150 Psychologie
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We argue that objectivity is acquired by learning to refer to particular situations, that is, by developing episodicity. This contrasts with the widespread idea that genericity is crucial in developing humans’ ability to conceive of an objective world. According to the collective intentionality account, objectivity is acquired by contrasting one’s particular perspective in the “here and now” with a generic group perspective on how things are generally. However, this line of argument rests on confusing two independent notions of genericity: social and worldly genericity. Holding these two notions apart shows that there is no coherent developmental route from episodicity to objectivity via genericity. In effect, the collective intentionality account presupposes objectivity. Alternatively, episodicity may develop by enculturation into the common practice of spatial-indexical use. This ability establishes an initial, socially shared spatiotemporal reference system comprising the basis for objectivity.
Numerical magnitude information is assumed to be spatially represented in the form of a mental number line defined with respect to a body-centred, egocentric frame of reference. In this context, spatial language skills such as mastery of verbal descriptions of spatial position (e.g., in front of, behind, to the right/left) have been proposed to be relevant for grasping spatial relations between numerical magnitudes on the mental number line. We examined 4- to 5-year-old’s spatial language skills in tasks that allow responses in egocentric and allocentric frames of reference, as well as their relative understanding of numerical magnitude (assessed by a number word comparison task). In addition, we evaluated influences of children’s absolute understanding of numerical magnitude assessed by their number word comprehension (montring different numbers using their fingers) and of their knowledge on numerical sequences (determining predecessors and successors as well as identifying missing dice patterns of a series). Results indicated that when considering responses that corresponded to the egocentric perspective, children’s spatial language was associated significantly with their relative numerical magnitude understanding, even after controlling for covariates, such as children’s SES, mental rotation skills, and also absolute magnitude understanding or knowledge on numerical sequences. This suggests that the use of egocentric reference frames in spatial language may facilitate spatial representation of numbers along a mental number line and thus seem important for preschoolers’ relative understanding of numerical magnitude.
Human thought can be characterised as being situated in the ‘space of reasons’. That is to say that human thought is guided by the norms of theoretical and practical rationality which, in turn, enable autonomous thinking. But how do children learn to navigate the space of reasons? Building on the work of Tugendhat and Bakhurst, among others, we argue, first, that this process involves the acquisition of propositional thought and that it is an essentially social one in which both children and adults take an active role. Second, and more specifically, by drawing on Brandom's theory of meaning, we provide a philosophical analysis of empirical findings with respect to the efficacy of ‘Sustained Shared Thinking’ (SST) in early educational settings. We argue that the efficacy of SST is based on its emphasising, modelling and practising those elements of communication that are essential for gaining proficiency in ‘playing the game of giving and asking for reasons’, namely drawing inferences between propositions and concepts and providing justifications for one's assertions. This is achieved by making explicit the inferential relationships between concepts and propositions and by the use of modal and doxastic markers that function as an invitation to a joint search for reasons.
The idea that a simple execution of an innovation invented by actors other than those who are expected to apply it is not likely to take place is a truism. We assume, however, in this paper the idea of a discursive production of knowledge on the application of an innovation across different levels of the education system. We aim to shed light on an innovation’s ‘journey’ from educational policy over training providers to teams of professionals in early childhood education and care (ECEC). By investigating knowledge and emotions associated with the introduction of an intended innovation using the example of “stimulation interactions” in day care-centers, the paper contributes to research on the transfer of innovations in education. To better understand challenges occurring during the transfer of innovations, we triangulate methods from discourse theory (coding techniques based on GTM) and cognitive science, namely cognitive-affective mapping (according to the scholarly conventions). The data corpus includes educational plans (N = 2), in-service training programs (N = 123) and group discussions of pedagogical teams (N = 6) who participated in an in-service training on the subject, stimulating interaction. Findings underline that similar messages from the inventors on the educational policy level are received and processed heterogeneously by the teams of pedagogues as a result of their preexisting views, routine practices and experiences with intended innovations through in-service trainings. Besides, a diffuse mixture of competing and contradictory information is communicated to the professionals and, hence, collides with the in-service training providers’ and educational policy actors’ expectations on the processing of the intended innovation. Specific knowledge elements and their valences are diametrically opposed to each other. Dissonances like these are considered as obstacles to social innovation. The obstacles are caused by the lack of a ‘common language’ beyond all levels. Hence, policy-makers and in-service-training providers should anticipate the supportive as well as competing knowledge-emotional complexes of professionals and take these into account when communicating an intended innovation.
Adult-child interactions can support children's development and are established as predictors of program quality in early childhood settings. However, the linguistic components that constitute positive interactions have not yet been studied in detail. This study investigates the effects of hypotheses proposed by adults on children's responses in a dyadic picture-book viewing situation. In 2 experiments, adults’ use of hypotheses (e.g., “Maybe this is a dwarf's door”) was tested against the use of instructive statements (“This is a dwarf's door”) and in combination with open questions (“What do you think, why is the door so small?”). In Experiment 1, hypotheses differed from instructions only by the modal marker “maybe”. Children's responses to hypotheses were longer and contained more self-generated explanations as compared to responses to instructions. The use of hypotheses also seemed to encourage children to attach more importance to their own explanations. In Experiment 2, combining hypotheses with open-ended why questions elicited longer responses but no more self-generated explanations in children than open-ended questions alone. Results indicate that subtle differences in adults’ utterances can directly influence children's reasoning and children's contributions to dialogues.
Perner and Roessler (in: Aguilar J, Buckareff A (eds) Causing human action: new perspectives on the causal theory of action, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 199–228, 2010) hold that children who do not yet have an understanding of subjective perspectives, i.e., mental states, explain actions by appealing to objective facts. In this paper, we criticize this view. We argue that in order to understand objective facts, subjects need to understand perspectives. By analysing basic fact-expressing assertions, we show that subjects cannot refer to facts if they do not understand two types of perspectivity, namely, spatial and doxastic perspectivity. To avoid conceptual confusion regarding different ways of referring to facts, we distinguish between reference to facts de re and de dicto.
While research on object individuation assumes that even very young children are able to perceive objects as particulars, we argue that the results of relevant studies can be explained in terms of feature discrimination. We propose that children start out navigating the world with a feature‐based ontology and only later become able to individuate objects spatiotemporally. Furthermore, object individuation is a cognitively demanding achievement resting on a uniquely human form of enculturation, namely the acquisition of deictic demonstratives. We conclude by outlining empirical expectations for operationalizations of our proposal.
Was wäre, wenn...?
(2014)