@misc{HurrelmannTraxlerKarch, author = {Hurrelmann, Klaus and Traxler, Christian and Karch, Heribert}, title = {Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen: Zwischen Eigenverantwortung und Regulierung - L{\"o}sungsans{\"a}tze in Deutschland und Europa}, editor = {Hurrelmann, Klaus and Traxler, Christian and Karch, Heribert}, publisher = {Beltz Juventa}, address = {Weinheim}, isbn = {978-3-7799-3369-4}, pages = {224}, abstract = {Die Studie gibt Aufschluss dar{\"u}ber, wie Jugendliche und junge Erwachsene {\"u}ber das Geld von heute und die Rente von morgen denken. Sie macht eindringlich klar: Die nachhaltige Alterssicherung ist in Gefahr - und zwar nicht nur in Deutschland. Wer heute in das Berufsleben eintritt, soll sich vom ersten Tag an um seine Alterssicherung k{\"u}mmern. Wer das nicht tut, ist sp{\"a}ter von Altersarmut bedroht. Wohl noch nie stand eine junge Generation so stark im Spannungsfeld von eigener Verantwortung und staatlicher Regulierung. Die Studie gibt Aufschluss dar{\"u}ber, welche Einstellungen Jugendliche und junge Erwachsene zu Vorsorge und Finanzthemen haben. Erg{\"a}nzt wird sie durch Beitr{\"a}ge europ{\"a}ischer Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler. Sie analysieren die L{\"o}sungsans{\"a}tze in verschiedenen L{\"a}ndern und machen eindringlich klar: Nicht nur in Deutschland ist die nachhaltige Alterssicherung in Gefahr.}, language = {de} } @incollection{HurrelmannKarchTraxler, author = {Hurrelmann, Klaus and Karch, Heribert and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Die Generation Y und die Altersvorsorge. Ein {\"U}berblick {\"u}ber den Stand der Forschung}, series = {Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen! Zwischen Eigenverantwortung und Regulierung - L{\"o}sungsans{\"a}tze in Deutschland und Europa}, booktitle = {Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen! Zwischen Eigenverantwortung und Regulierung - L{\"o}sungsans{\"a}tze in Deutschland und Europa}, editor = {Hurrelmann, Klaus and Karch, Heribert and Traxler, Christian}, publisher = {Beltz Juventa}, address = {Weinheim}, isbn = {978-3-7799-3369-4}, pages = {14 -- 28}, abstract = {Die Studie gibt Aufschluss dar{\"u}ber, wie Jugendliche und junge Erwachsene {\"u}ber das Geld von heute und die Rente von morgen denken. Sie macht eindringlich klar: Die nachhaltige Alterssicherung ist in Gefahr - und zwar nicht nur in Deutschland. Wer heute in das Berufsleben eintritt, soll sich vom ersten Tag an um seine Alterssicherung k{\"u}mmern. Wer das nicht tut, ist sp{\"a}ter von Altersarmut bedroht. Wohl noch nie stand eine junge Generation so stark im Spannungsfeld von eigener Verantwortung und staatlicher Regulierung. Die Studie gibt Aufschluss dar{\"u}ber, welche Einstellungen Jugendliche und junge Erwachsene zu Vorsorge und Finanzthemen haben. Erg{\"a}nzt wird sie durch Beitr{\"a}ge europ{\"a}ischer Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler. Sie analysieren die L{\"o}sungsans{\"a}tze in verschiedenen L{\"a}ndern und machen eindringlich klar: Nicht nur in Deutschland ist die nachhaltige Alterssicherung in Gefahr.}, language = {de} } @misc{HurrelmannKarchTraxler, author = {Hurrelmann, Klaus and Karch, Heribert and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Jugend, Vorsorge Finanzen. Zwischen Eigenverantwortung und Regulierung}, publisher = {Beltz Juventa}, address = {Weinheim}, isbn = {978-3-7799-3369-4}, pages = {224}, language = {de} } @incollection{HurrelmannTraxler, author = {Hurrelmann, Klaus and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Eigeninitiative oder sanfter Paternalismus? Die Rolle von Nudging f{\"u}r die Altersvorsorge}, series = {Jugend, Vorsorge Finanzen. Zwischen Eigenverantwortung und Regulierung - L{\"o}sungsans{\"a}tze in Deutschland und Europa}, booktitle = {Jugend, Vorsorge Finanzen. Zwischen Eigenverantwortung und Regulierung - L{\"o}sungsans{\"a}tze in Deutschland und Europa}, editor = {Hurrelmann, Klaus and Karch, Heribert and Traxler, Christian}, publisher = {Beltz Juventa}, address = {Weinheim}, isbn = {978-3-7799-3369-4}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-23325}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {77 -- 87}, abstract = {Die Studie gibt Aufschluss dar{\"u}ber, wie Jugendliche und junge Erwachsene {\"u}ber das Geld von heute und die Rente von morgen denken. Sie macht eindringlich klar: Die nachhaltige Alterssicherung ist in Gefahr - und zwar nicht nur in Deutschland. Wer heute in das Berufsleben eintritt, soll sich vom ersten Tag an um seine Alterssicherung k{\"u}mmern. Wer das nicht tut, ist sp{\"a}ter von Altersarmut bedroht. Wohl noch nie stand eine junge Generation so stark im Spannungsfeld von eigener Verantwortung und staatlicher Regulierung. Die Studie gibt Aufschluss dar{\"u}ber, welche Einstellungen Jugendliche und junge Erwachsene zu Vorsorge und Finanzthemen haben. Erg{\"a}nzt wird sie durch Beitr{\"a}ge europ{\"a}ischer Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler. Sie analysieren die L{\"o}sungsans{\"a}tze in verschiedenen L{\"a}ndern und machen eindringlich klar: Nicht nur in Deutschland ist die nachhaltige Alterssicherung in Gefahr.}, language = {de} } @incollection{HurrelmannTraxler, author = {Hurrelmann, Klaus and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Die Generation Y und die Altersvorsorge. Ein {\"U}berblick {\"u}ber den Stand der Forschung}, series = {Jugend, Vorsorge Finanzen. Zwischen Eigenverantwortung und Regulierung}, booktitle = {Jugend, Vorsorge Finanzen. Zwischen Eigenverantwortung und Regulierung}, publisher = {Beltz Juventa}, address = {Weinheim}, isbn = {978-3-7799-3369-4}, pages = {14 -- 25}, language = {de} } @article{EngelGoergTraxler, author = {Engel, Christoph and Goerg, Sebastian and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Intensified support for juvenile offenders on probation: Evidence from Germany}, series = {Journal of Empirical Legal Studies}, volume = {19}, journal = {Journal of Empirical Legal Studies}, number = {2}, doi = {10.1111/jels.12311}, pages = {447 -- 490}, abstract = {This paper studies a probation program in Cologne, Germany. The program, which has a clear rehabilitative focus, offers intensified personal support to serious juvenile offenders over the first 6 months of their probation period. To evaluate the program's impact on recidivism, we draw on two research designs. Firstly, a small-scale randomized trial assigns offenders to probation with regular or intensified support. Secondly, a regression discontinuity design exploits a cutoff that defines program eligibility. The results suggest that the program reduces recidivism. The effect seems persistent over at least 3 years. Our evidence further indicates that the drop in recidivism is strongest among less severe offenders.