TY - JOUR A1 - Krügel, Sebastian A1 - Ostermaier, Andreas A1 - Uhl, Matthias T1 - ChatGPT’s inconsistent moral advice influences users’ judgment JF - Scientific Reports N2 - AbstractChatGPT is not only fun to chat with, but it also searches information, answers questions, and gives advice. With consistent moral advice, it can improve the moral judgment and decisions of users. Unfortunately, ChatGPT’s advice is not consistent. Nonetheless, it does influence users’ moral judgment, we find in an experiment, even if they know they are advised by a chatting bot, and they underestimate how much they are influenced. Thus, ChatGPT corrupts rather than improves its users’ moral judgment. While these findings call for better design of ChatGPT and similar bots, we also propose training to improve users’ digital literacy as a remedy. Transparency, however, is not sufficient to enable the responsible use of AI. UR - https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-31341-0 Y1 - 2023 UR - https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-31341-0 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:573-41835 SN - 2045-2322 VL - 13 PB - Springer Nature CY - London ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Rosbach, Emely A1 - Ammeling, Jonas A1 - Krügel, Sebastian A1 - Kießig, Angelika A1 - Fritz, Alexis A1 - Ganz, Jonathan A1 - Puget, Chloé A1 - Donovan, Taryn A1 - Klang, Andrea A1 - Köller, Maximilian C. A1 - Bolfa, Pompei A1 - Tecilla, Marco A1 - Denk, Daniela A1 - Kiupel, Matti A1 - Paraschou, Georgios A1 - Kok, Mun Keong A1 - Haake, Alexander F. H. A1 - de Krijger, Ronald R. A1 - Sonnen, Andreas F.-P. A1 - Kasantikul, Tanit A1 - Dorrestein, Gerry M. A1 - Smedley, Rebecca C. A1 - Stathonikos, Nikolas A1 - Uhl, Matthias A1 - Bertram, Christof A1 - Riener, Andreas A1 - Aubreville, Marc ED - Yamashita, Naomi ED - Evers, Vanessa ED - Yatani, Koji ED - Ding, Xianghua ED - Lee, Bongshin ED - Chetty, Marshini ED - Toups-Dugas, Phoebe T1 - "When Two Wrongs Don't Make a Right" - Examining Confirmation Bias and the Role of Time Pressure During Human-AI Collaboration in Computational Pathology T2 - CHI'25: Proceedings of the 2025 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems N2 - Artificial intelligence (AI)-based decision support systems hold promise for enhancing diagnostic accuracy and efficiency in computational pathology. However, human-AI collaboration can introduce and amplify cognitive biases, like confirmation bias caused by false confirmation when erroneous human opinions are reinforced by inaccurate AI output. This bias may increase under time pressure, a ubiquitous factor in routine pathology, as it strains practitioners’ cognitive resources. We quantified confirmation bias triggered by AI-induced false confirmation and examined the role of time constraints in a web-based experiment, where trained pathology experts (n=28) estimated tumor cell percentages. Our results suggest that AI integration fuels confirmation bias, evidenced by a statistically significant positive linear-mixed-effects model coefficient linking AI recommendations mirroring flawed human judgment and alignment with system advice. Conversely, time pressure appeared to weaken this relationship. These findings highlight potential risks of AI in healthcare and aim to support the safe integration of clinical decision support systems. UR - https://doi.org/10.1145/3706598.3713319 Y1 - 2025 UR - https://doi.org/10.1145/3706598.3713319 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:573-58797 SN - 979-8-4007-1394-1 PB - ACM CY - New York ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Alfano, Mark A1 - Rusch, Hannes A1 - Uhl, Matthias T1 - Ethics, morality, and game theory JF - Games N2 - Ethics is a field in which the gap between words and actions looms large. Game theory and the empirical methods it inspires look at behavior instead of the lip service people sometimes pay to norms. We believe that this special issue comprises several illustrations of the fruitful application of this approach to ethics. UR - https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020020 KW - morals KW - ethics KW - strategic interaction KW - game theory KW - behavior KW - economics KW - philosophy Y1 - 2018 UR - https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020020 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:573-16386 SN - 2073-4336 N1 - Editorial N1 - This article belongs to the Special Issue "Ethics, Morality, and Game Theory" VL - 9 IS - 2 PB - MDPI CY - Basel ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Krügel, Sebastian A1 - Uhl, Matthias T1 - The behavioral economics of dynamically inconsistent behavior: a critical assessment JF - Social Choice and Welfare N2 - Preferences often change—even in short time intervals—due to either the mere passage of time (present-biased preferences) or changes in visceral or environmental conditions (state-dependent preferences). On the basis of empirical findings concerning state-dependent preferences, we critically discuss the “Aristotelian” view of unitary decision makers in economics. We illustrate that the conceptualization of preferences as “present-biased” as opposed