TY - JOUR A1 - Henke, Marina T1 - Buying Allies: Payment Practices in Multilateral Military Coalition-Building T2 - International Security N2 - Many countries serving in multilateral military coalitions are "paid" to do so, either in cash or in concessions relating to other international issues. This article examines whether these payment practices follow a systematic pattern. It suggests that 'pivotal states' provide the means to cover such payments. These states reason that rewarding third parties to serve in multilateral coalitions holds important political benefits. Moreover, two distinct types of payment schemes exist: deployment subsidies and political side-deals. Three types of states are most likely to receive such payments: (1) states that are inadequately resourced to deploy; (2) states that are perceived by the pivotal states as critical contributors to the coalition endeavor; and (3) opportunistic states that perceive a coalition deployment as an opportunity to negotiate a quid pro quo. Using hundreds of declassified archival sources as well as elite interviews, the article illustrates these practices with historical examples from the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the U.S. intervention in Iraq, the NATO intervention in Afghanistan, the UN-AU mission in Darfur, and the AU mission in Somalia. The theory and evidence presented in this article generate new insights into how security cooperation comes about, and how burden-sharing works in practice. Moreover, it raises important questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of such payment schemes in multilateral military deployments. Y1 - 2019 UR - https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-hsog/frontdoor/index/index/docId/3074 VL - 43 IS - 4 SP - 128 EP - 162 ER -