}, language = {en} } @techreport{TraxlerAltmannWeinschenk, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Traxler, Christian and Altmann, Steffen and Weinschenk, Philip}, title = {Deadlines and Memory Limitations}, pages = {62}, abstract = {This paper studies the behavioral consequences of deadlines. In cooperation with a dental clinic, we conduct two natural field experiments that exogenously vary deadlines and associated rewards for arranging check-up appointments. Our data show strong and systematic effects of deadlines on patients' behavior. Imposing relatively tight deadlines induces patients to act earlier and at a persistently higher frequency than without a deadline. Several of our findings suggest that individuals' responses to deadlines are shaped by limitations in memory and attention.}, language = {en} } @techreport{TraxlerLinek, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Traxler, Christian and Linek, Maximilian}, title = {Framing and Social Information Nudges at Wikipedia}, pages = {34}, abstract = {We analyze a series of trials that randomly assignedWikipedia users in Germany to different web banners soliciting donations. The trials varied content or framing of social information about how many other users are donating. Framing of a given number of donors in a negative way increased donation rates. Variation in social information had no detectable effects. The findings are consistent with the results from a survey experiment. In line with donations being strategic substitutes, the survey documents that the negative framing lowers beliefs about others' donations. In contrast, the provided social information is ineffective in changing average beliefs. The ineffectiveness seems to be due to the limited salience rather than the limited credibility of the social information.}, language = {en} } @article{DušekTraxler2022, author = {Dušek, Libor and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Learning from Law Enforcement}, series = {Journal of the European Economic Association}, volume = {2}, journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association}, edition = {20}, issn = {1542-4766}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvab037}, pages = {739 -- 777}, year = {2022}, abstract = {This paper studies how punishment affects future compliance behavior and isolates deterrence effects mediated by learning. Using administrative data from speed cameras that capture the full driving histories of more than a million cars over several years, we evaluate responses to punishment at the extensive (receiving a speeding ticket) and intensive margins (tickets with higher fines). Two complementary empirical strategies—a regression discontinuity design and an event study—coherently document strong responses to receiving a ticket: The speeding rate drops by a third and re-offense rates fall by 70\%. Higher fines produce a small but imprecisely estimated additional effect. All responses occur immediately and are persistent over time, with no backsliding toward speeding even two years after receiving a ticket. Our evidence rejects unlearning and temporary salience effects. Instead, it supports a learning model in which agents update their priors on the expected punishment in a coarse manner.}, language = {en} } @article{BauernschusterTraxler, author = {Bauernschuster, Stefan and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Tempolimit 130 auf Autobahnen: Eine evidenzbasierte Diskussion der Auswirkunge}, series = {Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik}, volume = {22}, journal = {Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik}, number = {2}, doi = {10.1515/pwp-2021-0023}, pages = {86 -- 102}, abstract = {Welche Effekte w{\"u}rde ein allgemeines Tempolimit auf deutschen Autobahnen mit sich bringen? Stefan Bauernschuster und Christian Traxler versuchen, sich dieser oft emotional diskutierten Frage empirisch zu n{\"a}hern. Die Autoren stoßen dabei rasch an Grenzen: Die Datenlage ist d{\"u}rftig und kausale Evidenz ist rar. Gleichwohl skizzieren sie in ihrem Beitrag auf Basis der vorhandenen Daten und der internationalen Literatur eine Einsch{\"a}tzung, wie sich die Einf{\"u}hrung eines Tempolimits 130 unter anderem auf Verkehrssicherheit, Emissionen und Zeitverluste auswirkt. Vieles spricht daf{\"u}r, dass der Nutzen eines Tempolimits die m{\"o}glichen Kosten {\"u}bersteigt. Die Autoren rufen zu einer St{\"a}rkung der evidenzbasierten Verkehrspolitik auf.}, language = {de} } @article{TraxlerDušekPardo, author = {Traxler, Christian and Dušek, Libor and Pardo, Nicolas}, title = {Salience and Timely Compliance: Evidence from Speeding Tickets}, series = {Journal of Policy Analysis and Management}, volume = {2}, journal = {Journal of Policy Analysis and Management}, edition = {41}, doi = {10.1002/pam.22387}, pages = {426 -- 449}, abstract = {This paper studies the enforcement of fines, and, in particular, the effects of simplification and salience nudges on timely payments. In a randomized controlled trial, we add cover letters to 80,000 payment notifications for speeding. The letters increase the salience of the payment deadline, the late penalty, or both. Emphasizing only the deadline is not effective. Stressing the late penalty significantly and persistently increases payment rates. The effect is largest if both parameters are made salient. The most effective treatment yields a net revenue gain that covers approximately 25 percent of the labor costs of the ticket administration personnel. A survey experiment documents how the salience nudges alter prior (mis)perceptions about the communicated parameters. The survey results rationalize the differential effects of the treatments and, together with the evidence from the RCT, offer a broader framework for explaining why certain nudges are effective in some contexts but fail in others.}, language = {en} } @article{LinekTraxler, author = {Linek, Maximilian and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Framing and Social Information Nudges at Wikipedia}, series = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}, volume = {188}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}, issn = {0167-2681}, doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2021.06.033}, pages = {1269 -- 1279}, abstract = {We analyze a series of trials that randomly assigned Wikipedia users in Germany to different web banners soliciting donations. The trials varied framing or content of social information about how many other users are donating. Framing a given number of donors in a negative way increased donation rates. Variations in the communicated social information had no detectable effects. The findings are consistent with the results from a survey experiment. In line with donations being strategic substitutes, the survey documents that the negative framing lowers beliefs about others' donations. Varying the social information, in contrast, is ineffective in changing average beliefs.