Einfluss des öffentlichen Anteilseigners auf Public Private Partnerships: Eine empirische Untersuchung am Beispiel der Public Private Partnerships der Bundeswehr
- The present article analyzes the influence of the public shareholder on public–private partnerships (PPPs) that support public projects by supplying essential goods and services. The empirical analysis examines public–private partnerships involving the German Federal Ministry of Defense. The main characteristic of these PPPs is the dual role of the German Federal Ministry of Defense, which appears simultaneously as public shareholder and public purchaser. The paper shows that the government institution decisively determines monetary objectives and consequently the entire system of objectives. The most important monetary objective of PPPs is cost minimization, in contrast to profit maximization, which is commonly the objective of private shareholders. By determining the monetary objectives of such partnerships, the government institution prevents the opportunistic behavior of PPPs with regard to the level of charges for goods and services, which is commonly part of renegotiations if the government institution changes the demand for goods and services. Compared to wholly government-funded public projects, PPPs offer an opportunity to use the capital, competence and economic efficiency of private economic subjects without increasing the transaction costs commonly associated with the opportunistic behavior exhibited by PPPs with regard to the level of charges.