TY - JOUR A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Voting over Taxes : The Case of Tax Evasion JF - Public Choice N2 - This paper studies majority voting on taxes when tax evasion is possible. We characterize the voting equilibrium where the agent with median taxed income is pivotal. Since the ranking of true incomes does not necessarily correspond to the ranking of taxed incomes, the decisive voter can differ from the median income receiver. In this case, we find unconventional patterns of redistribution, e.g., from the middle class to the poor and the rich. KW - Majority Voting KW - Tax Evasion KW - Welfare Analysis KW - Redistribution Y1 - 2009 UR - https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-hsog/frontdoor/index/index/docId/2162 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21624 SN - 0048-5829 VL - 140 IS - 1-2 SP - 43 EP - 58 ER -