@book{RehChristiansen, author = {Reh, Christine and Christiansen, Thomas}, title = {Constitutionalizing the European Union}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, address = {Basingstoke}, isbn = {1403932506}, publisher = {Hertie School}, abstract = {Enlargement and treaty reform have moved Europe's constitutional debate into the political spotlight. This important new text outlines the main themes of constitutional debate in the EU, analyzes formal and informal constitution-building since the early days of European integration, and introduces the actors and structures behind treaty change}, language = {en} } @article{KoopRehBressanelli, author = {Koop, Christel and Reh, Christine and Bressanelli, Edoardo}, title = {When politics prevails: Parties, elections and loyalty in the European Parliament}, series = {European Journal of Political Research}, volume = {57}, journal = {European Journal of Political Research}, number = {3}, issn = {1475-6765.12252}, doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12252}, pages = {563 -- 586}, abstract = {In many political systems, legislators serve multiple principals who compete for their loyalty in legislative votes. This article explores the political conditions under which legislators choose between their competing principals in multilevel systems, with a focus on how election proximity shapes legislative behaviour across democratic arenas. Empirically, the effect of electoral cycles on national party delegations' 'collective disloyalty' with their political groups in the European Parliament (EP) is analysed. It is argued that election proximity changes the time horizons, political incentives and risk perceptions of both delegations and their principals, 'punctuating' cost-benefit calculations around defection as well as around controlling, sanctioning and accommodating. Under the shadow of elections, national delegations' collective disloyalty with their transnational groups should, therefore, increase. Using a new dataset with roll-call votes cast under legislative codecision by delegations between July 1999 and July 2014, the article shows that the proximity of planned national and European elections drives up disloyalty in the EP, particularly by delegations from member states with party-centred electoral rules. The results also support a 'politicisation' effect: overall, delegations become more loyal over time, but the impact of election proximity as a driver of disloyalty is strongest in the latest parliament analysed (i.e., 2009-2014). Furthermore, disloyalty is more likely in votes on contested and salient legislation, and under conditions of Euroscepticism; by contrast, disloyalty is less likely in votes on codification files, when a delegation holds the rapporteurship and when the national party participates in government. The analysis sheds new light on electoral politics as a determinant of legislative choice under competing principals, and on the conditions under which politics 'travels' across democratic arenas in the European Union's multilevel polity.}, language = {en} } @article{Reh, author = {Reh, Christine}, title = {Is informal politics undemocratic? Trilogues, early agreements and the selection model of representation}, series = {Journal of European Public Policy}, volume = {21}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, number = {6}, issn = {1350-1763}, doi = {10.1080/13501763.2014.910247}, pages = {822 -- 841}, abstract = {Over the last two decades, the European Parliament (EP) has been empowered to make European Union (EU) legislation more inclusive, transparent and accountable. Yet, co-legislation has increased informalization and seclusion, as an ever-larger proportion of legislative acts is pre-agreed between Parliament and Council prior to first reading. This article asks under which conditions informalization is democratically problematic or tenable. So far, 'early agreements' have been criticized for their lack of transparency and accountability, their challenge to deliberation and inclusiveness, and their differential empowerment of 'relais actors'. Little attention has been paid, however, to the representation of the parliamentary principal in trilogues. This article draws on Jane Mansbridge's selection model of representation to fill the gap; it argues that representation with a strong 'selection core' and a weak 'sanction periphery' is, prudentially, best-suited for bicameral bargaining, and it introduces normative standards that make the selection model democratically tenable. A close analysis of codecision's current practices and institutions shows that these fall short of 'good deliberation at initial selection' and of 'narrative accountability'; 'ease of maintenance and de-selection' is approximated and 'transparency in rationale' is strengthened in the EP's 2012 Rules of Procedure. Future reform should, therefore, introduce two democratically crucial, yet hitherto neglected, measures: open deliberation about the appointment of rapporteurs; and reason-giving and justification (in addition to reporting back) by trilogue negotiators.