@article{IschingerBunde, author = {Ischinger, Wolfgang and Bunde, Tobias}, title = {European Security Policy at the End of the Post-Cold War Era}, series = {Global Policy}, volume = {8}, journal = {Global Policy}, number = {S4}, doi = {10.1111/1758-5899.12431}, pages = {27 -- 29}, abstract = {From today's viewpoint, 2016 may well represent the end of the post-Cold War era and the general assumptions that are associated with it. These include the beliefs that the United States remains a European power, guaranteeing the territorial integrity of its European NATO allies, that liberal democracy represents the political system widely seen as the only legitimate normative reference point, and that the future of the European Union will be defined by continued integration into an 'ever closer Union'. These assumptions have been shaken to the core.}, language = {en} } @misc{IschingerBundeLeinStrucketal., author = {Ischinger, Wolfgang and Bunde, Tobias and Lein-Struck, Antje and Oroz, Adrian}, title = {Towards Mutual Security: Fifty Years of Munich Security Conference}, editor = {Ischinger, Wolfgang and M{\"u}nchner Sicherheitskonferenz, Stiftung}, publisher = {Vandenhoeck \& Ruprecht}, address = {G{\"o}ttingen}, isbn = {978-3525300541}, pages = {477}, abstract = {The Munich Security Conference, founded as "Internationale Wehrkunde-Begegnung" in 1963, has evolved into the leading independent forum for security policy. Traditionally seen as a kind of transatlantic family meeting for debating NATO strategy during the Cold War, the conference has increasingly broadened its agenda and today attracts participants from across the globe. Each year, dozens of heads of state and government, ministers, and experts from different fields of security policy gather in Munich for an open exchange of ideas and policies on the most pressing international security issues - ranging from regional conflicts, international peace operations and nuclear disarmament to cyber security and environmental challenges. On the occasion of the conference's 50th anniversary in 2014, a number of prominent participants, including former and current foreign and defense ministers, reflect on the conference's history and significance, some of the major issues debated, and on key security challenges facing the international community.}, language = {en} } @article{IschingerBunde, author = {Ischinger, Wolfgang and Bunde, Tobias}, title = {Neue deutsche Diplomatie?}, series = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik}, volume = {8}, journal = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik}, number = {1}, doi = {10.1007/s12399-014-0462-4}, pages = {313 -- 333}, abstract = {In der aktuellen Debatte stellt sich die Frage, ob mit einer „neuen" deutschen Außenpolitik auch eine neue deutsche Diplomatie einhergeht oder einhergehen sollte. Berlin t{\"a}te gut daran, sich auf die außenpolitischen Traditionen der Bonner Republik zu besinnen. Diese Prinzipien werden bisweilen vernachl{\"a}ssigt, sind aber aufgrund der allseits konstatierten gewachsenen Bedeutung Deutschlands heute aktueller denn je. Allerdings bed{\"u}rfen die konkreten Instrumente der Diplomatie und ihr institutioneller Rahmen einer {\"U}berarbeitung, um den Herausforderungen gerecht zu werden, denen die Berliner Republik gegen{\"u}bersteht.}, language = {de} } @incollection{Bunde, author = {Bunde, Tobias}, title = {Social constructivism}, series = {Research Handbook on NATO}, booktitle = {Research Handbook on NATO}, editor = {Mayer, Sebastian}, publisher = {Edward Elgar Publishing Limited}, address = {Cheltenham}, isbn = {9781839103384}, doi = {10.4337/9781839103391.00014}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {69 -- 83}, abstract = {From a social constructivist perspective, NATO is not just another alliance or security institution, but the institutional embodiment of the transatlantic security community, which is based on a collective identity of liberal democracies. This collective identity serves as the main explanatory factor for social constructivist research dealing with NATO's creation, its specific institutional design and its unique culture of consultation. It also helps understand NATO's persistence after the end of the Cold War, its enlargement and its (liberal) out-of-area operations and missions in the post-Cold War period. Constructivism has become one of the key theoretical approaches in NATO research, offering a broader view of the Alliance and accounting for empirical anomalies that competitors fail to explain. Still, constructivist research has arguably not yet reached its full potential and could offer additional insights into NATO's past, presence and future. These lacunae are addressed in the chapter.}, language = {en} } @article{Bunde, author = {Bunde, Tobias}, title = {Lessons (to be) learned? Germany's Zeitenwende and European security after the Russian invasion of Ukraine}, series = {Contemporary Security Policy}, volume = {43}, journal = {Contemporary Security Policy}, number = {3}, doi = {10.1080/13523260.2022.2092820}, pages = {516 -- 530}, abstract = {In Germany, the Russian war on Ukraine is widely perceived as a "Zeitenwende," a watershed moment undermining key foreign policy beliefs. Despite mounting evidence contradicting them, German elites previously failed to adapt core beliefs regarding Russia and the use of force because these beliefs were not only deeply embedded in largely uncontested identity constructions but also shaped the definition of economic interests, which in turn made ideational adaptation more costly. Moreover, Germany's extraordinarily beneficial geopolitical situation in the post-Cold War era meant that the country could afford not to learn. Although the "Zeitenwende" will trigger significant change, it is unclear which lessons exactly Germans will now be learning and how far that adaptation will go. Given Germany's key position in Europe and its previous role in shaping the European and transatlantic policy toward Russia, the results of these learning processes will significantly shape the emerging European security order.}, language = {en} } @article{Bunde, author = {Bunde, Tobias}, title = {Defending European integration by (symbolically) integrating European defence? Germany and its ambivalent role in European security and defence policy}, series = {Journal of European Integration}, volume = {43}, journal = {Journal of European Integration}, number = {2}, doi = {10.1080/07036337.2021.1877693}, pages = {243 -- 259}, abstract = {For many German policymakers, a commitment to European integration in defence is a necessary means to further the end of European integration in general - in stark contrast to French leaders who see European integration as the means to reach the end of a stronger European defence. Although there is general support for European defence cooperation and even integration among the German public and state elites, other ideational factors, most notably wide-spread anti-militarist attitudes, military planners' traditional embeddedness in NATO planning procedures, and a deep commitment to parliamentary control of the armed forces, present manifest hurdles for real capacity-building on the supranational level. As a result, German efforts to integrate defence policy within the EU have been largely symbolic, while real progress takes place in other (bilateral or minilateral and often German-led) frameworks. Berlin has thus contributed considerably to the increasing institutional fragmentation and territorial differentiation in European defence.