@article{Reh, author = {Reh, Christine}, title = {The Convention on the Future of Europe and the development of integration theory: A lasting imprint?}, series = {Journal of European Public Policy}, volume = {15}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, number = {5}, issn = {0143-814}, doi = {10.1080/13501760802133351}, pages = {781 -- 794}, abstract = {The Convention on the Future of Europe not only attracted public and political attention, but quickly reached centre-stage in the academic debate about European integration. Six years after the Convention was set up, this article asks whether this flourishing field of research chiefly permits insights into an idiosyncratic institution, or whether the Convention served as a catalyst for more enduring developments in integration theory. Arguing in favour of the latter, the article demonstrates that EU scholars have used the Convention to refine our theoretical understanding in three areas: (1) domestic preference formation; (2) international negotiations; and (3) deliberative democracy and constitutional design. The reviewed literature follows a predominant trend in integration theory, namely to 'import' established approaches from comparative politics, international relations and democratic theory rather than to theorize the Union's nature and the process of supranational integration as a single case. In turn, some of the contributions discussed below generate conceptual, methodological and theoretical insights that could be 'exported' back into political science more generally.}, language = {en} } @article{Reh, author = {Reh, Christine}, title = {Pre-cooking the European Constitution? The Role of Government Representatives in EU Reform}, series = {Journal of European Public Policy}, volume = {14}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, number = {8}, issn = {0143-814}, doi = {10.1080/13501760701656411}, pages = {1186 -- 1207}, abstract = {This paper sheds light on an unexplored phase and a neglected actor in EU constitutional politics: the preparation of Treaty reform by the Group of Government Representatives. Striving to explain whether and under which conditions constitutional decisions in Europe were de facto taken by officials, the paper proceeds in three steps. First, possible functions of preparation in complex negotiations are conceptualized and two conditions for effective preparation are proposed: a preparatory body's issue and process resources as well as consensual pre-agreement. A second section introduces the role of government representatives in preparing EU reform, checks their collective resources against the criteria developed in section 1 and assesses their preparatory agency as strong. Third, I analyse the effectiveness of preparing for Amsterdam, using the negotiations on free movement and flexibility as plausibility probes. The analysis demonstrates that officials play a key role even in the bastion of high politics that is Treaty reform, where the final European Council is only the 'tip' of a long-term negotiation process.}, language = {en} } @incollection{NaurinReh, author = {Naurin, Daniel and Reh, Christine}, title = {Deliberative Negotiation}, series = {The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy}, booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy}, editor = {B{\"a}chtiger, Andre and Dryzek, John S. and Mansbridge, Jane and Warren, Mark}, publisher = {Oxford UP}, address = {Oxford}, isbn = {9780198747369}, doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198747369.001.0001}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {728 -- 741}, abstract = {Deliberative democracy has been the main game in contemporary political theory for two decades and has grown enormously in size and importance in political science and many other disciplines, and in political practice. The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy takes stock of deliberative democracy as a research field, as well as exploring and creating links with multiple disciplines and policy practice around the globe. It provides a concise history of deliberative ideals in political thought while also discussing their philosophical origins. It locates deliberation in a political system with different spaces, publics, and venues, including parliament and courts but also governance networks, protests, mini-publics, old and new media, and everyday talk. It documents the intersections of deliberative ideals with contemporary political theory, involving epistemology, representation, constitutionalism, justice, and multiculturalism. It explores the intersections of deliberative democracy with major research fields in the social sciences and law, including social and rational choice theory, communications, psychology, sociology, international relations, framing approaches, policy analysis, planning, democratization, and methodology. It engages with practical applications, mapping deliberation as a reform movement and as a device for conflict resolution. It documents the practice and study of deliberative democracy around the world, in Asia, Latin America, Africa, Europe, and global governance. And it provides reflections on the field by pioneering thinkers.