}, language = {en} } @article{AltmannTraxlerWeinschenk2021, author = {Altmann, Steffen and Traxler, Christian and Weinschenk, Philipp}, title = {Deadlines and Memory Limitations}, series = {Management Science}, volume = {68}, journal = {Management Science}, number = {9}, doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2021.4227}, pages = {6733 -- 6750}, year = {2021}, abstract = {This paper presents the results of two natural field experiments at a dental clinic. Guided by a simple theoretical model, we exogenously vary deadlines and associated rewards for arranging check-up appointments. Our data show strong and systematic effects of deadlines on patients' behavior. Imposing deadlines induces patients to act earlier and at a persistently higher frequency than without a deadline. We further document that individuals systematically respond to deadlines, even if these are not tied to explicit rewards. Several of our findings suggest that individuals' responses to deadlines are shaped by limitations in memory and attention. Our results illustrate that deadlines can be a powerful management tool to encourage timely task completion and to increase the cost effectiveness of performance-contingent rewards.}, language = {en} } @misc{TraxlerKarchHurrelmann, author = {Traxler, Christian and Karch, Heribert and Hurrelmann, Klaus}, title = {Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen. MetallRente Studie 2022. Zwischen sozialstaatlichem Anspruch und Individualisierung}, publisher = {Juventa Verlag GmbH}, address = {Weinheim}, isbn = {978-3-7799-6743-9}, pages = {108}, abstract = {Die MetallRente Jugendstudie ist die umfassendste repr{\"a}sentative Untersuchung zum Finanz- und Vorsorgeverhalten junger Menschen in Deutschland. Die f{\"u}nfte Studie analysiert auch Einfl{\"u}sse der Corona-Pandemie auf die Bereitschaft junger Menschen zur Zukunftsplanung und ihr Vorsorgeverhalten. Trauen 17- bis 27-J{\"a}hrige dem Staat eine zukunftsfeste Alterssicherung f{\"u}r ihre Generation zu? Wie stehen sie zu immer neuen politischen Vorschl{\"a}gen? Wie schauen sie auf Sicherheit und Rendite? Angesichts Niedrigzinsen, {\"U}beralterung und mangelnden Reformen orientiert sich eine ganze Generation neu.}, language = {de} } @incollection{Traxler, author = {Traxler, Christian}, title = {Behavioural Insights for Health Governance}, series = {The Governance Report 2019: Health Governance}, booktitle = {The Governance Report 2019: Health Governance}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, address = {Oxford}, isbn = {9780198821502}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {135 -- 148}, language = {en} } @techreport{DušekPardoTraxler, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Dušek, Libor and Pardo, Nicolas and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Salience, Incentives, and Timely Compliance: Evidence from Speeding Tickets}, series = {MPI Collective Goods Discussion Paper}, journal = {MPI Collective Goods Discussion Paper}, edition = {No. 2020/9}, pages = {50}, abstract = {This paper studies the enforcement of fines. We randomly assign 80,000 speeding tickets to treatments that increase the salience of the payment deadline, late penalties, or both. Stressing the penalties significantly and persistently increases payment rates. Emphasizing only the deadline is not effective. The findings from the RCT are consistent with a survey experiment which documents the treatments' impact on priors about parameters of the compliance problem. Exploiting discontinuous variation in fines, we then document a strong price responsiveness: a 1\% increase in the payment obligation induces a 0.23 percentage point decrease in timely compliance. This semi-elasticity suggests that the impact of the salience nudges is equivalent to the effect of a 4-9\% reduction in fines.}, language = {en} } @techreport{TraxlerWegrich, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Traxler, Christian and Wegrich, Kai}, title = {Attitudes on Urban Mobility Policies. Results from a Survey in Berlin}, publisher = {Hertie School}, address = {Berlin}, pages = {19}, abstract = {Urban mobility policies and the discussion around them have gained traction in many European cities, including Berlin. This policy brief presents survey evidence examining the preferences of citizens of Berlin city on mobility policy changes. The survey covers the expansion of bike infrastructure, the creation of traffic-calmed neighborhoods (Kiezblocks akin to Barcelona's superblocks), the implementation of a 30km/h speed limit on main roads, increased parking fees, and introduction of congestion charges. The results indicate majority support for more cycle paths and a further roll out of Kiezblocks. In contrast, only a third of respondents support an increase in parking fees and the introduction of a congestion charge. Support and opposition is strongly correlated with education, political attitudes and car (vs bike) ownership.}, language = {en} } @techreport{TraxlerDušek, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Traxler, Christian and Dušek, Libor}, title = {Fines, Non-Payment, and Revenues: Evidence from Speeding Tickets}, doi = {10.2139/ssrn.4281384}, pages = {29}, abstract = {We estimate the effect of the level of fines on payment compliance and revenues collected from speeding tickets. Exploiting discontinuous increases in fines at speed cutoffs, we implement a regression discontinuity design. The results document small payment responses: a 10 percent increase in the fine (i.e. the payment obligation) induces a 1 percentage point decline in timely payments. The implied revenue elasticity is about 0.9. Expressed in absolute terms, a one euro increase in the fine translates into a roughly 60 cent increase in payments collected.}, language = {en} } @techreport{TraxlerDušekPardo, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Traxler, Christian and Dušek, Libor and Pardo, Nicolas}, title = {Jak zlepšit v{\´y}běr pokut? Experiment se zjednodušen{\´i}m informac{\´i}}, number = {Studie 2/2023}, publisher = {Legal Data Hub}, pages = {13}, language = {mul} } @article{TraxlerDušek, author = {Traxler, Christian and Dušek, Libor}, title = {Fines, nonpayment, and revenues: evidence from speeding tickets}, series = {The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization}, journal = {The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization}, doi = {10.1093/jleo/ewad025}, abstract = {We estimate the effect of the level of fines on payment compliance and revenues collected from speeding tickets. Exploiting discontinuous increases in fines at speed cutoffs and reform-induced variation in these discontinuities, we implement two complementary regression discontinuity designs. The results consistently document small payment responses: a 10\% increase in the fine (i.e., the payment obligation) induces a 1.2 percentage point decline in timely payments. The implied revenue elasticity is about 0.9. Expressed in absolute terms, a one-dollar increase in the fine translates into a roughly 60-cent increase in payments collected within 15 days (JEL H27, H26, K42).