@article{FeierGogollUhl2022, author = {Feier, Till and Gogoll, Jan and Uhl, Matthias}, title = {Hiding Behind Machines: Artificial Agents May Help to Evade Punishment}, volume = {28}, pages = {19}, journal = {Science and Engineering Ethics}, number = {2}, publisher = {Springer Nature}, address = {Cham}, issn = {1471-5546}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-022-00372-7}, year = {2022}, abstract = {The transfer of tasks with sometimes far-reaching implications to autonomous systems raises a number of ethical questions. In addition to fundamental questions about the moral agency of these systems, behavioral issues arise. We investigate the empirically accessible question of whether the imposition of harm by an agent is systematically judged differently when the agent is artificial and not human. The results of a laboratory experiment suggest that decision-makers can actually avoid punishment more easily by delegating to machines than by delegating to other people. Our results imply that the availability of artificial agents could provide stronger incentives for decision-makers to delegate sensitive decisions.}, language = {en} } @article{GogollUhl2020, author = {Gogoll, Jan and Uhl, Matthias}, title = {Leviathan for sale}, volume = {2020}, pages = {101898}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, subtitle = {the fallacy of trusting in people instead of institutions}, number = {63}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {Amsterdam}, issn = {0176-2680}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101898}, year = {2020}, abstract = {We experimentally test Hume's hypothesis that people underappreciate the value of cooperation-enforcing institutions in impersonal interactions by relying on personal trust. Subjects played a game in groups of two or six. Each subject could defect at any time, leaving the others with zero payoff by unilaterally appropriating an amount of money that grew over a period of 5 ​minutes. All players received the maximum payoff only if nobody defected. Before the game, subjects could purchase a cooperation-enforcing institution. Their willingness to pay for this institution fell short of the loss caused by failed cooperation under institution-free play. This was even true for the best-off subject in an institution-free society. In the absence of learning, people indeed fell prey to the atavistic fallacy of trusting in people instead of institutions. Understanding this bias might help people in complex societies to acknowledge the value of institutions intellectually.}, language = {en} } @article{GogollUhl2018, author = {Gogoll, Jan and Uhl, Matthias}, title = {Rage against the machine: Automation in the moral domain}, volume = {2018}, journal = {Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics}, number = {74}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {Amsterdam}, issn = {2214-8043}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2018.04.003}, pages = {97 -- 103}, year = {2018}, language = {en} }