@techreport{TraxlerDušek, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Traxler, Christian and Dušek, Libor}, title = {Fines, Non-Payment, and Revenues: Evidence from Speeding Tickets}, series = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, journal = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, edition = {No. 23}, doi = {10.48462/opus4-5046}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-50461}, pages = {38}, abstract = {We estimate the effect of the level of fines on payment compliance and revenues collected from speeding tickets. Exploiting discontinuous increases in fines at speed cutoffs and reform induced variation in these discontinuities, we implement two complementary regression discontinuity designs. The results consistently document small payment responses: a 10\% increase in the fine (i.e. the payment obligation) induces a 1.2 percentage point decline in timely payments. The implied revenue elasticity is about 0.9. Expressed in absolute terms, a one dollar increase in the fine translates into a roughly 60 cent increase in payments collected within 15 days.}, language = {en} } @article{AltmannTraxlerWeinschenk2021, author = {Altmann, Steffen and Traxler, Christian and Weinschenk, Philipp}, title = {Deadlines and Memory Limitations}, series = {Management Science}, volume = {68}, journal = {Management Science}, number = {9}, doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2021.4227}, pages = {6733 -- 6750}, year = {2021}, abstract = {This paper presents the results of two natural field experiments at a dental clinic. Guided by a simple theoretical model, we exogenously vary deadlines and associated rewards for arranging check-up appointments. Our data show strong and systematic effects of deadlines on patients' behavior. Imposing deadlines induces patients to act earlier and at a persistently higher frequency than without a deadline. We further document that individuals systematically respond to deadlines, even if these are not tied to explicit rewards. Several of our findings suggest that individuals' responses to deadlines are shaped by limitations in memory and attention. Our results illustrate that deadlines can be a powerful management tool to encourage timely task completion and to increase the cost effectiveness of performance-contingent rewards.}, language = {en} } @techreport{DušekTraxler, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Dušek, Libor and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Swiftness and Delay of Punishment}, series = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, journal = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, edition = {No. 32}, doi = {10.48462/opus4-5239}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-52391}, pages = {61}, abstract = {This paper studies how the swiftness and delay of punishment affect behavior. Using rich administrative data from automated speed cameras, we exploit two (quasi-)experimental sources of variation in the time between a speeding offense and the sending of a ticket. At the launch of the speed camera system, administrative challenges caused delays of up to three months. Later, we implemented a protocol that randomly assigned tickets to swift or delayed processing. We identify two different results. First, delays have a negative effect on payment compliance: the rate of timely paid fines diminishes by 7 to 9\% when a ticket is sent with a delay of four or more weeks. We also find some evidence that very swift tickets - sent on the first or second day following the offense - increase timely payments. These results align with the predictions of expert scholars that we elicited in a survey. Second, speeding tickets cause a strong, immediate, and persistent decline in speeding. However, we do not detect any robust, differential effects of swiftness or delay on speeding. This challenges widely held beliefs, as reflected in our survey. Yet, we document large mechanical benefits of swift punishment and provide a theoretical framework of learning and updating that explains our findings.}, language = {en} } @techreport{HaanTraxler, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Haan, Peter and Traxler, Christian}, title = {An Evaluation of Montenegro's 2022 Minimum Wage and Income Tax Reform}, publisher = {International Labour Organization}, address = {Geneva}, isbn = {9789220402009}, pages = {46}, abstract = {Between 2018 and 2022, Montenegro introduced a series of significant policy reforms. The reforms affected economic, educational, and social policies, ranging from the introduction of a universal child allowance to major changes in its labour market regulations and tax rules. From an economic policy perspective, the most significant reform package was implemented in January 2022. It was composed of a huge increase in Montenegro's statutory minimum wage, alongside a new income tax regime and the abolishment of mandatory health insurance contributions. According to the Government, the reform package aimed at increasing the living standards of citizens and promoting a more sustainable and inclusive growth model. This report evaluates the conjoint impact of this reform package.}, language = {en} } @techreport{AydinGehrsitzTraxler, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Aydin, Eren and Gehrsitz, Markus and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Greener Fleet, Cleaner Air: How Low Emission Zones Reduce Pollution}, number = {IZA DP No. 17144}, publisher = {IZA - Institute of Labor Economics}, address = {Bonn}, pages = {36}, abstract = {Using a stacked differences-in-differences approach, we study the effects of Low Emission Zones (LEZs) in Germany. The implementation of stage 1 and 2 LEZs, which banned the most pollution-intensive vehicles from city centers, significantly reduced PM10 concentrations. The most restrictive third stage had no detectable, additional effect. Analyzing the mechanisms behind these improvements, we find weak evidence of a 2\% traffic decline inside LEZs. Exploiting novel data, our main results document small but precisely estimated effects on the local fleet composition: LEZs induced the replacement of 50,000 older, emission-intensive diesel vehicles with newer, less polluting gasoline cars. Our estimates suggest that LEZs had lower social costs than previously estimated.}, language = {en} } @article{TraxlerDušek, author = {Traxler, Christian and Dušek, Libor}, title = {Fines, nonpayment, and revenues: evidence from speeding tickets}, series = {The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization}, volume = {41}, journal = {The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization}, number = {2}, doi = {10.1093/jleo/ewad025}, pages = {381 -- 401}, abstract = {We estimate the effect of the level of fines on payment compliance and revenues collected from speeding tickets. Exploiting discontinuous increases in fines at speed cutoffs and reform-induced variation in these discontinuities, we implement two complementary regression discontinuity designs. The results consistently document small payment responses: a 10\% increase in the fine (i.e., the payment obligation) induces a 1.2 percentage point decline in timely payments. The implied revenue elasticity is about 0.9. Expressed in absolute terms, a one-dollar increase in the fine translates into a roughly 60-cent increase in payments collected within 15 days (JEL H27, H26, K42).}, language = {en} }