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Aggregated Power Indices for Measuring Indirect Control in Complex Corporate Networks with Float Shareholders

  • The purpose of this paper is to introduce new methods to measure the indirect control power of firms in complex corporate shareholding structures using the concept of power indices from cooperative game theory. The proposed measures vary in desirable properties satisfied, as well as in the bargaining models of power indices used to construct them. Hence, they can be used to produce different pictures of the coalitional strength of firms in control of other firms in mutual shareholding networks with the presence of cycles. Precisely, in the framework of Karos and Peters from 2015, ten power indices substitute the original Shapley and Shubik power index in a modular fashion. In this way, we obtain a set of new measures called aggregated indices. The float shareholders typically hold less than 5 percent of the outstanding shares, which is an uncertain element of indirect control in complex shareholding structures. The fuzzy number seems appropriate to model these shareholders’ behavior. The novelty is that we model the behavior of floatThe purpose of this paper is to introduce new methods to measure the indirect control power of firms in complex corporate shareholding structures using the concept of power indices from cooperative game theory. The proposed measures vary in desirable properties satisfied, as well as in the bargaining models of power indices used to construct them. Hence, they can be used to produce different pictures of the coalitional strength of firms in control of other firms in mutual shareholding networks with the presence of cycles. Precisely, in the framework of Karos and Peters from 2015, ten power indices substitute the original Shapley and Shubik power index in a modular fashion. In this way, we obtain a set of new measures called aggregated indices. The float shareholders typically hold less than 5 percent of the outstanding shares, which is an uncertain element of indirect control in complex shareholding structures. The fuzzy number seems appropriate to model these shareholders’ behavior. The novelty is that we model the behavior of float using Z-fuzzy numbers. The new methods are tested in an example. The article belongs to the Special Issue "Decision Optimization in Information Theory and Game Theory" of the journal "Entropy".show moreshow less

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Metadaten
Author:Izabella StachORCiD, Jacek MercikORCiD, Cesarino BertiniORCiD, Barbara GladyszORCiD, Jochen StaudacherORCiDGND
DOI:https://doi.org/10.3390/e25030429
Identifier:1099-4300 OPAC HS OPAC extern
Parent Title (English):Entropy
Publisher:MDPI
Place of publication:Basel
Document Type:Article
Language:English
Date of Publication (online):2023/02/27
Year of first Publication:2023
Tag:Z-fuzzy number; cooperative game theory; corporate shareholding networks; direct and indirect control; power indices
GND Keyword:Spieltheorie
Volume:25
Issue:3
Article Number:429
Number of pages:27 Seiten
First Page:1
Last Page:27
Institutes:Fakultät Informatik
IFI - Institut für Internationalisierung
Dewey Decimal Classification:0 Informatik, Informationswissenschaft, allgemeine Werke
3 Sozialwissenschaften
Open Access:open_access
Research focus:FSP4: Soziale Innovationen
Publication Lists:Staudacher, Jochen
Publication reviewed:begutachtet
Release Date:2023/05/15
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