@article{RoetzelPedellGroninger2020, author = {R{\"o}tzel, Peter and Pedell, Burkhard and Groninger, Daniel}, title = {Information load in escalation situations: combustive agent or counteractive measure?}, series = {Journal of Business Economics}, volume = {2020}, journal = {Journal of Business Economics}, number = {90/4}, pages = {757 -- 786}, year = {2020}, abstract = {This experimental study analyzes how a key factor, information load, influences decision making in escalation situations, i.e., in situations in which decision mak- ers reinvest further resources in a losing course of action, even when accounting information indicates that the project is performing poorly and should be discontin- ued. This study synthesizes prior escalation research with information overload and investigates how different levels of information load influence the escalation of com- mitment. Our findings reveal a U-shaped effect of information load: When decision makers face negative feedback, a higher information load mitigates the escalation tendency up to a certain point. However, beyond this point, more information rein- forces the escalation tendency. Moreover, we find that the type of feedback affects self-justification, and we find a negative and significant interaction between informa- tion load and self-justification in negative-feedback cases. Thus, studies investigat- ing escalation of commitment should control for self-justification and information load when utilizing high levels of information load. Finally, in the positive-feedback condition, higher information load encourages decision makers to continue promis- ing courses of action, i.e., increases decision-making performance.}, subject = {Informations{\"u}berlastung}, language = {en} }