TY - JOUR A1 - Albrecht, Felix A1 - Kube, Sebastian A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Cooperation and norm enforcement - The individual-level perspective JF - Journal of Public Economics N2 - We explore the relationship between individuals' disposition to cooperate and their inclination to engage in peer punishment as well as their relative importance for mitigating social dilemmas. Using a modified strategy-method approach we identify individual punishment patterns and link them with individual cooperation patterns. Classifying N = 628 subjects along these two dimensions documents that cooperation and punishment patterns are aligned for most individuals. However, the data also reveal a sizable share of free-riders that punish pro-socially and conditional cooperators that do not engage in punishment. Analyzing the interplay between types in an additional experiment, we show that pro-social punishers are important for achieving cooperation. Incorporating information on punishment types explains large amounts of the between- and within-group variation in cooperation. KW - Strategy-method KW - Punishment patterns KW - Type classification KW - Conditional cooperation KW - Public-good games Y1 - 2018 UR - https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-hsog/frontdoor/index/index/docId/2585 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-25853 N1 - This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Journal of Public Economics. The final authenticated version is available online at: DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.06.010 Document includes Appendix. VL - 165 SP - 1 EP - 16 ER -