to “state-dependent” has very different normative implications for which preferences should be considered “rational.” Empirically, however, the two concepts are very difficult to distinguish. The economist can justify any paternalistic intervention if she can conceptualize changing preferences so flexibly, and she can easily become a benevolent despot. We therefore urge for a more careful “Heraclitean” view of decision-making that accepts that a person may consist of multiple selves. UR - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01471-5 Y1 - 2023 UR - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01471-5 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:573-40488 SN - 0176-1714 SN - 1432-217X VL - 61 IS - 4 SP - 817 EP - 833 PB - Springer Nature CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Krügel, Sebastian A1 - Ostermaier, Andreas A1 - Uhl, Matthias T1 - Zombies in the Loop? Humans Trust Untrustworthy AI-Advisors for Ethical Decisions JF - Philosophy & Technology N2 - Departing from the claim that AI needs to be trustworthy, we find that ethical advice from an AI-powered algorithm is trusted even when its users know nothing about its training data and when they learn information about it that warrants distrust. We conducted online experiments where the subjects took the role of decision-makers who received advice from an algorithm on how to deal with an ethical dilemma. We manipulated the information about the algorithm and studied its influence. Our findings suggest that AI is overtrusted rather than distrusted. We suggest digital literacy as a potential remedy to ensure the responsible use of AI. UR - https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-022-00511-9 KW - Algorithm KW - Artificial intelligence KW - Digital literacy KW - Ethics Y1 - 2022 UR - https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-022-00511-9 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:573-20187 SN - 2210-5441 VL - 35 IS - 1 PB - Springer CY - Dodrecht ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ostermaier, Andreas A1 - Uhl, Matthias T1 - Performance evaluation and creativity BT - balancing originality and usefulness JF - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics UR - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2020.101552 KW - creativity KW - innovation KW - performance evaluation KW - perspective-taking theory Y1 - 2020 UR - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2020.101552 SN - 2214-8043 VL - 2020 IS - 86 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Krügel, Sebastian A1 - Uhl, Matthias T1 - The risk ethics of autonomous vehicles: an empirical approach JF - Scientific Reports N2 - How would people distribute risks of autonomous vehicles (AVs) in everyday road traffic? The rich literature on the ethics of autonomous vehicles (AVs) revolves around moral judgments in unavoidable collision scenarios. We argue for extending the debate to driving behaviors in everyday road traffic where ubiquitous ethical questions arise due to the permanent redistribution of risk among road users. This distribution of risks raises ethically relevant questions that cannot be evaded by simple heuristics such as “hitting the brakes.” Using an interactive, graphical representation of different traffic situations, we measured participants’ preferences on driving maneuvers of AVs in a representative survey in Germany. Our participants’ preferences deviated significantly from mere collision avoidance. Interestingly, our participants were willing to take risks themselves for the benefit of other road users, suggesting that the social dilemma of AVs may be mitigated in risky environments. Our research might build a bridge between engineers and philosophers to discuss the ethics of AVs more constructively. UR - https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-024-51313-2 Y1 - 2024 UR - https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-024-51313-2 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:573-43296 SN - 2045-2322 VL - 14 PB - Springer Nature CY - London ER - TY - INPR A1 - Krügel, Sebastian A1 - Uhl, Matthias T1 - The risk ethics of autonomous vehicles: a continuous trolley problem in regular road traffic N2 - Is the ethics of autonomous vehicles (AVs) restricted to weighing lives in unavoidable accidents? We argue that AVs distribute risks between road users in regular traffic situations, either explicitly or implicitly. This distribution of risks raises ethically relevant questions that cannot be evaded by simple heuristics such as "hitting the brakes." Using an interactive, graphical representation of different traffic situations, we measured participants' preferences on driving maneuvers of AVs in a representative survey in Germany. Our participants' preferences deviated significantly from mere collision avoidance. Interestingly, our participants were willing to take risks themselves for the benefit of other road users suggesting that the social dilemma of AVs may lessen in a context of risk. UR - https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2206.03258 KW - continuous trolley problem KW - autonomous vehicles KW - risk ethics