}, language = {en} } @incollection{WallaceReh, author = {Wallace, Helen and Reh, Christine}, title = {An Institutional Anatomy and Five Policy Modes}, series = {Policy-making in the European Union}, booktitle = {Policy-making in the European Union}, editor = {Wallace, Helen and Pollack, Mark A. and Young, Alasdair R.}, publisher = {Oxford UP}, address = {Oxford}, isbn = {9780199689675}, doi = {10.1093/hepl/9780199689675.003.0004}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {72 -- 112}, abstract = {This chapter examines the European Union's institutional design and how its institutions interact with national institutions in five different policy modes. It first considers the evolving role and internal functioning of the European Commission, Council of the EU, European Council, European Parliament, and Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). It also discusses quasi-autonomous agencies, in particular the European Central Bank (ECB), institutionalized control and scrutiny, and non-state actors. It concludes with an analysis of five EU policy modes that capture the different patterns of interaction between EU and national institutions: the classical Community method, the regulatory mode, the distributional mode, the policy coordination mode, and intensive transgovernmentalism.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Reh, author = {Reh, Christine}, title = {Informal Politics: The Normative Challenge}, series = {International Handbook of Informal Governance}, booktitle = {International Handbook of Informal Governance}, editor = {Christiansen, Thomas and Neuhold, Christine}, publisher = {Edward Elgar}, address = {Cheltenham}, isbn = {9781848445611}, doi = {10.4337/9781781001219}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {65 -- 84}, language = {en} } @incollection{Reh, author = {Reh, Christine}, title = {Consensus, compromise and "inclusive agreement": Negotiating supranational governance}, series = {Arguing Global Governance: Agency, Lifeworld and Shared Reasoning}, booktitle = {Arguing Global Governance: Agency, Lifeworld and Shared Reasoning}, editor = {Bjola, Corneliu and Kornprobst, Markus}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {9781136906367}, doi = {10.4324/9780203842577}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {177 -- 194}, abstract = {Negotiated "policy-arrangements" and their institutionalization are at the heart of global governance. This chapter focuses on the European Union (EU) as one particular arena that produces binding decisions beyond the nation state. For scholars of global governance, the EU constitutes an interesting but idiosyncratic case: the EU's system of decision-making and enforcement is highly institutionalized; the EU covers a broad policy-remit, touching upon core areas of national sovereignty such as monetary policy or border control; and the EU is exceptionally intrusive and effective, producing binding laws that are widely complied with in its member states. At the same time, the nature of supranational governance - famously described as "less than a federation, more than a regime" (Wallace 1983) - remains open and undefined. For scholars of argumentation, deliberation and persuasion, the European Union is an equally fruitful object of study: the EU's deliberative decision-style is used to explain compliance with European law (Neyer 2004); the EU is conceptualized as an actor that projects "normative" rather than military power (Manners 2002) and the supranational decision-process serves as testing ground for theories of deliberation (Eriksen and Fossum 2000; Joerges and Neyer 1997a, 1997b), argumentation (Naurin 2010), problem-solving (Elgstr{\"o}m and J{\"o}nsson 2000), rhetorical action (Schimmelfennig 2001) and judgment (Kornprobst 2008).}, language = {en} } @techreport{PatelReh, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Patel, Oliver and Reh, Christine}, title = {Brexit: The Consequences for the EU's Political System}, language = {en} } @article{OberholzerReh, author = {Oberholzer, Lukas and Reh, Christine}, title = {How to Negotiate under Co-decision in the EU: Reforming Trilogues and First-Reading Agreements}, series = {CEPS Policy Brief}, volume = {270}, journal = {CEPS Policy Brief}, pages = {10}, language = {en} } @article{BressanelliKoopReh, author = {Bressanelli, Edoardo and Koop, Christel and Reh, Christine}, title = {EU Actors under pressure: politicisation and depoliticisation as strategic responses}, series = {Journal of European Public Policy}, volume = {27}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, number = {3}, doi = {10.1080/13501763.2020.1713193}, pages = {329 -- 341}, abstract = {This contribution conceptualises bottom-up politicisation in Europe's multi-level system. EU-level actors, we argue, respond strategically to the functional and political pressures 'travelling up' from the member states. Perceiving domestic dissensus as either constraining or enabling, actors display both self-restraint and assertiveness in their responses. Motivated by the survival of the EU as a system 'under attack', and by the preservation of their own substantive and procedural powers, actors choose to either politicise or depoliticise decision-making, behaviour and policy outcomes at the supranational level. As a collection, this Special Issue demonstrate that the choices actors make 'under stress' at the EU-level - ranging from 'restrained depoliticisation' to 'assertive politicisation' - are, indeed, conditional on how bottom-up pressures are perceived and processed.