TY - JOUR A1 - Fellner, Gerlinde A1 - Sausgruber, Rupert A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information JF - Journal of the European Economic Association N2 - We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailings, a threat treatment which makes a high detection risk salient has a significant deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others’ behavior enhances compliance on aggregate. However, the information condition has a weak positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common. KW - field experiments KW - enforcement strategies KW - compliance KW - perceptions Y1 - 2013 UR - https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-hsog/frontdoor/index/index/docId/1970 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-19704 N1 - This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Journal of the European Economic Association. The final authenticated version is available online at: DOI 10.1111/jeea.12013| VL - 11 IS - 3 SP - 634 EP - 660 ER -