Y1 - 2022 UR - https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2206.03258 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:573-26795 PB - arXiv CY - Ithaca ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Max, Raphael A1 - Uhl, Matthias T1 - The downside of moralizing financial markets BT - anti-semitic stereotypes in German MTurkers JF - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance UR - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2021.100512 KW - ethical investment KW - bounded morality KW - out-group bias KW - stereotyping KW - vignette experiment Y1 - 2021 UR - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2021.100512 SN - 2214-6350 VL - 2021 IS - 31 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Krügel, Sebastian A1 - Uhl, Matthias T1 - Autonomous vehicles and moral judgments under risk JF - Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice UR - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2021.10.016 KW - stochastic trolley problems KW - autonomous vehicles KW - risk management Y1 - 2021 UR - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2021.10.016 SN - 0965-8564 VL - 2022 IS - 155 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Jauernig, Johanna A1 - Uhl, Matthias T1 - Spite and preemptive retaliation after tournaments JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization UR - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.001 KW - competition KW - tournaments KW - money burning KW - preemptive retaliation KW - spite KW - self-binding Y1 - 2018 UR - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.001 SN - 1879-1751 SN - 0167-2681 VL - 2019 IS - 158 SP - 328 EP - 336 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Lütge, Christoph A1 - Uhl, Matthias T1 - Business ethics BT - an economically informed perspective UR - https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198864776.001.0001 KW - Wirtschaftsethik Y1 - 2021 UR - https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198864776.001.0001 SN - 978-0-19-263385-9 SN - 978-0-19-886477-6 PB - Oxford University Press CY - Oxford ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Uhl, Matthias A1 - Lütge, Christoph T1 - Teaching Business Ethics with Experiments JF - Journal of Business Ethics Education UR - https://doi.org/10.5840/jbee20181510 KW - experiments KW - teaching KW - experimental learning KW - vignettes KW - incentives Y1 - 2018 UR - https://doi.org/10.5840/jbee20181510 SN - 2044-4559 VL - 15 SP - 203 EP - 217 PB - NeilsonJournals Publishing CY - Edinburgh ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Gogoll, Jan A1 - Uhl, Matthias T1 - Rage against the machine: Automation in the moral domain JF - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics UR - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2018.04.003 Y1 - 2018 UR - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2018.04.003 SN - 2214-8043 N1 - Die Forschungsrohdaten zu diesem Artikel sind Open Access beim Originalartikel auf der Verlagsplattform verfügbar. VL - 2018 IS - 74 SP - 97 EP - 103 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Levati, Maria Vittoria A1 - Uhl, Matthias A1 - Zultan, Ro’i T1 - Imperfect recall and time inconsistencies: an experimental test of the absentminded driver “paradox” JF - International Journal of Game Theory UR - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0373-y KW - Imperfect recall KW - Absentmindedness KW - Dynamic inconsistency KW - Experiment Y1 - 2013 UR - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0373-y SN - 1432-1270 VL - 43 IS - 1 SP - 65 EP - 88 PB - Springer CY - Heidelberg ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Kataria, Mitesh A1 - Levati, Maria Vittoria A1 - Uhl, Matthias T1 - Paternalism with hindsight: do protégés react consequentialistically to paternalism? JF - Social Choice and Welfare UR - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0800-4 KW - Inequality Aversion KW - Strategy Method KW - Paternalistic Intervention KW - Experimental Currency Unit KW - Poker Machine Y1 - 2014 UR - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0800-4 SN - 1432-217X VL - 43 IS - 3 SP - 731 EP - 746 PB - Springer CY - Berlin ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schönmann, Manuela A1 - Uhl, Matthias ED - de Witt, Claudia ED - Gloerfeld, Christina ED - Wrede, Silke Elisabeth T1 - Eine ethische Perspektive auf KI in der Bildung T2 - Künstliche Intelligenz in der Bildung UR - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40079-8_21 Y1 - 2023 UR - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40079-8_21 SN - 978-3-658-40079-8 SP - 433 EP - 453 PB - Springer VS CY - Wiesbaden ER - TY - INPR A1 - Rosbach, Emely A1 - Ammeling, Jonas A1 - Krügel, Sebastian A1 - Kießig, Angelika A1 - Fritz, Alexis A1 - Ganz, Jonathan A1 - Puget, Chloé A1 - Donovan, Taryn A1 - Klang, Andrea A1 - Köller, Maximilian C. A1 - Bolfa, Pompei A1 - Tecilla, Marco A1 - Denk, Daniela A1 - Kiupel, Matti A1 - Paraschou, Georgios A1 - Kok, Mun Keong A1 - Haake, Alexander F. H. A1 - de Krijger, Ronald R. A1 - Sonnen, Andreas F.