}, language = {en} } @article{RehHeritierBressanellietal., author = {Reh, Christine and H{\´e}ritier, Adrienne and Bressanelli, Edoardo and Koop, Christel}, title = {The Informal Politics of Legislation}, series = {Comparative Polical Studies}, volume = {46}, journal = {Comparative Polical Studies}, number = {9}, issn = {0010-4140}, doi = {10.1177/0010414011426415}, pages = {1112 -- 1142}, abstract = {This article investigates a widespread yet understudied trend in EU politics: the shift of legislative decision making from public inclusive to informal secluded arenas and the subsequent adoption of legislation as "early agreements." Since its introduction in 1999, "fast-track legislation" has increased dramatically, accounting for 72\% of codecision files in the Sixth European Parliament. Drawing from functionalist institutionalism, distributive bargaining theory, and sociological institutionalism, this article explains under what conditions informal decision making is likely to occur. The authors test their hypotheses on an original data set of all 797 codecision files negotiated between mid-1999 and mid-2009. Their analysis suggests that fast-track legislation is systematically related to the number of participants, legislative workload, and complexity. These findings back a functionalist argument, emphasizing the transaction costs of intraorganizational coordination and information gathering. However, redistributive and salient acts are regularly decided informally, and the Council presidency's priorities have no significant effect on fast-track legislation. Hence, the authors cannot confirm explanations based on issue properties or actors' privileged institutional positions. Finally, they find a strong effect for the time fast-track legislation has been used, suggesting socialization into interorganizational norms of cooperation.}, language = {en} } @article{BurnsRasmussenReh, author = {Burns, Charlotte and Rasmussen, Anne and Reh, Christine}, title = {Legislative codecision and its impact on the political system of the European Union}, series = {Journal of European Public Policy}, volume = {20}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, number = {7}, doi = {10.1080/13501763.2013.795366}, pages = {941 -- 952}, abstract = {The European Union (EU) has experienced a remarkable degree of change during its history: it legislates in an ever wider range of policy areas, and its institutions and decision-making processes have been reformed repeatedly. One of the most important institutional changes was the introduction of the codecision procedure in 1993, which empowered the European Parliament (EP) and transformed the EU system of governance. Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon the majority of legislation is now subject to codecision under the ordinary legislative procedure. Consequently, the operation of codecision has major implications for our understanding and analysis of the EU's legislative outputs and for studies of supranational policy-making and systemic evolution more generally. This collection takes stock of 20 years of practising and studying codecision and examines the procedure's long-term implications for the EU's institutions, politics and policies.}, language = {en} } @article{RasmussenReh, author = {Rasmussen, Anne and Reh, Christine}, title = {The consequences of concluding codecision early: trilogues and intra-institutional bargaining success}, series = {Journal of European Public Policy}, volume = {20}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, number = {7}, issn = {0143-814}, doi = {10.1080/13501763.2013.795391}, pages = {1006 -- 1023}, abstract = {One of the most important changes in the history of codecision has been the steep increase in early agreements since 1999. Early agreements have enhanced the efficiency of European Union legislation, but they have been criticized for giving a subset of actors disproportionate control over the legislative agenda and negotiation process. Yet, no study has systematically shown whether and how early agreements have indeed redistributed influence between actors within the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Our contribution fills this gap by comparing actors' bargaining success across readings under codecision in a dataset of salient files. Contrary to our theoretical predictions, we do not find evidence of distributional consequences when controlling for inter-institutional conflict and file characteristics. Where codecision is concluded early, the final legislative outcomes are not located closer to the policy positions held by the party group of the Parliament's rapporteur or by the Council Presidency.}, language = {en} } @article{HeritierReh, author = {H{\´e}ritier, Adrienne and Reh, Christine}, title = {Codecision and Its Discontents: Intra-Organisational Politics and Institutional Reform in the European Parliament}, series = {West European Politics}, volume = {35}, journal = {West European Politics}, number = {5}, issn = {0140-2382}, doi = {10.1080/01402382.2012.706414}, pages = {1134 -- 1157}, abstract = {This article investigates the consequences of fast-track legislation in the European Union. Previous research has explained why fast-track legislation occurs and evaluated its democratic repercussions. This study focuses on the European Parliament (EP)'s intra-organisational response. It first describes how the early adoption of EU legislation has informalised legislative decision-making, transformed inter-organisational relations, and induced power shifts. It then discusses the political response, showing that actors seek to redress power shifts, that reform attempts centre on the control of negotiation authority and information flows, and that reform is highly contested. The research suggests that the chance of successful redress is low in Parliament as a decentralised organisation unless two conditions are met: (i) the extent of fast-track legislation reaches a critical level, and (ii) the organisation goes through a period of wider reform; the former increases the visibility of disempowerment and reputational loss, the latter allows package deals and/or the strategic use of norms. Based on qualitative document analysis and semi-structured elite interviews an analysis is made of how Parliament's rules of co-legislation have been contested, negotiated and reformed from the formal introduction of fast-track legislation in 1999 to the adoption of the Code of Conduct for Negotiating in the Context of Codecision Procedures in 2009. The analysis also shows that Parliament may have a price to pay for its successful fight for empowerment, namely a challenge to its institutional legitimacy and discontent of its of rank-and-file members. More generally, understanding the conditions for intra-organisational reform can inform the study of other democratic bodies which undergo a similar restriction and seclusion of de facto decision-making.