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Es scheint so zu sein, dass sich die beiden Ziele Gebrauchstauglichkeit und Sicherheit sehr häufig in der Umsetzung gegenseitig ausschließen: Eine sehr sichere Anwendung ist meistens eher aufwändiger zu benutzen und zu warten, eine einfach zu benutzende Anwendung vernachlässigt häufig die Sicherheit.
Als Lösung kann (wieder einmal) darauf hingewiesen werden, dass "gute" Software mehr ist als lediglich funktionierende Software. Im gesamten Entwicklungsprozess müssen vielfältige funktionale und nicht-funktionale Anforderungen, wie die der Sicherheit und Gebrauchstauglichkeit, berücksichtigt werden, um allen, auch sich zunächst widersprechenden, Anforderungen gerecht zu werden.
We present a pattern system/or security requirements engineering, consisting of security problem frames and concretized security problem frames. These are special kinds of problem frames that serve to structure, characterize, analyze, and finally solve software development problems in the area of software and system security. We equip each frame with formal preconditions and postconditions. The analysis of these conditions results in a pattern system that explicitly shows the dependencies between the different frames. Moreover, we indicate related frames, which are commonly used together with the considered frame. Hence, our approach helps security engineers to avoid omissions and to cover all security requirements that are relevant for a given problem.
This paper presents a conceptual framework for security engineering, with a strong focus on security requirements elicitation and analysis. This conceptual framework establishes a clear-cut vocabulary and makes explicit the interrelations between the different concepts and notions used in security engineering. Further, we apply our conceptual framework to compare and evaluate current security requirements engineering approaches, such as the Common Criteria, Secure Tropos, SREP, MSRA, as well as methods based on UML and problem frames. We review these methods and assess them according to different criteria, such as the general approach and scope of the method, its validation, and quality assurance capabilities. Finally, we discuss how these methods are related to the conceptual framework and to one another.
The Security Twin Peaks
(2011)
In this paper, the author aim to present a threat and risk-driven methodology to security requirements engineering. The chosen approach has a strong focus on gathering, modeling, and analyzing the environment in which a secure ICT-system to be built is located. The knowledge about the environment comprises threat and risk models. As presented in the paper, this security-relevant knowledge is used to assess the adequacy of security mechanisms, which are then selected to establish security requirements.
Developing security-critical systems is difficult, and there are many well-known examples of vulnerabilities exploited in practice. In fact, there has recently been a lot of work on methods, techniques, and tools to improve this situation already at the system specification and design. However, security-critical systems are increasingly long-living and undergo evolution throughout their lifetime. Therefore, a secure software development approach that supports maintaining the needed levels of security even through later software evolution is highly desirable. In this chapter, we recall the UMLsec approach to model-based security and discuss on tools and techniques to model and verify evolution of UMLsec models.
The authors present a security engineering process based on security problem frames and concretized security problem frames. Both kinds of frames constitute patterns for analyzing security problems and associated solution approaches. They are arranged in a pattern system that makes dependencies between them explicit. The authors describe step-by-step how the pattern system can be used to analyze a given security problem and how solution approaches can be found. Afterwards, the security problems and the solution approaches are formally modeled in detail. The formal models serve to prove that the solution approaches are correct solutions to the security problems. Furthermore, the formal models of the solution approaches constitute a formal specification of the software to be developed. Then, the specification is implemented by generic security components and generic security architectures, which constitute architectural patterns. Finally, the generic security components and the generic security architecture that composes them are refined and the result is a secure software product built from existing and/or tailor-made security components.
Considering legal aspects during software development is a challenging problem, due to the cross-disciplinary expertise required. The problem is even more complex for cloud computing systems, because of the international distribution, huge amounts of processed data, and a large number of stakeholders that own or process the data. Approaches exist to deal with parts of the problem, but they are isolated from each other. We present an integrated method for elicitation of legal requirements. A cloud computing online banking scenario illustrates the application of our methods. The running example deals with the problem of storing personal information in the cloud and based upon the BDSG (German Federal Data Protection Act). We describe the structure of the online banking cloud system using an existing pattern-based approach. The elicited information is further refined and processed into functional requirements for software development. Moreover, our method covers the analysis of security-relevant concepts such as assets and attackers particularly with regard to laws. The requirements artifacts then serve as inputs for existing patterns for the identification of laws relevant for the online banking cloud system. Finally, our method helps to systematically derive functional as well as security requirements that realize the previously identified laws.