TY - JOUR A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Social Norms and Conditional Cooperative Taxpayers T2 - European Journal of Political Economy N2 - This paper incorporates tax morale into the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model of income tax evasion. Tax morale is modeled as a social norm for tax compliance. The strength of the norm is shaped endogenously, depending on the share of evaders in the society. Taxpayers act conditionally cooperative as their evasion depends on the others' compliance. We characterize the equilibrium which accounts for this interdependence and study the implications for tax and enforcement policies. The analysis is extended to the case of a society consisting of heterogenous communities. Individual evasion decisions are then embedded in a complex social structure and behavior is influenced by the norm compliance among morale reference groups. Within this framework, we highlight the role of belief management as an alternative policy tool. KW - Tax evasion KW - Social norms KW - Multiple equilibria KW - Conditional cooperation KW - Belief management Y1 - 2017 UR - https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-hsog/frontdoor/index/index/docId/2160 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21603 SN - 0176-2680 N1 - This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in European Journal of Political Economy. The final authenticated version is available online at: DOI 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.11.001 VL - 26 IS - 1 SP - 89 EP - 103 ER -