@incollection{EnderleinFunkeLindner, author = {Enderlein, Henrik and Funke, Ole and Lindner, Johannes}, title = {The EU budget: which fiscal capacity at the European level?}, series = {European Union: Power and policy-making}, booktitle = {European Union: Power and policy-making}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {New York}, isbn = {978-0415715522}, pages = {211 -- 232}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{WernerJugl, author = {Werner, Klaus-Ulrich and Jugl, Anita}, title = {Nutzerforschung mit LibQual+®: Eine Anwendung an der Philologischen Bibliothek der FU Berlin}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-12055}, pages = {10}, abstract = {Nutzerforschung mit LibQual+®: Eine Anwendung an der Philologischen Bibliothek der FU Berlin}, language = {de} } @inproceedings{Quitzsch, author = {Quitzsch, Nicole}, title = {Vorbei die Zeiten von Gebrauchsanweisungen f{\"u}r Bibliotheksportale - Nutzerbeteiligung am Beispiel des neuen KOBV-Portals}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-12065}, pages = {24}, abstract = {Vorbei die Zeiten von Gebrauchsanweisungen f{\"u}r Bibliotheksportale - Nutzerbeteiligung am Beispiel des neuen KOBV-Portals}, language = {de} } @inproceedings{Vogel, author = {Vogel, Ivo}, title = {Vom Sondersammelgebiet zum Fachinformationsdienst f{\"u}r die Wissenschaft: Strategien, Prozesse, Verfahren - ein pers{\"o}nlicher Erfahrungsbericht}, abstract = {Vom Sondersammelgebiet zum Fachinformationsdienst f{\"u}r die Wissenschaft: Strategien, Prozesse, Verfahren - ein pers{\"o}nlicher Erfahrungsbericht}, language = {de} } @article{Wegrich, author = {Wegrich, Kai}, title = {Accommodating a foreign Object: Federalism, Coordination and Performance Management in the Reform of German Employment Administration}, series = {Public Management Review}, volume = {17}, journal = {Public Management Review}, number = {7}, publisher = {Routledge}, issn = {1471-9045}, doi = {10.1080/14719037.2015.1029345}, pages = {940 -- 959}, abstract = {This paper uses the case of the reform of the German employment administration to explore the usage of performance management approaches within multi-level governance settings. It traces the adoption and accommodation of the performance management approach to govern the joint service centres (called 'Jobcenter') at the local level within the multi-level administrative coordination regime in Germany's federal system. A contribution is made to nascent debates about the potential of managerial tools in systems of negotiated decision-making. The paper shows how performance management is adapted to the institutional logic of multi-level administrative coordination and serves as a facilitator of cross-level coordination.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Wegrich, author = {Wegrich, Kai}, title = {Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky: Implementation}, series = {Oxford Handbook of Classics in Public Policy and Public Administration}, booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Classics in Public Policy and Public Administration}, address = {Oxford}, isbn = {978-0-19-964613-5}, language = {en} } @article{Gandrud, author = {Gandrud, Christopher}, title = {simPH: An R Package for Illustrating Estimates from Cox Proportional Hazard Models Including for Interactive and Nonlinear Effects}, series = {Journal of Statistical Software}, volume = {65}, journal = {Journal of Statistical Software}, number = {3}, publisher = {University of California at Los Angeles}, address = {Los Angeles}, issn = {1548-7660}, doi = {10.18637/jss.v065.i03}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-15483}, pages = {1 -- 20}, abstract = {The R package simPH provides tools for effectively communicating results from Cox proportional hazard (PH) models, including models with interactive and nonlinear effects. The Cox (PH) model is a popular tool for examining event data. However, previously available computational tools have not made it easy to explore and communicate quantities of interest and associated uncertainty estimated from them. This is especially true when the effects are interactions or nonlinear transformations of continuous variables. These transformations are especially useful with Cox PH models because they can be employed to correctly specifying models that would otherwise violate the nonproportional hazards assumption. Package simPH makes it easy to simulate and then plot quantities of interest for a variety of effects estimated from Cox PH models including interactive effects, nonlinear effects, as well as standard linear effects. Package simPH employs visual weighting in order to effectively communicate estimation uncertainty. There are options to show either the standard central interval of the simulation's distribution or the shortest probability interval - which can be useful for asymmetrically distributed estimates. This paper uses hypothetical and empirical examples to illustrate package simPH's syntax and capabilities.