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The Asymmetric Public Goods Game (APGG) C++ framework offers an easy to use environment to study game theoretical questions. Specifically, it is designed to address questions in the domain of asymmetric public goods games.
We hereby publish version 1.1.2 of our software APGG (Release for DOI via Zenodo for paper in JOSS, the Journal of Open Source Software).
Package ‘rSRD’
(2023)
We provide an implementation for Sum of Ranking Differences (SRD),
a novel statistical test introduced by Héberger (2010)
<doi:10.1016/j.trac.2009.09.009>. The test allows the comparison of
different solutions through a reference by first performing a rank
transformation on the input, then calculating and comparing the distances
between the solutions and the reference - the latter is measured in the
L1 norm. The reference can be an external benchmark (e.g. an established
gold standard) or can be aggregated from the data. The calculated distances,
called SRD scores, are validated in two ways, see Héberger and Kollár-Hunek
(2011) <doi:10.1002/cem.1320>. A randomization test (also called permutation
test) compares the SRD scores of the solutions to the SRD scores of randomly
generated rankings. The second validation option is cross-validation that
checks whether the rankings generated from the solutions come from the same
distribution or not. For a detailed analysis about the cross-validation
process see Sziklai, Baranyi and Héberger (2021) <arXiv:2105.11939>. The
package offers a wide array of features related to SRD including the computation
of the SRD scores, validation options, input preprocessing and plotting tools.
One of the most pressing problems the modern world faces today is climate change. In most countries, the average annual temperature is rising in a massive an unprecedented manner (IPCC 2022). The serious consequences create risks that can be differentiated into acute (e.g., frequent and severe extreme weather events) and chronic physical climate risks, which cause major damage in various forms also for the country of Georgia.
It is clear from the outset, that due to the scope of the problems some lasting destruction is inevitable. Hence climate change adaptation is as important as mitigation. In both respects, due to its pivotal role within the society and its role in the origination of the problem, economy is the main focus. As a consequence, especially those sectors most affected by and most contributing to climate change need to be transformed in a consequent and timely manner. But for this transformation to succeed, financing is needed and hence financial institutions are essential.
However, from the perspective of financial institutions, the transformation also has a downside: With changing markets and framing conditions, new challenges and risks are arising, labelled as transition (climate) risks. Because in every transformation, there are those that profit and those that suffer. If individual entrepreneurs or companies face economic problems because they find themselves on the losing side of transformation, this could harm their abilities to pay back loans and hence will affect banks and MFI’s as well. Therefore, both physical and transition risks will also affect the banks/ MFI ‘s. This requires Central banks to act in order to preserve financial stability, addressing both the requirement and the practical steps to implement the consideration of especially climate risk management in banks and financial institutions.
We are studying the Gately point, an established solution concept for cooperative games. We point out that there are superadditive games for which the Gately point is not unique, i.e. in general the concept is rather set-valued than an actual point. We derive conditions under which the Gately point is guaranteed to be a unique imputation and provide a geometric interpretation. The Gately point can be understood as the intersection of a line defined by two points with the set of imputations. Our uniqueness conditions guarantee that these two points do not coincide. We provide demonstrative interpretations for negative propensities to disrupt. We briefly show that our uniqueness conditions for the Gately point include quasibalanced games and discuss the relation of the Gately point to the τ-value in this context. Finally, we point out relations to cost games and the ACA method and end upon a few remarks on the implementation of the Gately point and an upcoming software package for cooperative game theory.