TY - JOUR A1 - Rötzel, Peter A1 - Pedell, Burkhard A1 - Groninger, Daniel T1 - Information Load in Escalation Situations - Combustive Agent or Counteractive Measure? JF - Journal of Business Economics, 14 May 2020 N2 - This experimental study analyzes how a key factor, information load, influences decision making in escalation situations, i.e., in situations in which decision makers reinvest further resources in a losing course of action, even when accounting information indicates that the project is performing poorly and should be discontinued. This study synthesizes prior escalation research with information overload and investigates how different levels of information load influence the escalation of commitment. Our findings reveal a U-shaped effect of information load: When decision makers face negative feedback, a higher information load mitigates the escalation tendency up to a certain point. However, beyond this point, more information reinforces the escalation tendency. Moreover, we find that the type of feedback affects self-justification, and we find a negative and significant interaction between information load and self-justification in negative-feedback cases. Thus, studies investigating escalation of commitment should control for self-justification and information load when utilizing high levels of information load. Finally, in the positive-feedback condition, higher information load encourages decision makers to continue promising courses of action, i.e., increases decision-making performance. KW - Informationsüberlastung Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-020-00987-x ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Rötzel, Peter A1 - Pedell, Burkhard A1 - Groninger, Daniel T1 - Information load in escalation situations: combustive agent or counteractive measure? JF - Journal of Business Economics N2 - This experimental study analyzes how a key factor, information load, influences decision making in escalation situations, i.e., in situations in which decision mak- ers reinvest further resources in a losing course of action, even when accounting information indicates that the project is performing poorly and should be discontin- ued. This study synthesizes prior escalation research with information overload and investigates how different levels of information load influence the escalation of com- mitment. Our findings reveal a U-shaped effect of information load: When decision makers face negative feedback, a higher information load mitigates the escalation tendency up to a certain point. However, beyond this point, more information rein- forces the escalation tendency. Moreover, we find that the type of feedback affects self-justification, and we find a negative and significant interaction between informa- tion load and self-justification in negative-feedback cases. Thus, studies investigat- ing escalation of commitment should control for self-justification and information load when utilizing high levels of information load. Finally, in the positive-feedback condition, higher information load encourages decision makers to continue promis- ing courses of action, i.e., increases decision-making performance. KW - Informationsüberlastung Y1 - 2020 VL - 2020 IS - 90/4 SP - 757 EP - 786 ER -