@article{TowfighTraxlerGloeckner, author = {Towfigh, Emanuel and Traxler, Christian and Gl{\"o}ckner, Andreas}, title = {Zur Benotung in der Examensvorbereitung und im ersten Examen: Eine empirische Analyse}, series = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Didaktik der Rechtswissenschaft}, volume = {1/2014}, journal = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Didaktik der Rechtswissenschaft}, pages = {8 -- 27}, abstract = {Bislang gibt es zu den Erfolgsfaktoren des staatlichen Teils der Ersten Juristischen Staatspr{\"u}fung wenig gesicherte, empirisch belastbare Erkenntnisse. Lediglich die von den Landesjustizpr{\"u}fungs{\"a}mtern j{\"a}hrlich ver{\"o}ffentlichten {\"U}berblicksdaten {\"u}ber das allgemeine Abschneiden der Kandidatinnen und Kandidaten sind bekannt. Das ver- wundert vor allem mit Blick darauf, dass die Staatsexamina seit Jahrzehnten und in allen Bundesl{\"a}ndern in {\"a}hnlicher Form gepr{\"u}ft werden, dass sie f{\"u}r die sp{\"a}tere be- rufliche Entwicklung von Heerscharen von Juristen große Bedeutung haben, dass sich Jahr f{\"u}r Jahr Tausende Kandidatinnen und Kandidaten dieser Pr{\"u}fung unter- ziehen und dass es mit den privaten Repetitorien eine ganze Industrie kommerzieller Examensvorbereiter gibt. Auch aus didaktischer Sicht ist der Mangel an Evidenz unbefriedigend. Gibt es identifizierbare Faktoren, die f{\"u}r den Erfolg in der Examens- pr{\"u}fung eine Rolle spielen? Sind etwa „kluge K{\"o}pfe" mit gutem Abitur auch die in der Staatspr{\"u}fung erfolgreicheren Juristen (B. II.)? Lohnt sich das Schreiben von Probeklausuren (B. I. 1.), und erwirbt man dabei fachspezifische F{\"a}higkeiten, oder wirkt der Lernfortschritt f{\"a}cher{\"u}bergreifend; wie sieht die Lernkurve aus? Gibt es Unterschiede zwischen den Fakult{\"a}ten (B. III. 2.)? Gibt es Unterschiede zwischen M{\"a}nnern und Frauen (B. I. 2. und II. 3.), Deutschen und Ausl{\"a}ndern (B. II. 4.)?}, language = {de} } @article{Traxler, author = {Traxler, Christian}, title = {Majority voting and the welfare implications of tax avoidance}, series = {Journal of Public Economics}, volume = {96}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, number = {1-2}, pages = {1 -- 9}, language = {en} } @article{RienerTraxler, author = {Riener, Gerhard and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Norms, moods, and free lunch: Longitudinal evidence on payments from a Pay-What-You-Want restaurant}, series = {The Journal of Socio-Economics}, volume = {41}, journal = {The Journal of Socio-Economics}, number = {4}, doi = {10.1016/j.socec.2011.07.003}, pages = {476 -- 483}, language = {en} } @article{TraxlerWinter, author = {Traxler, Christian and Winter, Joachim}, title = {Survey evidence on conditional norm enforcement}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {28}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {3}, pages = {390 -- 398}, language = {en} } @article{RinckeTraxler, author = {Rincke, Johannes and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Enforcement Spillovers}, series = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, volume = {93}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, number = {4}, doi = {10.1162/REST_a_00128}, pages = {1224 -- 1234}, language = {en} } @article{KubeTraxler, author = {Kube, Sebastian and Traxler, Christian}, title = {The interaction of legal and social norm enforcement}, series = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, volume = {13}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, number = {5}, doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01515.x}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-19884}, pages = {639 -- 660}, language = {en} } @article{HurrelmannTraxler, author = {Hurrelmann, Klaus and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Konsumieren, Wirtschaften, Vorsorgen - Ergebnisse der 3. MetallRente Jugendstudie}, series = {BetrAV}, volume = {71}, journal = {BetrAV}, number = {6}, organization = {Arbeitsgemeinschaft f{\"u}r betriebliche Altersversorgung e.V.}, issn = {0005-9951}, pages = {490 -- 493}, language = {de} } @article{TraxlerBergerFellnerRoehlingetal., author = {Traxler, Christian and Berger, Melissa and Fellner-R{\"o}hling, Gerlinde and Sausgruber, Rupert}, title = {Higher Taxes, more Evasion? Evidence from Border Differentials in TV License Fees}, series = {Journal of Public Economics}, volume = {135}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, publisher = {Elsevier B.V.}, issn = {0047-2727}, doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.01.007}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21571}, pages = {74 -- 86}, abstract = {This paper studies the evasion of TV license fees in Austria. We exploit border differentials to identify the effect of fees on evasion. Comparing municipalities at the low- and high-fee side of state borders reveals that higher fees trigger significantly more evasion. Our preferred estimator indicates that a one percent increase in fees raises the evasion rate by 0.3 percentage points. The positive effect of fees on evasion is confirmed in different parametric and non-parametric approaches and survives several robustness checks.