}, language = {en} } @article{GandrudGrafstroem, author = {Gandrud, Christopher and Grafstr{\"o}m, Cassandra}, title = {Inflated Expectations: How government partisanship shapes monetary policy bureaucrats' inflation forecasts}, series = {Political Science Research and Methods}, volume = {3}, journal = {Political Science Research and Methods}, number = {2}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ. Press}, address = {Cambridge}, issn = {2049-8470}, doi = {10.1017/psrm.2014.34}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-15496}, pages = {353 -- 380}, abstract = {Governments' party identifications can indicate the types of economic policies they are likely to pursue. A common rule of thumb is that left-party governments are expected to pursue policies for lower unemployment, but which may cause inflation. Right-party governments are expected to pursue lower inflation policies. How do these expectations shape the inflation forecasts of monetary policy bureaucrats? If there is a mismatch between the policies bureaucrats expect governments to implement and those that they actually do, forecasts will be systematically biased. Using US Federal Reserve Staff's forecasts we test for executive partisan biases. We find that irrespective of actual policy and economic conditions forecasters systematically overestimate future inflation during left-party presidencies and underestimate future inflation during right-party ones. Our findings suggest that partisan heuristics play an important part in monetary policy bureaucrats' inflation expectations.}, language = {en} } @article{GandrudHallerberg, author = {Gandrud, Christopher and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {When all is said and done: updating "Elections, special interests, and financial crisis"}, series = {Research and Politics}, volume = {2}, journal = {Research and Politics}, number = {3}, publisher = {Sage}, address = {London [u.a.]}, issn = {2053-1680}, doi = {10.1177/2053168015589335}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-15509}, pages = {1 -- 9}, abstract = {How do elections affect the costliness of financial crises to taxpayers? Previous research contends that more electorally competitive countries choose policies that are less costly to taxpayers. In this paper, we update Keefer's seminal 2007 article published in International Organization with revised data. The original article found that more electorally competitive countries had lower fiscal costs from responding to crises. The commonly used IMF/World Bank data set Keefer employed has since been extensively corrected and expanded. We update the original analysis with the newest version of this data set. After doing so, we find no evidence for an association between electoral competitiveness and the fiscal costs of responding to financial crises both within the original sample and outside of it. Our update highlights a broader methodological lesson: that the costs of responding to financial crises can take many years to be settled. Future research should explicitly address and model this delayed cost resolution.}, language = {en} } @article{GandrudHallerberg, author = {Gandrud, Christopher and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Does Banking Union Worsen the EU's Democratic Deficit? The Need for Greater Supervisory Data Transparency}, series = {Journal of Common Market Studies}, volume = {53}, journal = {Journal of Common Market Studies}, number = {4}, publisher = {Blackwell}, address = {Oxford [u.a.]}, issn = {0021-9886}, doi = {10.1111/jcms.12226}, pages = {769 -- 785}, abstract = {Does banking union exacerbate the European Union's democratic deficit? Using Scharpf's 'input' and 'output' legitimacy concepts, it is argued in this article that its design does worsen the democratic deficit. There are good reasons to limit 'input legitimacy' for politically independent institutions. 'Output legitimacy' is then even more relevant. Transparency is a key part of 'output legitimacy'. It enables actors to judge whether the regulator is acting in the public's interest and can improve their outputs. This article focuses on the banking data that the supervisors collect. Data available to the European public is evaluated and compared to America's banking union. European practices are not comparable in terms of availability or detail. An original survey of relevant officials is conducted, which results in the finding that only 11 of 28 Member States release any information on the banks they supervise. Both EU and national supervisors should provide publicly available, timely and consistent individual bank data.}, language = {en} }