}, language = {en} } @techreport{HaanTraxler, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Haan, Peter and Traxler, Christian}, title = {An Evaluation of Montenegro's 2022 Minimum Wage and Income Tax Reform}, publisher = {International Labour Organization}, address = {Geneva}, isbn = {9789220402009}, pages = {46}, abstract = {Between 2018 and 2022, Montenegro introduced a series of significant policy reforms. The reforms affected economic, educational, and social policies, ranging from the introduction of a universal child allowance to major changes in its labour market regulations and tax rules. From an economic policy perspective, the most significant reform package was implemented in January 2022. It was composed of a huge increase in Montenegro's statutory minimum wage, alongside a new income tax regime and the abolishment of mandatory health insurance contributions. According to the Government, the reform package aimed at increasing the living standards of citizens and promoting a more sustainable and inclusive growth model. This report evaluates the conjoint impact of this reform package.}, language = {en} } @article{AlbrechtKubeTraxler, author = {Albrecht, Felix and Kube, Sebastian and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Cooperation and norm enforcement - The individual-level perspective}, series = {Journal of Public Economics}, volume = {165}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.06.010}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-25853}, pages = {1 -- 16}, abstract = {We explore the relationship between individuals' disposition to cooperate and their inclination to engage in peer punishment as well as their relative importance for mitigating social dilemmas. Using a modified strategy-method approach we identify individual punishment patterns and link them with individual cooperation patterns. Classifying N = 628 subjects along these two dimensions documents that cooperation and punishment patterns are aligned for most individuals. However, the data also reveal a sizable share of free-riders that punish pro-socially and conditional cooperators that do not engage in punishment. Analyzing the interplay between types in an additional experiment, we show that pro-social punishers are important for achieving cooperation. Incorporating information on punishment types explains large amounts of the between- and within-group variation in cooperation.}, language = {en} } @article{TraxlerWestermaierWohlschlegel, author = {Traxler, Christian and Westermaier, Franz and Wohlschlegel, Ansgar}, title = {Bunching on the Autobahn? Speeding responses to a 'notched' penalty scheme}, series = {Journal of Public Economics}, volume = {157}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.11.006}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-25867}, pages = {78 -- 94}, abstract = {This paper studies drivers' responses to a 'notched' penalty scheme in which speeding penalties are stepwise and discontinuously increasing in speed. We present survey evidence suggesting that drivers in Germany are well aware of the notched penalty structure. Based on a simple analytical framework, we analyze the impact of the notches on drivers' optimal speed choices. The model's predictions are confronted with data on more than 150,000 speeding tickets from the Autobahn and 290,000 speed measures from a traffic monitoring system. The data provide evidence on modest levels of bunching, despite several frictions working against it. We analyze the normative implications and assess the scope for welfare gains from moving from a simple, notched penalty scheme to a more complex but less salient Pigouvian scheme.}, language = {en} } @techreport{GloecknerTowfighTraxler, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Gl{\"o}ckner, Andreas and Towfigh, Emanuel and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Empirische Untersuchung zur Benotung in der staatlichen Pflichtfachpr{\"u}fung und in der zweiten juristischen Staatspr{\"u}fung in Nordrhein-Westfalen von 2006 bis 2016}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-25878}, pages = {62}, abstract = {Anhand der Analysen von bis zu 18.000 Ergebnissen der ersten und zweiten juristischen Staatspr{\"u}fungen in Nordrhein-Westfalen (NRW) aus den Jahren 2006 bis 2016 wurde untersucht, inwieweit Unterschiede in der Benotung von (a) M{\"a}nnern und Frauen und (b) von Personen mit bzw. ohne Indikatoren f{\"u}r einen Migrationshintergrund bestehen. Frauen erzielen sowohl in der ersten juristischen Pr{\"u}fung als auch im zweiten Staatsexamen schlechtere Noten als M{\"a}nner. Ein klarer zeitlicher Trend in diesen Geschlechterunterschieden l{\"a}sst sich nicht finden. Die Unterschiede in beiden Examen sind {\"a}hnlich stark ausgepr{\"a}gt. Die Unterschiede im zweiten Examen bleiben nach Kontrolle f{\"u}r die Note aus dem 1. Examen - auf einem niedrigen Niveau - statistisch signifikant. Frauen erreichen sowohl im ersten als auch im zweiten Examen mit deutlich geringerer Wahrscheinlichkeit als M{\"a}nner eine Pr{\"a}dikatsnote. In den m{\"u}ndlichen Noten sind gr{\"o}ßere Geschlechterunterschiede zu beobachten als in den schriftlichen Noten (zweites Examen). Diese Unterschiede bleiben auch bestehen, wenn f{\"u}r die Note aus dem schriftlichen Teil und/oder aus dem ersten Examen kontrolliert wird. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, mit einer guten m{\"u}ndlichen Note die relevante Schwelle f{\"u}r eine Gesamtnote {\"u}ber der n{\"a}chsten Noten-Stufe (z.B. {\"u}ber 9,0 Punkte) zu erreichen, ist - selbst bei identischen schriftlichen Noten - bei M{\"a}nnern deutlich h{\"o}her als bei Frauen. Dieser Geschlechterunterschied verschwindet jedoch, wenn mindestens eine Frau Teil der Pr{\"u}fungskommission in der m{\"u}ndlichen Pr{\"u}fung ist. Die Zusammensetzung der Kommission hat damit einen ausgleichenden Effekt auf das Erreichen der n{\"a}chsten Noten-Stufe. Der Effekt ist jedoch lokal, d.h. auf die m{\"u}ndliche Note rund um die jeweiligen Schwellenwerte begrenzt; auf die Geschlechtsunterschiede in der durchschnittlichen Gesamtnote hat die Zusammensetzung der Kommission der m{\"u}ndlichen Pr{\"u}fung keinen statistisch signifikanten Effekt. Differenziert man im Datensatz anhand der Indikatoren f{\"u}r Migrationshintergrund, so ergeben sich die folgenden zentralen Ergebnisse: Alle Indikatoren eines Migrationshintergrunds (d.h. Geburtsort im Ausland, keine deutsche Staatsangeh{\"o}rigkeit, Namensursprung im Ausland) weisen einen deutlichen negativen Zusammenhang mit den Noten im ersten und zweiten Examen auf. Die Effektgr{\"o}ßen sind in beiden Examen {\"a}hnlich stark ausgepr{\"a}gt und bestehen im zweiten Examen tendenziell auch nach Kontrolle f{\"u}r die Note aus dem ersten Examen. Es ist wiederum kein klarer