TY - UNPD A1 - Salazar-Morales, Diego A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - The Role of Fiscal Coordination and Partisanship in the Spanish Fiscal Federalist System: Lessons for European Union reforms N2 - An issue that the European Union continues to face is how to coordinate the economic and fiscal policies of its member states. Recent reforms that created the European Semester require additional information concerning member states’ fiscal plans for the Commission and Council to review more rigorously. Spain has developed similar provisions for its regions. In this paper, Mark Hallerberg and Diego Salazar-Morales consider the possible lessons arising from the emerging federation in Spain for the European framework. They analyse the performance of Spain’s fiscal federalist framework with a special emphasis on its coordination and political relationship with the autonomous regions. Their findings suggest that coordination agreements are negatively correlated with balances, indicating that such agreements are indicators of fiscal problems and also that they did not contribute to lower deficits. Moreover, they find that politics, rather than fiscal rules and frameworks, led to differing fiscal performance. The paper concludes with lessons from Spain’s experience for the European Union. KW - Spain KW - European Union KW - fiscal policy KW - coordination KW - shared goals Y1 - 2018 UR - https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-hsog/frontdoor/index/index/docId/3864 UR - https://www.dahrendorf-forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Spanish-Fiscal-Federalism.pdf ER -