}, language = {en} } @article{TraxlerSpichtig, author = {Traxler, Christian and Spichtig, Mathias}, title = {Social Norms and the Indirect Evolution of Conditional Cooperation}, series = {Journal of Economics}, volume = {102}, journal = {Journal of Economics}, number = {3}, publisher = {Springer Vienna}, issn = {0931-8658}, doi = {10.1007/s00712-010-0173-9}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21582}, pages = {237 -- 262}, abstract = {This paper develops a model of social norms and cooperation in large societies. Within this framework we use an indirect evolutionary approach to study the endogenous formation of preferences and the coevolution of norm compliance. Thereby we link the multiplicity of equilibria, which emerges in the presence of social norms, to the evolutionary analysis: Individuals face situations where many others cooperate as well as situations where a majority free-rides. The evolutionary adaptation to such heterogenous environments will favor conditional cooperators, who condition their pro-social behavior on the others' cooperation. As conditional cooperators react flexibly to their social environment, they dominate free-riders as well as unconditional cooperators.}, language = {en} } @article{TraxlerSlemrod, author = {Traxler, Christian and Slemrod, Joel}, title = {Optimal Observability in a Linear Income Tax}, series = {Economics Letters}, volume = {108}, journal = {Economics Letters}, number = {2}, issn = {0165-1765}, doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2010.04.044}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21590}, pages = {105 -- 108}, abstract = {We study the optimal observability of the tax base within the standard linear income tax problem, where observability is determined by the government's investment into the accurate measurement of the tax base.}, language = {en} } @article{Traxler, author = {Traxler, Christian}, title = {Social Norms and Conditional Cooperative Taxpayers}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {26}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {1}, issn = {0176-2680}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.11.001}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21603}, pages = {89 -- 103}, abstract = {This paper incorporates tax morale into the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model of income tax evasion. Tax morale is modeled as a social norm for tax compliance. The strength of the norm is shaped endogenously, depending on the share of evaders in the society. Taxpayers act conditionally cooperative as their evasion depends on the others' compliance. We characterize the equilibrium which accounts for this interdependence and study the implications for tax and enforcement policies. The analysis is extended to the case of a society consisting of heterogenous communities. Individual evasion decisions are then embedded in a complex social structure and behavior is influenced by the norm compliance among morale reference groups. Within this framework, we highlight the role of belief management as an alternative policy tool.}, language = {en} } @article{TraxlerTrautmann, author = {Traxler, Christian and Trautmann, Stefan}, title = {Reserve Prices as Reference Points : Evidence from Auctions for Football Players at Hattrick.org}, series = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, volume = {31}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, number = {2}, issn = {0167-4870}, doi = {10.1016/j.joep.2009.08.004}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21619}, pages = {230 -- 240}, abstract = {We study the impact of sellers' reserve prices on transfer prices in online auctions of virtual football players at Hattrick.org. We introduce an empirical model that distinguishes between two separate effects from public reserve prices: (1) a mechanical effect, which is driven by the design of the English auction and (2) a psychological reference-dependence effect through reserve prices serving as reference points. The psychological effect has recently been introduced in behavioral models of situations where agents are uncertain about their own willingness-to-pay, while the mechanical effect is well captured by standard auction theory. Controlling for censoring when players are not sold, both effects are observed. Once we account for the potential endogeneity of reserve prices, however, we do not find evidence for reference dependence in Hattrick auctions.}, language = {en} } @article{Traxler, author = {Traxler, Christian}, title = {Voting over Taxes : The Case of Tax Evasion}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {140}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {1-2}, issn = {0048-5829}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-009-9411-5}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21624}, pages = {43 -- 58}, abstract = {This paper studies majority voting on taxes when tax evasion is possible. We characterize the voting equilibrium where the agent with median taxed income is pivotal. Since the ranking of true incomes does not necessarily correspond to the ranking of taxed incomes, the decisive voter can differ from the median income receiver. In this case, we find unconventional patterns of redistribution, e.g., from the middle class to the poor and the rich.