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BressanelliKoopMinettoetal., type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bressanelli, Edoardo and Koop, Christel and Minetto, Francesca and Reh, Christine}, title = {The European Council: truly the law-maker-in-chief?}, publisher = {CEPS}, address = {Brussels}, pages = {12}, abstract = {We know that the European Council is a powerful and visible strategic agenda-setter, crisis manager, and impasse-breaker. Yet we are less familiar with the role of national heads of state or government in everyday law-making. By analysing all legislation under the ordinary legislative procedure since 1999, this CEPS Explainer asks whether and - if so - how and how often the European Council refers to these specific laws in its summit conclusions. We show that the European Council mentions about 20\% of all legislation and especially prioritises laws that redistribute money, expand EU competences and respond to a specific crisis. On prioritised laws, the European Council mandates the EU's other institutions and Member States and acts actively and assertively across all stages of the policy process. This is the case even on priorities not shared with the European Commission as the legislative agenda-setter. In short, this Explainer puts the spotlight firmly on the national leaders who run the show - not just in large, visible summits but also during the follow-up everyday law-making process.}, language = {en} } @article{KoopRehBressanelli2021, author = {Koop, Christel and Reh, Christine and Bressanelli, Edoardo}, title = {Agenda-setting under pressure: Does domestic politics influence the European Commission?}, series = {European Journal of Political Research}, volume = {61}, journal = {European Journal of Political Research}, number = {1}, edition = {European Journal of Political Research}, doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12438}, pages = {46 -- 66}, year = {2021}, abstract = {The European Union (EU) has become increasingly visible and contested over the past decades. Several studies have shown that domestic pressure has made the EU's 'electorally connected' institutions more responsive. Yet, we still know little about how politicisation has affected the Union's non-majoritarian institutions. We address this question by focusing on agenda-setting and ask whether and how domestic politics influences the prioritisation of legislative proposals by the European Commission. We argue that the Commission, as both a policy-seeker and a survival-driven bureaucracy, will respond to domestic issue salience and Euroscepticism, at party, mass and electoral level, through targeted performance and through aggregate restraint. Building on new data on the prioritisation of legislative proposals under the ordinary legislative procedure (1999-2019), our analysis shows that the Commission's choice to prioritise is responsive to the salience of policy issues for Europe's citizens. By contrast, our evidence suggests that governing parties' issue salience does not drive, and Euroscepticism does not constrain, the Commission's priority-setting. Our findings contribute to the literature on multilevel politics, shedding new light on the strategic responses of non-majoritarian institutions to the domestic politicisation of 'Europe'.}, language = {en} } @article{KoopReh, author = {Koop, Christel and Reh, Christine}, title = {Europe's Bank and Europe's Citizens: Accountability, transparency - legitimacy?}, series = {Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law}, volume = {26}, journal = {Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law}, number = {1}, doi = {10.1177/1023263X19827906}, pages = {63 -- 80}, abstract = {Since the Eurozone crisis, critique of the European Central Bank (ECB) has centred on the Bank's lack of acceptance by Europe's citizens. One prominent strand of the debate argues that such acceptance can be enhanced by ensuring higher levels of compliance with the democratic standards of accountability and transparency. This article critically assesses this 'standards-support nexus' and its underlying assumptions. We suggest that three conditions need to be fulfilled for the argument to hold: (i) citizens are aware of the ECB and its design; (ii) citizens prioritise democratic standards over alternative motivations for acceptance; and (iii) citizens are able to differentiate between the ECB and the European Union's wider multilevel system. Drawing from the established literature on support for European integration and trust in the ECB and from descriptive Eurobarometer data, we conclude that these three conditions are unlikely to bear out empirically. Moreover, increasing the ECB's accountability and transparency in times of crisis and heightened politicisation could adversely affect the Bank's policy-performance and public image. Hence, whilst not questioning the normative desirability of accountability and transparency, we caution against assuming too easily that such democratic standards alone will enhance citizen support, and against assuming that they come without trade-offs.