@article{TraxlerTrautmann, author = {Traxler, Christian and Trautmann, Stefan}, title = {Reserve Prices as Reference Points : Evidence from Auctions for Football Players at Hattrick.org}, series = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, volume = {31}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, number = {2}, issn = {0167-4870}, doi = {10.1016/j.joep.2009.08.004}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21619}, pages = {230 -- 240}, abstract = {We study the impact of sellers' reserve prices on transfer prices in online auctions of virtual football players at Hattrick.org. We introduce an empirical model that distinguishes between two separate effects from public reserve prices: (1) a mechanical effect, which is driven by the design of the English auction and (2) a psychological reference-dependence effect through reserve prices serving as reference points. The psychological effect has recently been introduced in behavioral models of situations where agents are uncertain about their own willingness-to-pay, while the mechanical effect is well captured by standard auction theory. Controlling for censoring when players are not sold, both effects are observed. Once we account for the potential endogeneity of reserve prices, however, we do not find evidence for reference dependence in Hattrick auctions.}, language = {en} } @article{Traxler, author = {Traxler, Christian}, title = {Voting over Taxes : The Case of Tax Evasion}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {140}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {1-2}, issn = {0048-5829}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-009-9411-5}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21624}, pages = {43 -- 58}, abstract = {This paper studies majority voting on taxes when tax evasion is possible. We characterize the voting equilibrium where the agent with median taxed income is pivotal. Since the ranking of true incomes does not necessarily correspond to the ranking of taxed incomes, the decisive voter can differ from the median income receiver. In this case, we find unconventional patterns of redistribution, e.g., from the middle class to the poor and the rich.}, language = {en} } @article{TraxlerStoewhase, author = {Traxler, Christian and St{\"o}whase, Sven}, title = {Tax Evasion and Auditing in a Federal Economy}, series = {International Tax and Public Finance}, volume = {12}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, number = {4}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers}, issn = {0927-5940}, doi = {10.1007/s10797-005-1542-0}, pages = {515 -- 531}, abstract = {This paper analyzes the relation between tax auditing and fiscal equalization in the context of fiscal competition. We incorporate a model of tax evasion by firms into a standard tax competition framework where regional governments use their audit rates as a strategic instrument to engage in fiscal competition. We compare the region's choice of audit policies for three different cases: A scenario of unconfined competition without interregional transfers, a scenario with a gross revenue equalization (GRS) scheme and finally, a scenario with net revenue sharing (NRS), where not only the revenues from taxation but also the regions auditing costs are shared. Without regional transfers, fiscal competition leads to audit rates which are inefficiently low for revenue-maximizing governments. While in general GRS aggravates the inefficiency, NRS makes the decentralized choice of auditing policies more efficient.}, language = {en} } @article{TraxlerLudwigEntorf, author = {Traxler, Christian and Ludwig, Jens and Entorf, Horst}, title = {Special Issue on the Economics of Crime: Editorial}, series = {German Economic Review}, volume = {13}, journal = {German Economic Review}, number = {4}, issn = {1468-0475}, doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0475.2012.00581.x}, pages = {363 -- 365}, language = {en} } @article{TowfighTraxlerGloeckner, author = {Towfigh, Emanuel and Traxler, Christian and Gl{\"o}ckner, Andreas}, title = {Geschlechts- und Herkunftseffekte bei der Benotung juristischer Staatspr{\"u}fungen}, series = {ZDRW Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Didaktik der Rechtswissenschaft}, volume = {Jahrgang 5}, journal = {ZDRW Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Didaktik der Rechtswissenschaft}, number = {2}, issn = {2196-7261}, doi = {10.5771/2196-7261-2018-2}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-27385}, pages = {115 -- 142}, language = {de} } @misc{HurrelmannKarchTraxler, author = {Hurrelmann, Klaus and Karch, Heribert and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen}, publisher = {Beltz Juventa}, address = {Weinheim}, isbn = {978-3-7799-3967-2}, pages = {169}, abstract = {Die vorliegende MetallRente Studie untersucht, welchen Einfluss sozialer Hintergrund, Geschlecht und Bildung auf Einstellungen und Handlungen junger Menschen haben, wenn es um die wichtigen Themen Finanzen und Vorsorge geht. Nach bisher drei Erhebungswellen in den Jahren 2010, 2013 und 2016 ist dies die vierte Auflage der bundesweit repr{\"a}sentativen Jugendstudie „Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen". 2 500 Jugendliche und junge Erwachsene im Alter von 17 bis 27 Jahren wurden befragt. Erneut wurden auch Gastautorinnen und Gaustautoren aus Wissenschaft, Institutionen und Wirtschaft eingeladen, die Befragungsergebnisse mit ihren Analysen und Kommentaren zu erg{\"a}nzen. Wie bew{\"a}ltigen junge Menschen das Spannungsfeld von eigener Verantwortung und staatlicher Regulierung? Welche Ver{\"a}nderungen werden gebraucht f{\"u}r eine zukunftsfeste Alterssicherung, die zur Lebenswirklichkeit der jungen Menschen passt? Auch die vierte MetallRente Studie geht mit dem Anspruch ans Werk, nicht nur zu analysieren, sondern Schlussfolgerungen zu formulieren sowie Forderungen und Vorschl{\"a}ge zu adressieren.}, language = {de} } @incollection{Traxler, author = {Traxler, Christian}, title = {Boosting und Nudging in der Altersvorsorge - Eine verhaltens{\"o}konomische Einordnung der Studienergebnisse}, series = {Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen}, booktitle = {Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen}, editor = {Hurrelmann, Klaus and Karch, Heribert and Traxler, Christian}, publisher = {Beltz Juventa}, address = {Weinheim}, isbn = {978-3-7799-3967-2}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {77 -- 85}, abstract = {Die MetallRente Studie 2019 zeichnet ein zwiesp{\"a}ltiges Bild. Zum einen betont mittlerweile jeder zweite junge Erwachsene, im „Hier und Heute" zu leben - was die Zukunft bringt, wisse ohnehin niemand; im Jahr 2010 stimmte nur jeder Dritte dieser Aussage zu (siehe Kapitel 1 in diesem Buch, Abb. 10). Konsistent damit sinkt auch der Anteil jener, die die Altersvorsorge als Grund zum Sparen angeben. Unter den regelm{\"a}ßig Sparenden, d. h., bei jungen Erwachsenen, deren {\"o}konomische Situation das Sparen erm{\"o}glicht, war die Altersversorge im Jahr 2010 noch f{\"u}r 66 \% der Befragten ein wichtiges Sparmotiv, w{\"a}hrend dieser Wert 2019 um zehn Prozentpunkte gesunken ist (siehe Kapitel 1, Abb. 15). Zum anderen scheint bei jungen Erwachsenen sehr wohl ein klares und immer starker ausgepr{\"a}gtes Problembewusstsein vorhanden zu sein: 82 \% der Befragten erkennen, dass der demografische Wandel die gesetzlichen Rentenkassen zunehmend unter Druck setzt; 85 \% rechnen damit, noch weit {\"u}ber ihr 67. Lebensjahr arbeiten zu m{\"u}ssen, und 86 \% stimmen der Aussage zu, dass ohne eine eigenst{\"a}ndige private Vorsorge deutlich mehr Menschen von Altersarmut betroffen sein werden (siehe Kapitel 1, Abb. 23). Damit, so konnte man meinen, ist den Jugendlichen und jungen Erwachsenen die Bedeutung der dritten S{\"a}ule in der Altersvorsorge klar. Die Studienergebnisse zeigen jedoch, dass die private Altersvorsorge weiterhin an Attraktivit{\"a}t einb{\"u}ßt.}, language = {de} } @article{DragoMengelTraxler, author = {Drago, Francesco and Mengel, Friederike and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Compliance Behavior in Networks: Evidence from a Field Experiment}, series = {American Economic Journal: Applied Economics}, volume = {12}, journal = {American Economic Journal: Applied Economics}, number = {2}, issn = {1945-7782 (Print) / 1945-7790 (Online)}, doi = {10.1257/app.20170690}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-33890}, pages = {96 -- 133}, abstract = {This paper studies the spread of compliance behavior in neighborhood networks in Austria. We exploit a field experiment that varied the content of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. The data reveal a strong treatment spillover: untreated households are more likely to switch from evasion to compliance in response to mailings received by their network neighbors. Digging deeper into the properties of the spillover, we find that it is concentrated among close neighbors of the targets and increases with the treated households' diffusion centrality. Local concentration of equally treated households implies a lower spillover.