zeitlicher Trend in den Notenunterschieden zu beobachten. Der Einfluss der Migrationsindikatoren ist dabei deutlich gr{\"o}ßer als der Geschlechtereffekt. {\"A}hnlich wie bei den Geschlechtsunterschieden zeigen sich st{\"a}rkere negative Effekte bei den m{\"u}ndlichen als bei den schriftlichen Noten. Die Unterschiede in den m{\"u}ndlichen Noten bleiben auch bei Kontrolle f{\"u}r die Noten aus dem schriftlichen Teil und/oder dem ersten Examen bestehen. Personen mit Migrationshintergrund erreichen sowohl im ersten als auch im zweiten Examen mit deutlich geringerer Wahrscheinlichkeit ein Pr{\"a}dikat. Sie weisen ferner eine deutlich geringere Wahrscheinlichkeit auf, mit einer guten m{\"u}ndlichen Note die Schwelle f{\"u}r eine Gesamtnote in der n{\"a}chsth{\"o}heren Noten-Stufe zu erreichen. Vergleiche zwischen Migranten der ersten und zweiten (bzw. h{\"o}heren) Generation liefern vor allem f{\"u}r das erste Examen schwache Evidenz f{\"u}r positive Integrationseffekte. Gleichzeitig deuten einige Resultate auf strukturelle, gruppenspezifische Effekte (Herkunft) hin. Aufgrund der eingeschr{\"a}nkten Fallzahlen (zwar haben rd. 14\% der beobachteten Studierenden einen Migrationshintergrund, eine Differenzierung innerhalb dieser Gruppe f{\"u}hrt jedoch zu sehr kleinen Subgruppen) sind diesbez{\"u}glich aber keine verl{\"a}sslichen Aussagen m{\"o}glich.}, language = {de} } @article{ReubenTraxlervanWinden, author = {Reuben, Ernesto and Traxler, Christian and van Winden, Frans}, title = {Advocacy and political convergence under preference uncertainty}, series = {European Economic Review}, volume = {78}, journal = {European Economic Review}, doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.07.003}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-19681}, pages = {16 -- 36}, abstract = {We study the formation of advocacy groups and how they can impact policy outcomes by revealing information about voters׳ preferences to uninformed political candidates. We conduct a laboratory experiment based on a two-candidate spatial electoral competition setting where the policy preferences of voters are (initially) unknown and change over time. In the control treatment candidates learn about the preferred policy of the median voter through the voting outcome of elections. In the advocacy treatments, voters can organize themselves into advocacy groups in order to reveal their policy preferences. We find that voters often overcome the collective action problem of forming an advocacy group. In fact, we observe the formation of both informative advocacy groups, which convey new information, and uninformative advocacy groups, which do not. Overall, advocacy groups significantly speed up the convergence to the preferred policy of the median voter. However, advocacy does not lead to higher earnings as the gains from faster convergence are offset by the costs of group formation.}, language = {en} } @article{AltmannTraxler, author = {Altmann, Steffen and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Nudges at the Dentist}, series = {European Economic Review}, volume = {72}, journal = {European Economic Review}, doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.07.007}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-19694}, pages = {19 -- 38}, abstract = {We implement a randomized field experiment to study the impact of reminders on dental health prevention. Patients who are due for a check-up receive no reminder, a neutral reminder postcard, or reminders including additional information on the benefits of prevention. Our results document a strong impact of reminders. Within one month after receiving a reminder, the fraction of patients who make a check-up appointment more than doubles. The effect declines slightly over time, but remains economically and statistically significant. Including additional information in the reminders does not increase response rates. In fact, the neutral reminder has the strongest impact for the overall population as well as for important subgroups of patients. Finally, we document that being exposed to reminders repeatedly does neither strengthen nor weaken their effectiveness.}, language = {en} } @article{FellnerSausgruberTraxler, author = {Fellner, Gerlinde and Sausgruber, Rupert and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information}, series = {Journal of the European Economic Association}, volume = {11}, journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association}, number = {3}, doi = {10.1111/jeea.12013|}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-19704}, pages = {634 -- 660}, abstract = {We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailings, a threat treatment which makes a high detection risk salient has a significant deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others' behavior enhances compliance on aggregate. However, the information condition has a weak positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common.}, language = {en} } @article{GloecknerTowfighTraxler, author = {Gl{\"o}ckner, Andreas and Towfigh, Emanuel and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Development of legal expertise}, series = {Instructional Science}, volume = {41}, journal = {Instructional Science}, number = {6}, pages = {989 -- 1007}, abstract = {In a comprehensive empirical investigation (N = 71,405) we analyzed the development of legal expertise in a critical 1-year period of academic legal training in which advanced law students start practicing to solve complex cases. We were particularly interested in the functional form of the learning curve and inter-individual differences in learning. Performance increases monotonically with the number of practice exams following a slightly concave learning curve without any considerable kinks. Considering the performance development over time, however, the curve is not monotonic and shows intermediate drops in performance. We provide evidence which suggests that these drops are due to cyclic drops in motivation. There are about equally sized marginal effects of practicing law exams in general and practicing exams in the specific area of law. However, students with high (vs. low) initial performance profit more from practicing exams within a specific area of law whereas students with low initial performance profit more from practicing exams in general. The concave increase in performance with the number of practicing exams is mainly driven by individuals with low initial performance. Those with high initial performance mainly display a linear learning trend. We discuss the practical implications of these findings for academic legal training.}, language = {en} } @incollection{TowfighTraxler, author = {Towfigh, Emanuel and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Nudges polarize!