-P. A1 - Kasantikul, Tanit A1 - Dorrestein, Gerry M. A1 - Smedley, Rebecca C. A1 - Stathonikos, Nikolas A1 - Uhl, Matthias A1 - Bertram, Christof A1 - Riener, Andreas A1 - Aubreville, Marc T1 - "When TwoWrongs Don’t Make a Right" - Examining Confirmation Bias and the Role of Time Pressure During Human-AI Collaboration in Computational Pathology UR - https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2411.01007 Y1 - 2024 UR - https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2411.01007 PB - arXiv CY - Ithaca ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bodenschatz, Anja A1 - Uhl, Matthias A1 - Walkowitz, Gari T1 - Autonomous systems in ethical dilemmas BT - attitudes toward randomization JF - Computers in human behavior reports N2 - It is ethically debatable whether autonomous systems should be programmed to actively impose harm on some to avoid greater harm for others. Surveys on ethical dilemmas in self-driving cars’ programming have shown that people favor imposing harm on some people to save others from suffering and are consequently willing to sacrifice smaller groups to save larger ones in unavoidable accident situations. This is, if people are forced to directly impose harm. Contrary to humans, autonomous systems feature a salient deontological alternative for immediate decisions: the ability to randomize decisions over dilemmatic outcomes. To be applicable in democracies, randomization must correspond to people's moral intuition. In three studies (N = 935), we present empirical evidence that many people prefer to randomize between dilemmatic outcomes due to moral considerations. We find these preferences in hypothetical and incentivized decision-making situations. We also find that preferences are robust in different contexts and persist across Germany, with its Kantian cultural tradition, and the US, with its utilitarian cultural tradition. UR - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chbr.2021.100145 KW - Randomization attitudes KW - Ethical dilemmas KW - Autonomous systems KW - Machine ethics KW - Utilitarianism Y1 - 2021 UR - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chbr.2021.100145 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:573-11109 SN - 2451-9588 VL - 2021 IS - 4 PB - Amsterdam CY - Elsevier ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Grundherr, Michael von A1 - Jauernig, Johanna A1 - Uhl, Matthias T1 - To condemn is not to punish BT - an experiment on hypocrisy JF - Games N2 - Hypocrisy is the act of claiming moral standards to which one’s own behavior does not conform. Instances of hypocrisy, such as the supposedly green furnishing group IKEA’s selling of furniture made from illegally felled wood, are frequently reported in the media. In a controlled and incentivized experiment, we investigate how observers rate different types of hypocritical behavior and if this judgment also translates into punishment. Results show that observers do, indeed, condemn hypocritical behavior strongly. The aversion to deceptive behavior is, in fact, so strong that even purely self-deceptive behavior is regarded as blameworthy. Observers who score high in the moral identity test have particularly strong reactions to acts of hypocrisy. The moral condemnation of hypocritical behavior, however, fails to produce a proportional amount of punishment. Punishment seems to be driven more by the violation of the norm of fair distribution than by moral pretense. From the viewpoint of positive retributivism, it is problematic if neither formal nor informal punishment follows moral condemnation. UR - https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020038 KW - corporate hypocrisy KW - punishment KW - moral judgment KW - experimental ethics KW - behavioral ethics KW - moral identity Y1 - 2021 UR - https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020038 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:573-11032 SN - 2073-4336 VL - 12 IS - 2 PB - MDPI CY - Basel ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Migrow, Dimitri A1 - Uhl, Matthias T1 - The Resolution Game: A Dual Selves Perspective JF - Games N2 - This article explains the emergence of an unique equilibrium resolution as the result of a compromise between two selves with different preferences. The stronger this difference is, the more generous the resolution gets. This result is in contrast to predictions of other models in which sinful consumption is distributed bimodally. Therefore, our result fits better with our daily observations concerning a lot of ambivalent goods where we often form nonrigid resolutions. The normative analysis uses the device of a hypothetical impartial self that regards both conflicting motives as equally legitimate. The result of this analysis is dilemmatic. It demonstrates that the resolution is broken too often to be welfare maximal. However, the introduction of external self-commitment devices results in their overuse and is welfare decreasing. UR - https://doi.org/10.3390/g2040452 KW - dual selves KW - resolutions KW - self-control KW - impartiality Y1 - 2011 UR - https://doi.org/10.3390/g2040452 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:573-37919 SN - 2073-4336 VL - 2 IS - 4 SP - 452 EP - 462 PB - MDPI CY - Basel ER -