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Perner and Roessler (in: Aguilar J, Buckareff A (eds) Causing human action: new perspectives on the causal theory of action, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 199–228, 2010) hold that children who do not yet have an understanding of subjective perspectives, i.e., mental states, explain actions by appealing to objective facts. In this paper, we criticize this view. We argue that in order to understand objective facts, subjects need to understand perspectives. By analysing basic fact-expressing assertions, we show that subjects cannot refer to facts if they do not understand two types of perspectivity, namely, spatial and doxastic perspectivity. To avoid conceptual confusion regarding different ways of referring to facts, we distinguish between reference to facts de re and de dicto.
Ohne Bindung keine Bildung
(2018)
Durch die Studien von John Bowlby und Mary Ainsworth zur Bildungstheorie wissen wir, dass Kinder durch vielfältige Interaktionen eine Bindung zu Erwachsenen aufbauen, also eine emotionale Beziehung, die über einen längeren Zeitraum anhält. Diese Bindung an ihre Bezugspersonen brauchen die Kinder, um aktiv und selbstbestimmt lernen zu können.
Das Thema Partizipation hat in den letzten Jahren in verschiedenen Bereichen der Bildungsforschung zweifellos an Bedeutung gewonnen. Auf der einen Seite werden in fachlichen und wissenschaftlichen Diskursen Beteiligungsmöglichkeiten und -formen in Bildungsinstitutionen und -prozessen verhandelt (Baraldi/Cockburn 2018; Gürlevik/Hurrelmann/Palentien 2016). Auf der anderen Seite ist mit dem Anwachsen des Interesses an partizipativen Forschungsmethoden auch eine stärkere Beteiligung von Akteur*innen an kollaborativen Forschungsprojekten in pädagogischen und sozialen Bildungskontexten unter Einbezug von Kindern und Jugendlichen zu beobachten.
The current understanding of cognitive development rests on the premise that infants can individuate objects early on. However, the so-called object-first account faces severe difficulties explaining extant empirical findings in object individuation tasks while alternative, more parsimonious explanations are available. In this paper, we assume that children start as feature-thinkers without being able to individuate objects and show how this ability can be learned by thinkers who do not already implicitly possess the notion of an object. Based on Tugendhat's ideas on the relation between singular terms and object reference, we argue that spatial indexicals comprise the fundamental means of object individuation and describe how feature thinkers might acquire the complex substitutional system of spatial indexicals. In closing, two accounts of object cognition that do not rely on symbolic capacities, namely Pylyshyn's FINST indexes and Burge's perceptual objectivity, are critically discussed.
Sich selbst wahrnehmen
(2013)
The ability to refer to objects – singular reference – is arguably the decisive innovation on the way to human propositional cognition. This article argues that object individuation requires singular reference because basic singular terms, namely spatial indexicals, provide a symbolic frame of reference for object individuation. The authors suggest that singular reference is intrinsically connected to essential characteristics of propositionality: among other things, it guarantees the situation-independence of meaning, allows for the distinction between truth and falsehood, and enables us to think about possibilities. The authors sketch how singular reference gives rise to the development of predication, the powerful logical tool of quantification, and forms the basis for differentiating between belief and desire.
Skepsis
(2014)
Among the philosophical accounts of reference, Quine’s (1974) The Roots of Reference stands out in offering an integrated account of the acquisition of linguistic reference and object individuation. Based on a non-referential ability to distinguish bodies, the acquisition of sortals and quantification are crucial steps in learning to refer to objects. In this article, we critically re-assess Quine’s account of reference. Our critique will proceed in three steps with the aim of showing that Quine effectively presupposes what he sets out to explain, namely, reference to objects. We are going to argue (i) that sortals do not individuate, (ii) that bodies are already objects, and (iii) that the acquisition of variables presupposes a notion of identity. The result is diagnostic of a central desideratum for any theory of reference: an explanation of spatiotemporal object individuation.