}, language = {en} } @article{BellamyKornprobstReh, author = {Bellamy, Richard and Kornprobst, Markus and Reh, Christine}, title = {Introduction: Meeting in the Middle}, series = {Government and Opposition}, volume = {47}, journal = {Government and Opposition}, number = {Special Issue 3 (Politics as Compromise)}, issn = {0017-257X}, doi = {10.1111/j.1477-7053.2012.01363.x}, pages = {275 -- 295}, abstract = {Compromise is routinely evoked in everyday language and in scholarly debates across the social sciences. Yet, it has been subjected to relatively little systematic study. The introduction to this inter-disciplinary volume addresses the research gap in three steps. First, we offer three reasons for the study of compromise: its empirical omnipresence in politics, its theoretical potential to bridge the rationalist-constructivist divide, and its normative promise to recognize the plurality of society. Second, we introduce different approaches to the coherence, legitimacy and limits of compromise found in the existing explanatory and normative literatures. We discuss why these literatures need to speak to one another, and identify possible applications in empirical research. Third, we conceptualize compromise as one possible solution to a conflict. Distinct from both dissensus and consensus, all compromises share three characteristics: concessions, non-coercion and continued controversy. However, different types of compromise can be distinguished by how mutual, costly and painful concessions are; by whether all forms of coercion are absent; and by the degree to which the relevant parties' grounds for conflict are transformed. We conclude by discussing the challenge and appeal of 'politics as compromise' in plural and complex societies.}, language = {en} } @article{Reh, author = {Reh, Christine}, title = {European Integration as Compromise: Recognition, Concessions and the Limits of Cooperation}, series = {Government and Opposition}, volume = {47}, journal = {Government and Opposition}, number = {3}, issn = {0017-257X}, doi = {10.1111/j.1477-7053.2012.01369.x}, pages = {414 -- 440}, abstract = {The role of compromise in EU politics has been widely recognized by scholars and practitioners alike. At the same time, the systematic conceptual, analytical and normative study of compromise has remained an exception. This is surprising, given that the study of compromise can be linked to three broader questions at the heart of integration: (1) How does the EU accommodate diversity? (2) What makes supranational rule normatively justifiable? (3) Who or what defines the limits of cooperation? Against this backdrop, this article sheds light on the concept of compromise, on the role of compromise in legitimizing supranational governance and on the limits to compromise in the European polity. I argue that the EU - a divided, multilevel and functionally restricted polity - is highly dependent on the legitimizing force of 'inclusive compromise', which is characterized by the recognition of difference. This is true for horizontal or micro-level relations between political actors (where compromise works through concessions as well as justification, perspective-taking and empathic concern in a process of 'procedural accommodation'), and for vertical or macro-level relations between systems of governance (where compromise works through 'constitutional compatibility'). Given the legitimizing force of inclusive compromise, I subsequently identify the limits to such agreements and, thus, to supranational cooperation; I argue that these limits are issue specific and depend on where the costs of cooperation are borne. The article concludes by outlining routes for follow-up empirical research.}, language = {en} } @article{BolleyerReh, author = {Bolleyer, Nicole and Reh, Christine}, title = {EU legitimacy revisited: the normative foundations of a multilevel polity}, series = {Journal of European Public Policy}, volume = {19}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, number = {4}, doi = {10.1080/13501763.2011.610688}, pages = {472 -- 490}, abstract = {This paper reconceptualizes the challenge of legitimate governance in the European Union (EU) as a multilevel polity. Legitimacy is defined as one possible motivation for accepting political rule; it roots in citizens' affiliation with a balanced set of core values and their structural realization. This article argues that any attempt to legitimize the EU faces two distinct challenges. First, owing to the co-existence of states and individuals as political subjects, national legitimacy standards - defined by their balance of negative freedom, political equality and welfare - cannot be reproduced. Second, the legitimacy of both the Union and its member states depends upon the compatibility of values across levels. Empirically, legitimacy is hard to disentangle from other motivations behind acceptance, such as self-interest or fear of sanctions. By analysing the EU's constitutional evolution as a 'structural proxy' for its underlying values, we capture shifts in the supranational value configuration and identify potential incompatibilities with established national balances. Such incompatibilities, we argue, are a hitherto neglected challenge to the normative justifiability of both the EU and its member states.}, language = {en} }