}, language = {en} } @article{TraxlerStoewhase, author = {Traxler, Christian and St{\"o}whase, Sven}, title = {Tax Evasion and Auditing in a Federal Economy}, series = {International Tax and Public Finance}, volume = {12}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, number = {4}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers}, issn = {0927-5940}, doi = {10.1007/s10797-005-1542-0}, pages = {515 -- 531}, abstract = {This paper analyzes the relation between tax auditing and fiscal equalization in the context of fiscal competition. We incorporate a model of tax evasion by firms into a standard tax competition framework where regional governments use their audit rates as a strategic instrument to engage in fiscal competition. We compare the region's choice of audit policies for three different cases: A scenario of unconfined competition without interregional transfers, a scenario with a gross revenue equalization (GRS) scheme and finally, a scenario with net revenue sharing (NRS), where not only the revenues from taxation but also the regions auditing costs are shared. Without regional transfers, fiscal competition leads to audit rates which are inefficiently low for revenue-maximizing governments. While in general GRS aggravates the inefficiency, NRS makes the decentralized choice of auditing policies more efficient.}, language = {en} } @article{TraxlerLudwigEntorf, author = {Traxler, Christian and Ludwig, Jens and Entorf, Horst}, title = {Special Issue on the Economics of Crime: Editorial}, series = {German Economic Review}, volume = {13}, journal = {German Economic Review}, number = {4}, issn = {1468-0475}, doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0475.2012.00581.x}, pages = {363 -- 365}, language = {en} } @article{TowfighTraxlerGloeckner, author = {Towfigh, Emanuel and Traxler, Christian and Gl{\"o}ckner, Andreas}, title = {Geschlechts- und Herkunftseffekte bei der Benotung juristischer Staatspr{\"u}fungen}, series = {ZDRW Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Didaktik der Rechtswissenschaft}, volume = {Jahrgang 5}, journal = {ZDRW Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Didaktik der Rechtswissenschaft}, number = {2}, issn = {2196-7261}, doi = {10.5771/2196-7261-2018-2}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-27385}, pages = {115 -- 142}, language = {de} } @misc{HurrelmannKarchTraxler, author = {Hurrelmann, Klaus and Karch, Heribert and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen}, publisher = {Beltz Juventa}, address = {Weinheim}, isbn = {978-3-7799-3967-2}, pages = {169}, abstract = {Die vorliegende MetallRente Studie untersucht, welchen Einfluss sozialer Hintergrund, Geschlecht und Bildung auf Einstellungen und Handlungen junger Menschen haben, wenn es um die wichtigen Themen Finanzen und Vorsorge geht. Nach bisher drei Erhebungswellen in den Jahren 2010, 2013 und 2016 ist dies die vierte Auflage der bundesweit repr{\"a}sentativen Jugendstudie „Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen". 2 500 Jugendliche und junge Erwachsene im Alter von 17 bis 27 Jahren wurden befragt. Erneut wurden auch Gastautorinnen und Gaustautoren aus Wissenschaft, Institutionen und Wirtschaft eingeladen, die Befragungsergebnisse mit ihren Analysen und Kommentaren zu erg{\"a}nzen. Wie bew{\"a}ltigen junge Menschen das Spannungsfeld von eigener Verantwortung und staatlicher Regulierung? Welche Ver{\"a}nderungen werden gebraucht f{\"u}r eine zukunftsfeste Alterssicherung, die zur Lebenswirklichkeit der jungen Menschen passt? Auch die vierte MetallRente Studie geht mit dem Anspruch ans Werk, nicht nur zu analysieren, sondern Schlussfolgerungen zu formulieren sowie Forderungen und Vorschl{\"a}ge zu adressieren.}, language = {de} } @incollection{Traxler, author = {Traxler, Christian}, title = {Boosting und Nudging in der Altersvorsorge - Eine verhaltens{\"o}konomische Einordnung der Studienergebnisse}, series = {Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen}, booktitle = {Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen}, editor = {Hurrelmann, Klaus and Karch, Heribert and Traxler, Christian}, publisher = {Beltz Juventa}, address = {Weinheim}, isbn = {978-3-7799-3967-2}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {77 -- 85}, abstract = {Die MetallRente Studie 2019 zeichnet ein zwiesp{\"a}ltiges Bild. Zum einen betont mittlerweile jeder zweite junge Erwachsene, im „Hier und Heute" zu leben - was die Zukunft bringt, wisse ohnehin niemand; im Jahr 2010 stimmte nur jeder Dritte dieser Aussage zu (siehe Kapitel 1 in diesem Buch, Abb. 10). Konsistent damit sinkt auch der Anteil jener, die die Altersvorsorge als Grund zum Sparen angeben. Unter den regelm{\"a}ßig Sparenden, d. h., bei jungen