohesion in the European Parliament}, series = {European Union Politics}, volume = {17}, journal = {European Union Politics}, number = {1}, issn = {1465-1165}, doi = {10.1177/1465116515608704}, pages = {91 -- 113}, abstract = {European Union legislative decision-making is increasingly shifted into informal secluded arenas. Scholars have explained this trend and analysed its consequences for bargaining success and democratic legitimacy. Yet, we know little about how informalisation affects legislative behaviour in the European Parliament. This article contributes to closing the gap, by theorising and analysing the impact of 'early agreements' on cohesion. Given the reputational, political and transaction costs of failing an early agreement in plenary, we expect political groups to invest heavily in discipline and consensus, and legislators to comply in votes. Using a new dataset, combining Hix et al.'s (2007) roll-call data with original codecision data (1999-2011), we show that informalisation increases cohesion but only for centrist parties. Rapporteurships and votes on 'costly' legislative resolutions also matter, but do not mediate the effect of early agreement.}, language = {en} } @article{RehBressanelliKoop, author = {Reh, Christine and Bressanelli, Edoardo and Koop, Christel}, title = {Responsive withdrawal? The politics of EU agenda-setting}, series = {Journal of European Public Policy}, volume = {27}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, number = {3}, doi = {10.1080/13501763.2020.1712453}, pages = {419 -- 438}, abstract = {This contribution asks whether and why the newly political environment of EU law-making impacts on the European Commission's choice (not) to announce the withdrawal of legislative proposals. We argue that the Commission uses 'responsive withdrawal' in response to bottom-up pressure, so as to signal self-restraint or policy-determination to different audiences. Bottom-up pressures are driven by (1) the national contestation of 'Europe'; (2) visible controversy about optimal (crisis) governance; and (3) the domestic salience of EU legislation. Our hypotheses are tested on a new dataset of all codecision files concluded, withdrawn, rejected or ongoing between 2006 and 2018. We show that the Commission reacts to bottom-up pressure by either politicising or depoliticising the EU's legislative agenda: 'withdrawal announcements' are more likely when Euroscepticism is high and when legislation touches core state powers, but less likely when legislation is domestically salient. We also demonstrate the continued importance of cyclical and technical reasons. Our analysis complements extant explanations of withdrawal as the upshot of functional factors or of uncertainty, and contributes to the nascent debate about whether, why and how supranational actors respond when the systems in which they operate - and the policies they produce - come under attack.}, language = {en} } @incollection{WallaceRehMinetto, author = {Wallace, Helen and Reh, Christine and Minetto, Francesca}, title = {An Institutional Anatomy and Five Policy Modes}, series = {Policy-Making in the European Union}, booktitle = {Policy-Making in the European Union}, editor = {Wallace, Helen and Pollack, Mark A. and Young, Alasdair R.}, edition = {9}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, isbn = {9780198912408}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {81 -- 118}, language = {en} }