}, language = {en} } @article{BronieckiObholzerReh, author = {Broniecki, Philipp and Obholzer, Lukas and Reh, Christine}, title = {Legislation Against the Odds: Overcoming Ideological Gridlock in EU Decision-Making}, series = {Legislative Studies Quarterly}, journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly}, doi = {10.1111/lsq.70020}, abstract = {Negotiations in bicameral settings face the risk of gridlock when veto players' preferences diverge on the ideological (left-right) dimension. In the European Union (EU), a high proportion of legislation appears gridlocked yet is nevertheless adopted. We argue that ideological gridlock is resolved through the supply of and trust in legislative concessions. These are made to uphold supranational cooperation, to use issue linkage, and under "permissive consensus" across EU member states. We test our argument using a new dataset on amendments and repeals of existing EU laws (1999-2015). Our results demonstrate that elites' preferences on supranational cooperation as well as the potential for issue linkage help explain legislative success despite gridlock. High public Euroskepticism decreases the likelihood of compromise because lawmakers fear domestic electoral backlash to EU-level concessions. We contribute to established debates about legislative bargaining under complexity and propose that politicized cooperation can diminish problem-solving capacity across federations, multi-level states, and international organizations.}, language = {en} } @article{BressanelliKoopReh, author = {Bressanelli, Edoardo and Koop, Christel and Reh, Christine}, title = {The impact of informalisation: Early agreements and voting cohesion in the European Parliament}, series = {European Union Politics}, volume = {17}, journal = {European Union Politics}, number = {1}, issn = {1465-1165}, doi = {10.1177/1465116515608704}, pages = {91 -- 113}, abstract = {European Union legislative decision-making is increasingly shifted into informal secluded arenas. Scholars have explained this trend and analysed its consequences for bargaining success and democratic legitimacy. Yet, we know little about how informalisation affects legislative behaviour in the European Parliament. This article contributes to closing the gap, by theorising and analysing the impact of 'early agreements' on cohesion. Given the reputational, political and transaction costs of failing an early agreement in plenary, we expect political groups to invest heavily in discipline and consensus, and legislators to comply in votes. Using a new dataset, combining Hix et al.'s (2007) roll-call data with original codecision data (1999-2011), we show that informalisation increases cohesion but only for centrist parties. Rapporteurships and votes on 'costly' legislative resolutions also matter, but do not mediate the effect of early agreement.}, language = {en} } @article{RehBressanelliKoop, author = {Reh, Christine and Bressanelli, Edoardo and Koop, Christel}, title = {Responsive withdrawal? The politics of EU agenda-setting}, series = {Journal of European Public Policy}, volume = {27}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, number = {3}, doi = {10.1080/13501763.2020.1712453}, pages = {419 -- 438}, abstract = {This contribution asks whether and why the newly political environment of EU law-making impacts on the European Commission's choice (not) to announce the withdrawal of legislative proposals. We argue that the Commission uses 'responsive withdrawal' in response to bottom-up pressure, so as to signal self-restraint or policy-determination to different audiences. Bottom-up pressures are driven by (1) the national contestation of 'Europe'; (2) visible controversy about optimal (crisis) governance; and (3) the domestic salience of EU legislation. Our hypotheses are tested on a new dataset of all codecision files concluded, withdrawn, rejected or ongoing between 2006 and 2018. We show that the Commission reacts to bottom-up pressure by either politicising or depoliticising the EU's legislative agenda: 'withdrawal announcements' are more likely when Euroscepticism is high and when legislation touches core state powers, but less likely when legislation is domestically salient. We also demonstrate the continued importance of cyclical and technical reasons. Our analysis complements extant explanations of withdrawal as the upshot of functional factors or of uncertainty, and contributes to the nascent debate about whether, why and how supranational actors respond when the systems in which they operate - and the policies they produce - come under attack.}, language = {en} } @incollection{WallaceRehMinetto, author = {Wallace, Helen and Reh, Christine and Minetto, Francesca}, title = {An Institutional Anatomy and Five Policy Modes}, series = {Policy-Making in the European Union}, booktitle = {Policy-Making in the European Union}, editor = {Wallace, Helen and Pollack, Mark A. and Young, Alasdair R.}, edition = {9}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, isbn = {9780198912408}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {81 -- 118}, language = {en} }