}, series = {Choice Architecture in Democracies: Exploring the Legitimacy of Nudging}, booktitle = {Choice Architecture in Democracies: Exploring the Legitimacy of Nudging}, editor = {Kemmerer, et al., Alexandra}, publisher = {Hart/Nomos}, isbn = {978-3-8487-2288-4}, doi = {10.5771/9783845263939-321}, pages = {321 -- 328}, language = {en} } @incollection{Traxler, author = {Traxler, Christian}, title = {Deterrence of economic crimes: Tax evasion}, series = {Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice}, booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {1005 -- 1014}, language = {en} } @article{TowfighTraxlerGloeckner, author = {Towfigh, Emanuel and Traxler, Christian and Gl{\"o}ckner, Andreas}, title = {Zur Benotung in der Examensvorbereitung und im ersten Examen: Eine empirische Analyse}, series = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Didaktik der Rechtswissenschaft}, volume = {1/2014}, journal = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Didaktik der Rechtswissenschaft}, pages = {8 -- 27}, abstract = {Bislang gibt es zu den Erfolgsfaktoren des staatlichen Teils der Ersten Juristischen Staatspr{\"u}fung wenig gesicherte, empirisch belastbare Erkenntnisse. Lediglich die von den Landesjustizpr{\"u}fungs{\"a}mtern j{\"a}hrlich ver{\"o}ffentlichten {\"U}berblicksdaten {\"u}ber das allgemeine Abschneiden der Kandidatinnen und Kandidaten sind bekannt. Das ver- wundert vor allem mit Blick darauf, dass die Staatsexamina seit Jahrzehnten und in allen Bundesl{\"a}ndern in {\"a}hnlicher Form gepr{\"u}ft werden, dass sie f{\"u}r die sp{\"a}tere be- rufliche Entwicklung von Heerscharen von Juristen große Bedeutung haben, dass sich Jahr f{\"u}r Jahr Tausende Kandidatinnen und Kandidaten dieser Pr{\"u}fung unter- ziehen und dass es mit den privaten Repetitorien eine ganze Industrie kommerzieller Examensvorbereiter gibt. Auch aus didaktischer Sicht ist der Mangel an Evidenz unbefriedigend. Gibt es identifizierbare Faktoren, die f{\"u}r den Erfolg in der Examens- pr{\"u}fung eine Rolle spielen? Sind etwa „kluge K{\"o}pfe" mit gutem Abitur auch die in der Staatspr{\"u}fung erfolgreicheren Juristen (B. II.)? Lohnt sich das Schreiben von Probeklausuren (B. I. 1.), und erwirbt man dabei fachspezifische F{\"a}higkeiten, oder wirkt der Lernfortschritt f{\"a}cher{\"u}bergreifend; wie sieht die Lernkurve aus? Gibt es Unterschiede zwischen den Fakult{\"a}ten (B. III. 2.)? Gibt es Unterschiede zwischen M{\"a}nnern und Frauen (B. I. 2. und II. 3.), Deutschen und Ausl{\"a}ndern (B. II. 4.)?}, language = {de} } @article{Traxler, author = {Traxler, Christian}, title = {Majority voting and the welfare implications of tax avoidance}, series = {Journal of Public Economics}, volume = {96}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, number = {1-2}, pages = {1 -- 9}, language = {en} } @article{RienerTraxler, author = {Riener, Gerhard and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Norms, moods, and free lunch: Longitudinal evidence on payments from a Pay-What-You-Want restaurant}, series = {The Journal of Socio-Economics}, volume = {41}, journal = {The Journal of Socio-Economics}, number = {4}, doi = {10.1016/j.socec.2011.07.003}, pages = {476 -- 483}, language = {en} } @article{TraxlerWinter, author = {Traxler, Christian and Winter, Joachim}, title = {Survey evidence on conditional norm enforcement}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {28}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {3}, pages = {390 -- 398}, language = {en} } @article{RinckeTraxler, author = {Rincke, Johannes and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Enforcement Spillovers}, series = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, volume = {93}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, number = {4}, doi = {10.1162/REST_a_00128}, pages = {1224 -- 1234}, language = {en} } @article{KubeTraxler, author = {Kube, Sebastian and Traxler, Christian}, title = {The interaction of legal and social norm enforcement}, series = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, volume = {13}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, number = {5}, doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01515.x}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-19884}, pages = {639 -- 660}, language = {en} } @article{HurrelmannTraxler, author = {Hurrelmann, Klaus and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Konsumieren, Wirtschaften, Vorsorgen - Ergebnisse der 3. MetallRente Jugendstudie}, series = {BetrAV}, volume = {71}, journal = {BetrAV}, number = {6}, organization = {Arbeitsgemeinschaft f{\"u}r betriebliche Altersversorgung e.V.}, issn = {0005-9951}, pages = {490 -- 493}, language = {de} } @article{TraxlerBergerFellnerRoehlingetal., author = {Traxler, Christian and Berger, Melissa and Fellner-R{\"o}hling, Gerlinde and Sausgruber, Rupert}, title = {Higher Taxes, more Evasion? Evidence from Border Differentials in TV License Fees}, series = {Journal of Public Economics}, volume = {135}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, publisher = {Elsevier B.V.}, issn = {0047-2727}, doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.01.007}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21571}, pages = {74 -- 86}, abstract = {This paper studies the evasion of TV license fees in Austria. We exploit border differentials to identify the effect of fees on evasion. Comparing municipalities at the low- and high-fee side of state borders reveals that higher fees trigger significantly more evasion. Our preferred estimator indicates that a one percent increase in fees raises the evasion rate by 0.3 percentage points. The positive effect of fees on evasion is confirmed in different parametric and non-parametric approaches and survives several robustness checks.}, language = {en} } @article{TraxlerSpichtig, author = {Traxler, Christian and Spichtig, Mathias}, title = {Social Norms and the Indirect Evolution of Conditional Cooperation}, series = {Journal of Economics}, volume = {102}, journal = {Journal of Economics}, number = {3}, publisher = {Springer Vienna}, issn = {0931-8658}, doi = {10.1007/s00712-010-0173-9}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21582}, pages = {237 -- 262}, abstract = {This paper develops a model of social norms and cooperation in large societies. Within this framework we use an indirect evolutionary approach to study the endogenous formation of preferences and the coevolution of norm compliance. Thereby we link the multiplicity of equilibria, which emerges in the presence of social norms, to the evolutionary analysis: Individuals face situations where many others cooperate as well as situations where a majority free-rides. The evolutionary adaptation to such heterogenous environments will favor conditional cooperators, who condition their pro-social behavior on the others' cooperation. As conditional cooperators react flexibly to their social environment, they dominate free-riders as well as unconditional cooperators.