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This study analyzes survey data on public-private partnerships (PPPs) of the German Armed Forces. The analyzed PPPs are unique in that the German Federal Ministry of Defence, a government institution, has a dual role as a main shareholder and a major customer. Drawing on these data, the present article analyzes how a government institution influences a PPP's set of objectives and shows that the conflict of interest with respect to monetary objectives between the government institution and the PPP as a whole is low in such partnerships. Furthermore, the article examines the opportunistic behavior of PPPs in contractual renegotiations where the government institution acts as a customer. The results show that, although such behavior indeed occurs, it does not concern monetary issues, since the government institution can control the monetary objectives of PPPs in which it is a main shareholder. Third, this study also analyzes and identifies certain exogenous factors that may influence the level of opportunistic behavior exhibited by the examined PPPs, providing evidence on the causes and effects of such behavior and indicating how it can be limited by the government institution.
This article explores the relationships between innovation idea value, innovators’ perceptions of fairness, and their participation behavior and knowledge sharing behavior in the intrafirm social network. The study uses survey data and a database from a large company that is one of Europe’s top performers in idea management. In addition to the idea database, this study surveys participating employees about their perceptions of fairness and their participation behavior and knowledge sharing behavior. The results show that there is a clear relationship between innovation idea value, employees’ perceptions of fairness, and employees’ participation behavior and knowledge sharing behavior. Furthermore, there is clear evidence that tenure increases the value of innovation ideas. The findings suggest a number of implications for ideation management and for the design of social networks for innovation ideas. To increase the value of innovation ideas, social networks for innovation ideas can be used if the allocation of rewards for idea providers is positively associated with the fairness perceptions of network members.
This study analyzes the renegotiations that take place between institutionalized public–private partnerships (PPPs) and their public clients drawing on survey data on the PPPs of the German Federal Armed Forces. Generally, both the party that initiates such renegotiations and the time at which renegotiations are launched determine the outcome of the PPP’s renegotiated remuneration. This effect is moderated by the degree of contract specificity and by a decrease in demand. Specifically, when the public client initiates the renegotiation of an incomplete contractual agreement due to a decrease in demand, it can successfully reduce the remuneration of the PPP.
The present article analyzes the influence of the public shareholder on public–private partnerships (PPPs) that support public projects by supplying essential goods and services. The empirical analysis examines public–private partnerships involving the German Federal Ministry of Defense. The main characteristic of these PPPs is the dual role of the German Federal Ministry of Defense, which appears simultaneously as public shareholder and public purchaser. The paper shows that the government institution decisively determines monetary objectives and consequently the entire system of objectives. The most important monetary objective of PPPs is cost minimization, in contrast to profit maximization, which is commonly the objective of private shareholders. By determining the monetary objectives of such partnerships, the government institution prevents the opportunistic behavior of PPPs with regard to the level of charges for goods and services, which is commonly part of renegotiations if the government institution changes the demand for goods and services. Compared to wholly government-funded public projects, PPPs offer an opportunity to use the capital, competence and economic efficiency of private economic subjects without increasing the transaction costs commonly associated with the opportunistic behavior exhibited by PPPs with regard to the level of charges.
Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht den Einfluss des öffentlichen Anteilseigners auf gemischtwirtschaftliche Public Private Partnerships, welche die staatliche Durchführung von öffentlichen Aufgaben durch die Bereitstellung von notwendigen Gütern und Dienstleistungen unterstützen. Die empirische Analyse bezieht sich auf Public Private Partnerships des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung. Diese Public Private Partnerships sind dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass der öffentliche Anteilseigner gleichzeitig als öffentlicher Auftraggeber auftritt. Zunächst wird gezeigt, dass die staatliche Institution als öffentlicher Anteilseigner das Zielsystem in Bezug auf die monetären Ziele maßgeblich bestimmt. Für die Public Private Partnerships ist demnach die Kostenminimierung und nicht die von den privaten Anteilseignern eingeforderte Gewinnmaximierung das wichtigste monetäre Ziel. Die staatliche Institution unterbindet durch die Beeinflussung der monetären Ziele einer Public Private Partnerhip das opportunistische Verhalten in Bezug auf das Entgelt für die zu erbringende Leistung. Im Vergleich zu einer rein privatwirtschaftlichen Erfüllung von öffentlichen Aufträgen ist die Etablierung von Public Private Partnerships eine Möglichkeit, das Kapital, die Kompetenz sowie die wirtschaftliche Effizienz von privaten Wirtschaftssubjekten zu nutzen, ohne die Transaktionskosten durch eine opportunistische Entgeltgestaltung maßgeblich zu erhöhen.