TY - JOUR A1 - Jauernig, Johanna A1 - Uhl, Matthias A1 - Pies, Ingo T1 - When Goliath sells to David: explaining price gouging perceptions through power JF - Public Choice N2 - AbstractExternal shocks (e.g., due to a pandemic) may lead to price jumps in the short term. Rather than being read as a signal of increased scarcity, the resulting “price gouging” is often ascribed to sellers’ selfish exploitation of the crisis. In our experimental study, we investigate the drivers of fairness perceptions regarding voluntary transactions in situations of increased scarcity and explore how they pertain to the economic policy debate on price gouging restrictions. Departing from previous research, our results show that perceptions of power, not of the seller as the profiteer (mercantilism), drive fairness perceptions. The more powerful a transaction partner is assumed to be, the less the respective transaction is regarded as fair. In line with the literature, we also find that fairness perceptions are correlated with zero-sum thinking (i.e., a denial of the mutuality of benefits implied by voluntary transactions). Our study helps to better understand why some market regulations appear attractive despite suboptimal outcomes, thus revealing a mixing of the micro and the macro cosmos, against which Hayek warned. By casting a light on the psychological mechanisms behind attitudes toward markets, we aim to improve the assessment of legitimacy issues and contribute to explaining (and overcoming) the moral paradox of modernity. UR - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01191-z Y1 - 2024 UR - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01191-z UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:573-49996 SN - 1573-7101 SN - 0048-5829 VL - 203 IS - 1-2 SP - 139 EP - 155 PB - Springer CY - New York ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Jauernig, Johanna A1 - Uhl, Matthias A1 - Walkowitz, Gari T1 - People prefer moral discretion to algorithms BT - algorithm aversion beyond intransparency JF - Philosophy & Technology N2 - We explore aversion to the use of algorithms in moral decision-making. So far, this aversion has been explained mainly by the fear of opaque decisions that are potentially biased. Using incentivized experiments, we study which role the desire for human discretion in moral decision-making plays. This seems justified in light of evidence suggesting that people might not doubt the quality of algorithmic decisions, but still reject them. In our first study, we found that people prefer humans with decision-making discretion to algorithms that rigidly apply exogenously given human-created fairness principles to specific cases. In the second study, we found that people do not prefer humans to algorithms because they appreciate flesh-and-blood decision-makers per se, but because they appreciate humans’ freedom to transcend fairness principles at will. Our results contribute to a deeper understanding of algorithm aversion. They indicate that emphasizing the transparency of algorithms that clearly follow fairness principles might not be the only element for fostering societal algorithm acceptance and suggest reconsidering certain features of the decision-making process. UR - https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-021-00495-y KW - algorithm aversion KW - artificial intelligence KW - moral discretion KW - behavioral ethics Y1 - 2022 UR - https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-021-00495-y UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:573-23207 SN - 2210-5441 SN - 2210-5433 VL - 35 IS - 1 PB - Springer Nature CY - Cham ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Jauernig, Johanna A1 - Uhl, Matthias A1 - Waldhof, Gabi T1 - Genetically Engineered Foods and Moral Absolutism: A Representative Study from Germany JF - Science and Engineering Ethics N2 - There is an ongoing debate about genetic engineering (GE) in food production. Supporters argue that it makes crops more resilient to stresses, such as drought or pests, and should be considered by researchers as a technology to address issues of global food security, whereas opponents put forward that GE crops serve only the economic interests of transnational agrifood-firms and have not yet delivered on their promises to address food shortage and nutrient supply. To address discourse failure regarding the GE debate, research needs to understand better what drives the divergent positions and which moral attitudes fuel the mental models of GE supporters and opponents. Hence, this study investigates moral attitudes regarding GE opposition and support in Germany. Results show that GE opponents are significantly more absolutist than supporters and significantly less likely to hold outcome-based views. Furthermore, GE opponents are more willing to donate for preventing GE admission than supporters are willing to donate for promoting GE admission. Our results shed light on why the divide between opponents and supporters in the German GE debate could remain stark and stable for so long. UR - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-023-00454-0 KW - Genetic engineering (GE) KW - Moral absolutism KW - Technology aversion KW - Moral convictions KW - GE debate KW - Consumer skepticism Y1 - 2023 UR - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-023-00454-0 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:573-39681 SN - 1471-5546 SN - 1353-3452 VL - 29 IS - 5 PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Grundherr, Michael von A1 - Jauernig, Johanna A1 - Uhl, Matthias T1 - To condemn is not to punish BT - an experiment on hypocrisy JF - Games N2 - Hypocrisy is the act of claiming moral standards to which one’s own behavior does not conform. Instances of hypocrisy, such as the supposedly green furnishing group IKEA’s selling of furniture made from illegally felled wood, are frequently reported in the media. In a controlled and incentivized experiment, we investigate how observers rate different types of hypocritical behavior and if this judgment also translates into punishment. Results show that observers do, indeed, condemn hypocritical behavior strongly. The aversion to deceptive behavior is, in fact, so strong that even purely self-deceptive behavior is regarded as blameworthy. Observers who score high in the moral identity test have particularly strong reactions to acts of hypocrisy. The moral condemnation of hypocritical behavior, however, fails to produce a proportional amount of punishment. Punishment seems to be driven more by the violation of the norm of fair distribution than by moral pretense. From the viewpoint of positive retributivism, it is problematic if neither formal nor informal punishment follows moral condemnation. UR - https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020038 KW - corporate hypocrisy KW - punishment KW - moral judgment KW - experimental ethics KW - behavioral ethics KW - moral identity Y1 - 2021 UR - https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020038 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:573-11032 SN - 2073-4336 VL - 12 IS - 2 PB - MDPI CY - Basel ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Jauernig, Johanna A1 - Uhl, Matthias A1 - Valentinov, Vladislav T1 - The ethics of corporate hypocrisy: An experimental approach JF - Futures N2 - In the current landscape of management and business ethics scholarship, a prominent type of dissimulation is exemplified by corporate hypocrisy. The concept of corporate hypocrisy brings traditional morality to bear on the institutions of the modern society and thereby emphasizes the contested relationship between the research programs of individual and institutional ethics. Assuming that morality in the modern society resides in institutions rather than individuals, institutional ethics emphasizes limits to the ability of traditional morality to come to terms with the moral complexity of the market economy. The case of corporate hypocrisy shows however that traditional morality nurtures individual sensitivity to immoral behaviors which may undermine the modern institutional fabric theorized by institutional ethics. This argument is supported by our central experimental finding that the moral evaluation of individual and corporate hypocrisy is driven by essentially the same psychological mechanisms. Moreover, the experiment showed that both corporate and individual hypocrisy are condemned stronger than frankly wrong behavior even if their consequences are identical. UR - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2021.102757 KW - Moral evaluation KW - Institutional ethics KW - Behavioral ethics KW - Greenwashing KW - (Self-) deception Y1 - 2021 UR - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2021.102757 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:573-11125 SN - 0016-3287 VL - 2021 IS - 131 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER -