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Zehn Argumente gegen Quantitative Easing und den Ankauf von Staatsanleihen durch das Eurosystem
(2015)
Sovereign Wealth Funds
(2008)
Staatsfonds
(2009)
Deutsche Direktinvestitionen in Entwicklungs- und Reformländern: Haben sich die Motive gewandelt?
(2003)
Das Eurosystem und auch die Deutsche Bundesbank werden 2023 Verluste erzielen, die einige Jahre anhalten dürften. Aufgrund der massiven Käufe von Wertpapieren in den letzten 10 Jahren, vor allem Staatsanleihen, sind die Überschussreserven der Banken stark angestiegen. Die dadurch bedingten hohen Zinszahlungen an die Banken seit der geldpolitischen Kehrtwende, bei geringen Einnahmen für die hohen Wertpapierbestände, führten zu massiver Kritik. Die Banken würden dadurch „ungerechte“ Gewinne erzielen, während die Fiskalbehörden auf die früher üblichen Überweisungen der Zentralbankgewinne verzichten müssen. Populistische Forderungen nach einer Begrenzung der Bankengewinne durch z.B. eine pauschale, drastische Erhöhung der Mindestreservesätze im Eurosystem zur Reduzierung der Überschussreserven bergen neue Probleme und sind nicht hilfreich. Letztlich haben die Staaten sehr lange von historisch niedrigen Zinsen infolge der expansiven Geldpolitik des Eurosystems profitiert und müssen nun die Folgen der massiven Aufblähung der Zentralbankbilanzen während des Zeitraums der Normalisierung der Geldpolitik tragen.
The so-called Troika, consisting of the EU-Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was supposed to support the member states of the euro area which had been hit hard by a sovereign debt crisis. For that purpose, economic adjustment programs were drafted and monitored in order to prevent the break-up of the euro area and sovereign defaults. The cooperation of these institutions, which was born out of necessity, has been partly successful, but has also created persistent problems. With the further increase of public debt, especially in France and Italy, the danger of a renewed crisis in the euro area was growing. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) together with the (strongly politicized) European Commission will replace the Troika in the future, following decisions of the EU Summit of December 2018. It shall play the role of a European Monetary Fund in the event of a crisis. The IMF, on the other side, will no longer play an active role in solving sovereign debt crises in the euro area. The current course is, however, inadequate to tackle the core problems of the euro zone and to avoid future crises, which are mainly structural in nature and due to escalating public debt and lack of international competitiveness of some member countries. The current Corona crisis will aggravate the institutional problems. It has led to a common European fiscal response ("Next Generation EU"). This rescue and recovery program will not be financed by ESM resources and will not be monitored by the ESM. One important novelty of this package is that it involves the issuance of substantial common European debt.
Der Vorschlag einer drastischen Erhöhung des Mindestreservesatzes durch die EZB erhitzt die Gemüter. Nach teils heftiger Kritik hochrangiger Bankenvertreter in Deutschland werden die „üblichen“ Beschuldigungen vorgebracht und von Medien z.T. unreflektiert wiedergegeben bzw. kommentiert. Die Banken erhielten seit Herbst 2022 – so das gängige Muster - risikolose und ungerechte Subventionen und wüssten nichts Besseres mit ihren Einlagen bei der Bundesbank anzufangen.
Diese Kritik greift zu kurz und ist teils sachlich falsch.
Direktinvestitionen
(2001)
The Eurosystem and the Deutsche Bundesbank will incur substantial losses in 2023 that are likely to persist for several years. Due to the massive purchases of securities in the last 10 years, especially of government bonds, the banks' excess reserves have risen sharply. The resulting high interest payments to the banks since the turnaround in monetary poli-cy, with little income for the large-scale securities holdings, led to massive criticism. The banks were said to be making "unfair" profits as a result, while the fiscal authorities had to forego the previously customary transfers of central bank profits. Populist demands to limit bank profits by, for example, drastically increasing the minimum reserve ratios in the Eurosystem to reduce excess reserves are creating new severe problems and are neither justified nor helpful. Ultimately, the EU member states have benefited for a very long time from historically low interest rates because of the Eurosystem's extraordinary loose monetary policy and must now bear the flip side consequences of the massive expansion of central bank balance sheets during the necessary period of monetary policy normalisa-tion.
Due to the massive purchases of securities in the last 15 years central banks incur substantial losses likely to persist for several years. On the other hand, the banking sector gains large profits from interest payments on their excess reserves holdings. Central banks and fiscal authorities must now bear the flip side consequences of their bond purchase programs. Populist demands to limit bank profits by drastically increasing minimum reserve ratios in the Eurosystem are creating new severe problems. Instead, a consistent and faster
normalisation of central bank balance sheets would be desirable. Central banks should also no longer be central players in government bond markets to restore the lost boundaries between fiscal and monetary policy.