@incollection{CostelloCox, author = {Costello, Cathryn and Cox, Neville}, title = {Sports Law}, series = {Annual Review of Irish Law}, booktitle = {Annual Review of Irish Law}, editor = {Byrne, Raymond and Binchy, William}, publisher = {Thomson Round Hall}, address = {Dublin}, isbn = {9781858003153}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {539 -- 553}, language = {en} } @article{Hassel, author = {Hassel, Anke}, title = {The Erosion Continues: Reply}, series = {British Journal of Industrial Relations}, volume = {40}, journal = {British Journal of Industrial Relations}, number = {2}, doi = {10.1111/1467-8543.00234}, pages = {309 -- 317}, language = {en} } @article{Hassel, author = {Hassel, Anke}, title = {The Erosion of the German System of Industrial Relations}, series = {British Journal of Industrial Relations}, volume = {37}, journal = {British Journal of Industrial Relations}, number = {3}, doi = {10.1111/1467-8543.00138}, pages = {483 -- 505}, abstract = {The paper assesses current trajectories of change in the German system of industrial relations by analysing the co-determination and collective bargaining systems. It argues that two parallel developments undermine the institutional stability of the German model. First, the institutional base of the German industrial relations system, which has served as the pre-condition of its past success, has been shrinking during the last two decades. This is due to a decline in coverage by the two major industrial relations institutions: the works council system and wage agreements. Today fewer than 15 per cent of German plants are covered by both a valid collective agreement and a works council. Second, increasing decentralization pressures within collective bargaining tend to undermine the division of labour between co-determination and collective bargaining. The dynamics of an institutional erosion of the German industrial relations institutions and the decentralization of collective bargaining disturbs the fine-tuning of the mediating process between macroeconomic steering capacity and co-operative workplace industrial relations. This tendency has been aggravated by the effects of German unification. The current institutional developments of the German industrial relations system leave serious doubts about the future of a successful model of co-operative modernization.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergVinhasdeSouzaRobertsClark, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Vinhas de Souza, Lucio and Roberts Clark, William}, title = {Political Business Cycles in EU Accession Countries}, series = {European Union Politics}, volume = {3}, journal = {European Union Politics}, number = {2}, issn = {1741-2757}, doi = {10.1177/1465116502003002005}, pages = {231 -- 250}, abstract = {This paper considers whether political business cycles existed in East European accession countries during the period 1990-9. Based on the Mundell-Fleming model expanded in Clark and Hallerberg (2000), we argue that the type of exchange rate regime and the relative independence of the central bank affects the instruments governments use to influence the economy before elections. In our empirical analysis, we find that accession countries with dependent central banks and flexible exchange rates have looser monetary policies in electoral periods than in non-electoral periods. If a country has a fixed exchange rate regime, it manipulates its economy in election years through running larger budgets instead of through looser monetary policy. The presence of such cycles in Eastern Europe has implications for the introduction of the euro in EU accession countries.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergWeber, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Weber, Katja}, title = {German Unification 1815-1871 and Its Relevance for Integration Theory}, series = {Journal of European Integration}, volume = {24}, journal = {Journal of European Integration}, number = {1}, issn = {1477-2280}, doi = {10.1080/07036330290014633}, pages = {1 -- 21}, abstract = {This paper reconsiders German unification during the period 1815-1871. First, it makes explicit the comparison between the German Empire and the European Union. Actors faced remarkably similar institution-building problems in both organisations. The second part of the paper evaluates the usefulness of three arguments from two theoretical traditions in European Union integration studies to explain the course of German unification. Following an analytic narrative approach, it considers the relevant actors and the relevant decision points to evaluate two versions of intergovernmentalism, one focused on the security concerns of actors and one focused on economic concerns, as well as neo-functionalism. Economic interests did play a role even in the geopolitically heavy 19th century. Neo-functionalism was less useful, although some structures like pan-German interest groups in support of further integration did develop as neo-functionalists would predict.}, language = {en} } @article{Hallerberg, author = {Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Fiscal Policy in the European Union}, series = {European Union Politics}, volume = {3}, journal = {European Union Politics}, number = {2}, issn = {1741-2757}, doi = {10.1177/1465116502003002001}, pages = {139 -- 150}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergStrauch, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Strauch, Rolf}, title = {On the Cyclicality of Public Finances in Europe}, series = {Empirica}, volume = {29}, journal = {Empirica}, number = {3}, issn = {1573-6911}, pages = {183 -- 207}, abstract = {Under EMU, monetary policy is oriented toward the euro area as a whole and fiscal policy is an important instrument remaining in the hands of national governments to cushion economic shocks to individual countries. The current paper analyses the cyclical pattern of public finances in Europe and addresses the question of whether fiscal policies have been geared towards this stabilising role. Although taxes fluctuate countercyclically in a conventional manner, we find that discretionary measures have tended to undermine automatic stabilisers. On the expenditure side, we find that public investment also displays a consistent procyclical pattern. Dynamic analysis reveals that a permanent shock to output induces asynchronous fluctuations in taxes and expenditures in the year of the shock and in periods thereafter. Finally, we examine political and institutional factors. The political fragmentation of the government as well as the partisan hue of the government do not interfere with the cyclical response of public finances, but we do find evidence of a pronounced electoral cycle.}, language = {en} } @article{Hallerberg, author = {Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions}, series = {International Organization}, volume = {56}, journal = {International Organization}, number = {4}, issn = {1531-5088}, doi = {10.1162/002081802760403775}, pages = {775 -- 802}, abstract = {I argue that two types of veto players matter in the choice of monetary institutions: party veto players and subnational governments, which are strong in federal systems but weak in unitary systems. A crucial issue is whether voters can readily identify the manipulation of the economy with party players. A second issue concerns the national party veto player's ability to control either fiscal or monetary policy. In one-party unitary governments identification and control are clear; parties where such governments are common prefer flexible exchange rates and dependent central banks. In multiparty coalition governments in unitary systems, identification is traditionally difficult, and the ability to target benefits to specific constituencies under fiscal policy makes fiscal policy autonomy more attractive for coalition governments. Such governments prefer central banks that are politically independent but that finance government debt. Under federalism, parties that constitute the central government have less control over fiscal policy and they prefer flexible exchange rates. Subnational governments do not support a dependent central bank that gives more power to the central government.}, language = {en} } @article{Hallerberg, author = {Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {The political economy of taxation in Prussia, 1871-1914}, series = {Jahrbuch f{\"u}r Wirtschaftsgeschichte}, volume = {2002}, journal = {Jahrbuch f{\"u}r Wirtschaftsgeschichte}, number = {2}, issn = {0075-2800}, pages = {11 -- 33}, abstract = {This paper examines the political economy of taxation in the Bundesstaat of Prussia during the Kaiserreich period. It examines how different factors of production with different levels of relative mobility, organized roughly along party lines, interacted with one another on taxation issues. It pays particular attention to the institutional composition of the Prussian state and how the institutions affected the mix of taxes the state levied. In particular, several elements of Prussia's electoral system, including the use of a three-class system, the distribution of electoral districts, and an indirect vote, guaranteed that large agricultural landowners would hold most of the power in spite of increasing industrialization. The parliament therefore consistently changed the tax code to reduce the burden on large agriculture.}, language = {en} } @article{Mair, author = {Mair, Johanna}, title = {Mandos intermedios con iniciativa. Un estudio emp{\´i}rico de su comportamiento emprendedor}, series = {Iniciativa Emprendedora y Empresa Familiar}, volume = {36}, journal = {Iniciativa Emprendedora y Empresa Familiar}, pages = {37 -- 43}, language = {es} }