TY - JOUR A1 - Henke, Marina T1 - The Rotten Carrot: Reexamining U.S.-Turkish Bargaining Failure over Iraq in 2003 T2 - Security Studies N2 - Side-payments are commonly used in international relations to alter the foreign policies of states. Despite their frequent usage, however, our understanding is very limited when it comes to why certain side-payment negotiations succeed while others fail. This article tries to remedy this shortcoming. It argues that social embeddedness between actors involved in the negotiations has a major bearing on bargaining outcomes. Under ideal circumstances, social relationships can be used to reduce information asymmetries and increase trust. Nevertheless, in the presence of fractured social networks, social ties can foster information bias and distrust thus ultimately increasing the likelihood of bargaining failure. This article uses U.S.-Turkish bargaining failure over the Iraq intervention in 2003 to illustrate and test this theory. KW - Iraq, USA, Turkey Y1 - 2019 UR - https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-hsog/frontdoor/index/index/docId/3076 VL - 27 ER -