}, language = {en} } @article{TraxlerSlemrod, author = {Traxler, Christian and Slemrod, Joel}, title = {Optimal Observability in a Linear Income Tax}, series = {Economics Letters}, volume = {108}, journal = {Economics Letters}, number = {2}, issn = {0165-1765}, doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2010.04.044}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21590}, pages = {105 -- 108}, abstract = {We study the optimal observability of the tax base within the standard linear income tax problem, where observability is determined by the government's investment into the accurate measurement of the tax base.}, language = {en} } @article{Traxler, author = {Traxler, Christian}, title = {Social Norms and Conditional Cooperative Taxpayers}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {26}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {1}, issn = {0176-2680}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.11.001}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21603}, pages = {89 -- 103}, abstract = {This paper incorporates tax morale into the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model of income tax evasion. Tax morale is modeled as a social norm for tax compliance. The strength of the norm is shaped endogenously, depending on the share of evaders in the society. Taxpayers act conditionally cooperative as their evasion depends on the others' compliance. We characterize the equilibrium which accounts for this interdependence and study the implications for tax and enforcement policies. The analysis is extended to the case of a society consisting of heterogenous communities. Individual evasion decisions are then embedded in a complex social structure and behavior is influenced by the norm compliance among morale reference groups. Within this framework, we highlight the role of belief management as an alternative policy tool.}, language = {en} } @article{TraxlerTrautmann, author = {Traxler, Christian and Trautmann, Stefan}, title = {Reserve Prices as Reference Points : Evidence from Auctions for Football Players at Hattrick.org}, series = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, volume = {31}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, number = {2}, issn = {0167-4870}, doi = {10.1016/j.joep.2009.08.004}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21619}, pages = {230 -- 240}, abstract = {We study the impact of sellers' reserve prices on transfer prices in online auctions of virtual football players at Hattrick.org. We introduce an empirical model that distinguishes between two separate effects from public reserve prices: (1) a mechanical effect, which is driven by the design of the English auction and (2) a psychological reference-dependence effect through reserve prices serving as reference points. The psychological effect has recently been introduced in behavioral models of situations where agents are uncertain about their own willingness-to-pay, while the mechanical effect is well captured by standard auction theory. Controlling for censoring when players are not sold, both effects are observed. Once we account for the potential endogeneity of reserve prices, however, we do not find evidence for reference dependence in Hattrick auctions.}, language = {en} } @article{Traxler, author = {Traxler, Christian}, title = {Voting over Taxes : The Case of Tax Evasion}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {140}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {1-2}, issn = {0048-5829}, doi = {10.1007/s11127-009-9411-5}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21624}, pages = {43 -- 58}, abstract = {This paper studies majority voting on taxes when tax evasion is possible. We characterize the voting equilibrium where the agent with median taxed income is pivotal. Since the ranking of true incomes does not necessarily correspond to the ranking of taxed incomes, the decisive voter can differ from the median income receiver. In this case, we find unconventional patterns of redistribution, e.g., from the middle class to the poor and the rich.}, language = {en} } @article{TraxlerStoewhase, author = {Traxler, Christian and St{\"o}whase, Sven}, title = {Tax Evasion and Auditing in a Federal Economy}, series = {International Tax and Public Finance}, volume = {12}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, number = {4}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers}, issn = {0927-5940}, doi = {10.1007/s10797-005-1542-0}, pages = {515 -- 531}, abstract = {This paper analyzes the relation between tax auditing and fiscal equalization in the context of fiscal competition. We incorporate a model of tax evasion by firms into a standard tax competition framework where regional governments use their audit rates as a strategic instrument to engage in fiscal competition. We compare the region's choice of audit policies for three different cases: A scenario of unconfined competition without interregional transfers, a scenario with a gross revenue equalization (GRS) scheme and finally, a scenario with net revenue sharing (NRS), where not only the revenues from taxation but also the regions auditing costs are shared. Without regional transfers, fiscal competition leads to audit rates which are inefficiently low for revenue-maximizing governments. While in general GRS aggravates the inefficiency, NRS makes the decentralized choice of auditing policies more efficient.}, language = {en} } @article{TraxlerLudwigEntorf, author = {Traxler, Christian and Ludwig, Jens and Entorf, Horst}, title = {Special Issue on the Economics of Crime: Editorial}, series = {German Economic Review}, volume = {13}, journal = {German Economic Review}, number = {4}, issn = {1468-0475}, doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0475.2012.00581.x}, pages = {363 -- 365}, language = {en} } @article{TowfighTraxlerGloeckner, author = {Towfigh, Emanuel and Traxler, Christian and Gl{\"o}ckner, Andreas}, title = {Geschlechts- und Herkunftseffekte bei der Benotung juristischer Staatspr{\"u}fungen}, series = {ZDRW Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Didaktik der Rechtswissenschaft}, volume = {Jahrgang 5}, journal = {ZDRW Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Didaktik der Rechtswissenschaft}, number = {2}, issn = {2196-7261}, doi = {10.5771/2196-7261-2018-2}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-27385}, pages = {115 -- 142}, language = {de} } @misc{HurrelmannKarchTraxler, author = {Hurrelmann, Klaus and Karch, Heribert and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen}, publisher = {Beltz Juventa}, address = {Weinheim}, isbn = {978-3-7799-3967-2}, pages = {169}, abstract = {Die vorliegende MetallRente Studie untersucht, welchen Einfluss sozialer Hintergrund, Geschlecht und Bildung auf Einstellungen und Handlungen junger Menschen haben, wenn es um die wichtigen Themen Finanzen und Vorsorge geht. Nach bisher drei Erhebungswellen in den Jahren 2010, 2013 und 2016 ist dies die vierte Auflage der bundesweit repr{\"a}sentativen Jugendstudie „Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen". 