Erwachsenen, deren {\"o}konomische Situation das Sparen erm{\"o}glicht, war die Altersversorge im Jahr 2010 noch f{\"u}r 66 \% der Befragten ein wichtiges Sparmotiv, w{\"a}hrend dieser Wert 2019 um zehn Prozentpunkte gesunken ist (siehe Kapitel 1, Abb. 15). Zum anderen scheint bei jungen Erwachsenen sehr wohl ein klares und immer starker ausgepr{\"a}gtes Problembewusstsein vorhanden zu sein: 82 \% der Befragten erkennen, dass der demografische Wandel die gesetzlichen Rentenkassen zunehmend unter Druck setzt; 85 \% rechnen damit, noch weit {\"u}ber ihr 67. Lebensjahr arbeiten zu m{\"u}ssen, und 86 \% stimmen der Aussage zu, dass ohne eine eigenst{\"a}ndige private Vorsorge deutlich mehr Menschen von Altersarmut betroffen sein werden (siehe Kapitel 1, Abb. 23). Damit, so konnte man meinen, ist den Jugendlichen und jungen Erwachsenen die Bedeutung der dritten S{\"a}ule in der Altersvorsorge klar. Die Studienergebnisse zeigen jedoch, dass die private Altersvorsorge weiterhin an Attraktivit{\"a}t einb{\"u}ßt.}, language = {de} } @article{DragoMengelTraxler, author = {Drago, Francesco and Mengel, Friederike and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Compliance Behavior in Networks: Evidence from a Field Experiment}, series = {American Economic Journal: Applied Economics}, volume = {12}, journal = {American Economic Journal: Applied Economics}, number = {2}, issn = {1945-7782 (Print) / 1945-7790 (Online)}, doi = {10.1257/app.20170690}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-33890}, pages = {96 -- 133}, abstract = {This paper studies the spread of compliance behavior in neighborhood networks in Austria. We exploit a field experiment that varied the content of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. The data reveal a strong treatment spillover: untreated households are more likely to switch from evasion to compliance in response to mailings received by their network neighbors. Digging deeper into the properties of the spillover, we find that it is concentrated among close neighbors of the targets and increases with the treated households' diffusion centrality. Local concentration of equally treated households implies a lower spillover.}, language = {en} } @techreport{TraxlerDušek, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Traxler, Christian and Dušek, Libor}, title = {Fines, Non-Payment, and Revenues: Evidence from Speeding Tickets}, series = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, journal = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, edition = {No. 23}, doi = {10.48462/opus4-5046}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-50461}, pages = {38}, abstract = {We estimate the effect of the level of fines on payment compliance and revenues collected from speeding tickets. Exploiting discontinuous increases in fines at speed cutoffs and reform induced variation in these discontinuities, we implement two complementary regression discontinuity designs. The results consistently document small payment responses: a 10\% increase in the fine (i.e. the payment obligation) induces a 1.2 percentage point decline in timely payments. The implied revenue elasticity is about 0.9. Expressed in absolute terms, a one dollar increase in the fine translates into a roughly 60 cent increase in payments collected within 15 days.}, language = {en} } @techreport{DušekTraxler, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Dušek, Libor and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Swiftness and Delay of Punishment}, series = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, journal = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, edition = {No. 32}, doi = {10.48462/opus4-5239}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-52391}, pages = {61}, abstract = {This paper studies how the swiftness and delay of punishment affect behavior. Using rich administrative data from automated speed cameras, we exploit two (quasi-)experimental sources of variation in the time between a speeding offense and the sending of a ticket. At the launch of the speed camera system, administrative challenges caused delays of up to three months. Later, we implemented a protocol that randomly assigned tickets to swift or delayed processing. We identify two different results. First, delays have a negative effect on payment compliance: the rate of timely paid fines diminishes by 7 to 9\% when a ticket is sent with a delay of four or more weeks. We also find some evidence that very swift tickets - sent on the first or second day following the offense - increase timely payments. These results align with the predictions of expert scholars that we elicited in a survey. Second, speeding tickets cause a strong, immediate, and persistent decline in speeding. However, we do not detect any robust, differential effects of swiftness or delay on speeding. This challenges widely held beliefs, as reflected in our survey. Yet, we document large mechanical benefits of swift punishment and provide a theoretical framework of learning and updating that explains our findings.}, language = {en} }