}, language = {en} } @article{BundeOnderco, author = {Bunde, Tobias and Onderco, Michal}, title = {Permissive dissensus: the nuclear dimension of the German Zeitenwende}, series = {The Nonproliferation Review}, volume = {30}, journal = {The Nonproliferation Review}, number = {4-6}, publisher = {Taylor \& Francis}, issn = {1073-6700}, doi = {10.1080/10736700.2024.2435137}, pages = {221 -- 240}, abstract = {For years, a debate raged within German elites and the public over whether Germany should continue to contribute to NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangement and procure new fighter jets equipped to carry US nuclear weapons. While this was ostensibly a technical issue, it touched on the very foundations of Germany's security policy. In the run-up to the elections in 2021, several party manifestos called for the withdrawal of US weapons from German soil, reflecting public skepticism. However, the new German government swiftly reaffirmed its long-term commitment to nuclear sharing and, soon after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, upped the ante by deciding to purchase F-35 fighter jets. Why could the German government quickly put an end to a debate that had preoccupied German policy makers for many years? This article explores the impact of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its nuclear saber rattling on Germany's nuclear policy. We argue that Russia's war of aggression unsettled the German domestic debate on nuclear deterrence, leading to a new "permissive dissensus." Supporters of nuclear deterrence seized this moment to push through their preferred policy as Russia's repeated nuclear threats bolstered the case for nuclear deterrence and momentarily weakened disarmament advocates.}, language = {en} } @article{Bunde, author = {Bunde, Tobias}, title = {Zeitenwende as a foreign policy identity crisis: Germany and the travails of adaptation after Russia's invasion of Ukraine}, series = {The British Journal of Politics and International Relations}, journal = {The British Journal of Politics and International Relations}, publisher = {SAGE Publications}, issn = {1369-1481}, doi = {10.1177/13691481241311568}, abstract = {While Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine represented a shock to countries across Europe, it was perceived as a particularly fundamental challenge in Germany - a 'Zeitenwende' as Chancellor Olaf Scholz called it. This article argues that the Russian invasion undermined widely shared foreign policy ideas, triggering a foreign policy identity crisis. This crisis allowed for significant ideational change and decisions previously considered unattainable. However, other elements of Germany's foreign policy identity have proven to be remarkably resilient, shaping the response across various policy areas. The absence of a new consensus that could be linked to other elements of the German collective identity has slowed adaptation in some areas and allowed opponents to push back. While German foreign policy has changed significantly since the beginning of the invasion, additional adaptation will not be as swift and extensive as many of Berlin's partners would like and as the changing security environment arguably demands.}, language = {en} } @article{BundeOnderco, author = {Bunde, Tobias and Onderco, Michal}, title = {Nuclear Zeitenwende? The consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine for nuclear policies around the world}, series = {The Nonproliferation Review}, volume = {30}, journal = {The Nonproliferation Review}, number = {4-6}, publisher = {Taylor \& Francis}, issn = {1073-6700}, doi = {10.1080/10736700.2024.2437290}, pages = {159 -- 172}, abstract = {Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been widely perceived as a turning point in world politics—or a "Zeitenwende," as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz called it. As the invasion has taken place under a nuclear shadow, with Russian President Vladimir Putin threatening the use of nuclear weapons, this begs the question of whether the Russia-Ukraine war also represents a "nuclear Zeitenwende." Against this background, this introduction spells out the rationale of this special issue, which focuses on how domestic actors in various countries perceive Russia's nuclear saber rattling and how they respond to it. After providing a brief overview of the existing work on the nuclear aspects of Russia's invasion, the piece provides a summary of the contributions that aim to shed light on the impact of Russia's war of aggression on the nuclear policies of different countries and the differences between various national responses. In sum, the contributions paint a heterogeneous picture of the nuclear Zeitenwende. They show that leaders and publics around the world have drawn different conclusions from Russia's invasion and that the nuclear Zeitenwende is what domestic actors make of it.}, language = {en} } @techreport{Bunde, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bunde, Tobias}, title = {Lessons (to be) learned? Germany's Zeitenwende and European security after the Russian invasion of Ukraine}, doi = {10.48462/opus4-5578}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-55785}, pages = {24}, abstract = {In Germany, the Russian war on Ukraine is widely perceived as a "Zeitenwende," a watershed moment undermining key foreign policy beliefs. Despite mounting evidence contradicting them, German elites previously failed to adapt core beliefs regarding Russia and the use of force because these beliefs were not deeply embedded in largely contested identity constructions but also shaped the definition of economic interests, which in turn made ideational adaptation more costly. Moreover, Germany's extraordinarily beneficial geopolitical situation in the post-Cold War era meant that the country could afford not to learn. Although the "Zeitenwende" will trigger significant change, it is unclear which lessons exactly Germans will now be learning and how far that adaptation will go. Given Germany's key position in Europe and its previous role in shaping the European and transatlantic policy toward Russia, the results of these learning processes will significantly shape the emerging security European order.}, language = {en} }