2 500 Jugendliche und junge Erwachsene im Alter von 17 bis 27 Jahren wurden befragt. Erneut wurden auch Gastautorinnen und Gaustautoren aus Wissenschaft, Institutionen und Wirtschaft eingeladen, die Befragungsergebnisse mit ihren Analysen und Kommentaren zu erg{\"a}nzen. Wie bew{\"a}ltigen junge Menschen das Spannungsfeld von eigener Verantwortung und staatlicher Regulierung? Welche Ver{\"a}nderungen werden gebraucht f{\"u}r eine zukunftsfeste Alterssicherung, die zur Lebenswirklichkeit der jungen Menschen passt? Auch die vierte MetallRente Studie geht mit dem Anspruch ans Werk, nicht nur zu analysieren, sondern Schlussfolgerungen zu formulieren sowie Forderungen und Vorschl{\"a}ge zu adressieren.}, language = {de} } @incollection{Traxler, author = {Traxler, Christian}, title = {Boosting und Nudging in der Altersvorsorge - Eine verhaltens{\"o}konomische Einordnung der Studienergebnisse}, series = {Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen}, booktitle = {Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen}, editor = {Hurrelmann, Klaus and Karch, Heribert and Traxler, Christian}, publisher = {Beltz Juventa}, address = {Weinheim}, isbn = {978-3-7799-3967-2}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {77 -- 85}, abstract = {Die MetallRente Studie 2019 zeichnet ein zwiesp{\"a}ltiges Bild. Zum einen betont mittlerweile jeder zweite junge Erwachsene, im „Hier und Heute" zu leben - was die Zukunft bringt, wisse ohnehin niemand; im Jahr 2010 stimmte nur jeder Dritte dieser Aussage zu (siehe Kapitel 1 in diesem Buch, Abb. 10). Konsistent damit sinkt auch der Anteil jener, die die Altersvorsorge als Grund zum Sparen angeben. Unter den regelm{\"a}ßig Sparenden, d. h., bei jungen Erwachsenen, deren {\"o}konomische Situation das Sparen erm{\"o}glicht, war die Altersversorge im Jahr 2010 noch f{\"u}r 66 \% der Befragten ein wichtiges Sparmotiv, w{\"a}hrend dieser Wert 2019 um zehn Prozentpunkte gesunken ist (siehe Kapitel 1, Abb. 15). Zum anderen scheint bei jungen Erwachsenen sehr wohl ein klares und immer starker ausgepr{\"a}gtes Problembewusstsein vorhanden zu sein: 82 \% der Befragten erkennen, dass der demografische Wandel die gesetzlichen Rentenkassen zunehmend unter Druck setzt; 85 \% rechnen damit, noch weit {\"u}ber ihr 67. Lebensjahr arbeiten zu m{\"u}ssen, und 86 \% stimmen der Aussage zu, dass ohne eine eigenst{\"a}ndige private Vorsorge deutlich mehr Menschen von Altersarmut betroffen sein werden (siehe Kapitel 1, Abb. 23). Damit, so konnte man meinen, ist den Jugendlichen und jungen Erwachsenen die Bedeutung der dritten S{\"a}ule in der Altersvorsorge klar. Die Studienergebnisse zeigen jedoch, dass die private Altersvorsorge weiterhin an Attraktivit{\"a}t einb{\"u}ßt.}, language = {de} } @article{DragoMengelTraxler, author = {Drago, Francesco and Mengel, Friederike and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Compliance Behavior in Networks: Evidence from a Field Experiment}, series = {American Economic Journal: Applied Economics}, volume = {12}, journal = {American Economic Journal: Applied Economics}, number = {2}, issn = {1945-7782 (Print) / 1945-7790 (Online)}, doi = {10.1257/app.20170690}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-33890}, pages = {96 -- 133}, abstract = {This paper studies the spread of compliance behavior in neighborhood networks in Austria. We exploit a field experiment that varied the content of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. The data reveal a strong treatment spillover: untreated households are more likely to switch from evasion to compliance in response to mailings received by their network neighbors. Digging deeper into the properties of the spillover, we find that it is concentrated among close neighbors of the targets and increases with the treated households' diffusion centrality. Local concentration of equally treated households implies a lower spillover.}, language = {en} } @techreport{TraxlerDušek, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Traxler, Christian and Dušek, Libor}, title = {Fines, Non-Payment, and Revenues: Evidence from Speeding Tickets}, series = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, journal = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, edition = {No. 23}, doi = {10.48462/opus4-5046}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-50461}, pages = {38}, abstract = {We estimate the effect of the level of fines on payment compliance and revenues collected from speeding tickets. Exploiting discontinuous increases in fines at speed cutoffs and reform induced variation in these discontinuities, we implement two complementary regression discontinuity designs. The results consistently document small payment responses: a 10\% increase in the fine (i.e. the payment obligation) induces a 1.2 percentage point decline in timely payments. The implied revenue elasticity is about 0.9. Expressed in absolute terms, a one dollar increase in the fine translates into a roughly 60 cent increase in payments collected within 15 days.}, language = {en} } @techreport{DušekTraxler, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Dušek, Libor and Traxler, Christian}, title = {Swiftness and Delay of Punishment}, series = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, journal = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, edition = {No. 32}, doi = {10.48462/opus4-5239}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-52391}, pages = {61}, abstract = {This paper studies how the swiftness and delay of punishment affect behavior. Using rich administrative data from automated speed cameras, we exploit two (quasi-)experimental sources of variation in the time between a speeding offense and the sending of a ticket. At the launch of the speed camera system, administrative challenges caused delays of up to three months. Later, we implemented a protocol that randomly assigned tickets to swift or delayed processing. We identify two different results. First, delays have a negative effect on payment compliance: the rate of timely paid fines diminishes by 7 to 9\% when a ticket is sent with a delay of four or more weeks. We also find some evidence that very swift tickets - sent on the first or second day following the offense - increase timely payments. These results align with the predictions of expert scholars that we elicited in a survey. Second, speeding tickets cause a strong, immediate, and persistent decline in speeding. However, we do not detect any robust, differential effects of swiftness or delay on speeding. This challenges widely held beliefs, as reflected in our survey. Yet, we document large mechanical benefits of swift punishment and provide a theoretical framework of learning and updating that explains our findings.}, language = {en} }