}, language = {en} } @techreport{TraxlerDušek, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Traxler, Christian and Dušek, Libor}, title = {Fines, Non-Payment, and Revenues: Evidence from Speeding Tickets}, series = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, journal = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, edition = {No. 23}, doi = {10.48462/opus4-5046}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-50461}, pages = {38}, abstract = {We estimate the effect of the level of fines on payment compliance and revenues collected from speeding tickets. Exploiting discontinuous increases in fines at speed cutoffs and reform induced variation in these discontinuities, we implement two complementary regression discontinuity designs. The results consistently document small payment responses: a 10\% increase in the fine (i.e. the payment obligation) induces a 1.2 percentage point decline in timely payments. The implied revenue elasticity is about 0.9. Expressed in absolute terms, a one dollar increase in the fine translates into a roughly 60 cent increase in payments collected within 15 days.}, language = {en} } @techreport{DušekTraxler, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Dušek, Libor and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Swiftness and Delay of Punishment}, series = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, journal = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, edition = {No. 32}, doi = {10.48462/opus4-5239}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-52391}, pages = {61}, abstract = {This paper studies how the swiftness and delay of punishment affect behavior. Using rich administrative data from automated speed cameras, we exploit two (quasi-)experimental sources of variation in the time between a speeding offense and the sending of a ticket. At the launch of the speed camera system, administrative challenges caused delays of up to three months. Later, we implemented a protocol that randomly assigned tickets to swift or delayed processing. We identify two different results. First, delays have a negative effect on payment compliance: the rate of timely paid fines diminishes by 7 to 9\% when a ticket is sent with a delay of four or more weeks. We also find some evidence that very swift tickets - sent on the first or second day following the offense - increase timely payments. These results align with the predictions of expert scholars that we elicited in a survey. Second, speeding tickets cause a strong, immediate, and persistent decline in speeding. However, we do not detect any robust, differential effects of swiftness or delay on speeding. This challenges widely held beliefs, as reflected in our survey. Yet, we document large mechanical benefits of swift punishment and provide a theoretical framework of learning and updating that explains our findings.}, language = {en} } @article{DušekTraxler2022, author = {Dušek, Libor and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Learning from Law Enforcement}, series = {Journal of the European Economic Association}, volume = {2}, journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association}, edition = {20}, issn = {1542-4766}, doi = {10.1093/jeea/jvab037}, pages = {739 -- 777}, year = {2022}, abstract = {This paper studies how punishment affects future compliance behavior and isolates deterrence effects mediated by learning. Using administrative data from speed cameras that capture the full driving histories of more than a million cars over several years, we evaluate responses to punishment at the extensive (receiving a speeding ticket) and intensive margins (tickets with higher fines). Two complementary empirical strategies—a regression discontinuity design and an event study—coherently document strong responses to receiving a ticket: The speeding rate drops by a third and re-offense rates fall by 70\%. Higher fines produce a small but imprecisely estimated additional effect. All responses occur immediately and are persistent over time, with no backsliding toward speeding even two years after receiving a ticket. Our evidence rejects unlearning and temporary salience effects. Instead, it supports a learning model in which agents update their priors on the expected punishment in a coarse manner.}, language = {en} }