TY - UNPD A1 - Danilov, Anastasia A1 - Hong, Ju Yeong A1 - Schöttner, Anja T1 - Strategic Use of Unfriendly Leadership and Labor Market Competition: An Experimental Analysis T2 - Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers N2 - A significant portion of the workforce experiences what we term `unfriendly leadership,' encompassing various forms of hostile behavior exhibited by managers. The motivations driving managers to adopt such behaviors are insufficiently understood. To explore this phenomenon, we conducted a laboratory experiment examining the relationship between managers' use of unfriendly leadership and labor market competition. We discern two labor market states: excess labor demand, where managers compete to hire workers, and excess labor supply, where workers compete to be hired. By perceiving unfriendly leadership as a performance-contingent punishment device inflicting discomfort on workers, we hypothesize that managers are less inclined to resort to unfriendly leadership when they compete to hire workers. We find that managers tend to engage in unfriendly leadership more frequently and intensely under excess labor supply, in comparison to excess labor demand. This trend is particularly pronounced among male participants. Additionally, workers display a decreased likelihood of accepting employment offers from more unfriendly managers and exert lower levels of effort when working under such managers, indicating that unfriendly leadership is costly. T3 - Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers - 42 Y1 - 2024 UR - https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-hsog/frontdoor/index/index/docId/5547 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-55471 UR - https://berlinschoolofeconomics.de/insights/discussion-papers ET - No. 42 ER -