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The ability to refer to objects – singular reference – is arguably the decisive innovation on the way to human propositional cognition. This article argues that object individuation requires singular reference because basic singular terms, namely spatial indexicals, provide a symbolic frame of reference for object individuation. The authors suggest that singular reference is intrinsically connected to essential characteristics of propositionality: among other things, it guarantees the situation-independence of meaning, allows for the distinction between truth and falsehood, and enables us to think about possibilities. The authors sketch how singular reference gives rise to the development of predication, the powerful logical tool of quantification, and forms the basis for differentiating between belief and desire.
Numerical magnitude information is assumed to be spatially represented in the form of a mental number line defined with respect to a body-centred, egocentric frame of reference. In this context, spatial language skills such as mastery of verbal descriptions of spatial position (e.g., in front of, behind, to the right/left) have been proposed to be relevant for grasping spatial relations between numerical magnitudes on the mental number line. We examined 4- to 5-year-old’s spatial language skills in tasks that allow responses in egocentric and allocentric frames of reference, as well as their relative understanding of numerical magnitude (assessed by a number word comparison task). In addition, we evaluated influences of children’s absolute understanding of numerical magnitude assessed by their number word comprehension (montring different numbers using their fingers) and of their knowledge on numerical sequences (determining predecessors and successors as well as identifying missing dice patterns of a series). Results indicated that when considering responses that corresponded to the egocentric perspective, children’s spatial language was associated significantly with their relative numerical magnitude understanding, even after controlling for covariates, such as children’s SES, mental rotation skills, and also absolute magnitude understanding or knowledge on numerical sequences. This suggests that the use of egocentric reference frames in spatial language may facilitate spatial representation of numbers along a mental number line and thus seem important for preschoolers’ relative understanding of numerical magnitude.
Among the philosophical accounts of reference, Quine’s (1974) The Roots of Reference stands out in offering an integrated account of the acquisition of linguistic reference and object individuation. Based on a non-referential ability to distinguish bodies, the acquisition of sortals and quantification are crucial steps in learning to refer to objects. In this article, we critically re-assess Quine’s account of reference. Our critique will proceed in three steps with the aim of showing that Quine effectively presupposes what he sets out to explain, namely, reference to objects. We are going to argue (i) that sortals do not individuate, (ii) that bodies are already objects, and (iii) that the acquisition of variables presupposes a notion of identity. The result is diagnostic of a central desideratum for any theory of reference: an explanation of spatiotemporal object individuation.
Human thought can be characterised as being situated in the ‘space of reasons’. That is to say that human thought is guided by the norms of theoretical and practical rationality which, in turn, enable autonomous thinking. But how do children learn to navigate the space of reasons? Building on the work of Tugendhat and Bakhurst, among others, we argue, first, that this process involves the acquisition of propositional thought and that it is an essentially social one in which both children and adults take an active role. Second, and more specifically, by drawing on Brandom's theory of meaning, we provide a philosophical analysis of empirical findings with respect to the efficacy of ‘Sustained Shared Thinking’ (SST) in early educational settings. We argue that the efficacy of SST is based on its emphasising, modelling and practising those elements of communication that are essential for gaining proficiency in ‘playing the game of giving and asking for reasons’, namely drawing inferences between propositions and concepts and providing justifications for one's assertions. This is achieved by making explicit the inferential relationships between concepts and propositions and by the use of modal and doxastic markers that function as an invitation to a joint search for reasons.
The idea that a simple execution of an innovation invented by actors other than those who are expected to apply it is not likely to take place is a truism. We assume, however, in this paper the idea of a discursive production of knowledge on the application of an innovation across different levels of the education system. We aim to shed light on an innovation’s ‘journey’ from educational policy over training providers to teams of professionals in early childhood education and care (ECEC). By investigating knowledge and emotions associated with the introduction of an intended innovation using the example of “stimulation interactions” in day care-centers, the paper contributes to research on the transfer of innovations in education. To better understand challenges occurring during the transfer of innovations, we triangulate methods from discourse theory (coding techniques based on GTM) and cognitive science, namely cognitive-affective mapping (according to the scholarly conventions). The data corpus includes educational plans (N = 2), in-service training programs (N = 123) and group discussions of pedagogical teams (N = 6) who participated in an in-service training on the subject, stimulating interaction. Findings underline that similar messages from the inventors on the educational policy level are received and processed heterogeneously by the teams of pedagogues as a result of their preexisting views, routine practices and experiences with intended innovations through in-service trainings. Besides, a diffuse mixture of competing and contradictory information is communicated to the professionals and, hence, collides with the in-service training providers’ and educational policy actors’ expectations on the processing of the intended innovation. Specific knowledge elements and their valences are diametrically opposed to each other. Dissonances like these are considered as obstacles to social innovation. The obstacles are caused by the lack of a ‘common language’ beyond all levels. Hence, policy-makers and in-service-training providers should anticipate the supportive as well as competing knowledge-emotional complexes of professionals and take these into account when communicating an intended innovation.
Adult-child interactions can support children's development and are established as predictors of program quality in early childhood settings. However, the linguistic components that constitute positive interactions have not yet been studied in detail. This study investigates the effects of hypotheses proposed by adults on children's responses in a dyadic picture-book viewing situation. In 2 experiments, adults’ use of hypotheses (e.g., “Maybe this is a dwarf's door”) was tested against the use of instructive statements (“This is a dwarf's door”) and in combination with open questions (“What do you think, why is the door so small?”). In Experiment 1, hypotheses differed from instructions only by the modal marker “maybe”. Children's responses to hypotheses were longer and contained more self-generated explanations as compared to responses to instructions. The use of hypotheses also seemed to encourage children to attach more importance to their own explanations. In Experiment 2, combining hypotheses with open-ended why questions elicited longer responses but no more self-generated explanations in children than open-ended questions alone. Results indicate that subtle differences in adults’ utterances can directly influence children's reasoning and children's contributions to dialogues.
Wie eine pädagogische Fachkraft mit den Kindern interagiert und sie damit in ihrer Entwicklung unterstützt, hängt maßgeblich davon ab, wie sie lernanregenden Interaktionen gegenüber eingestellt ist. Diese Einstellungen werden im Beitrag mit sogenannten cognitive-affective maps (CAMs) erfasst. Zur Erstellung der CAMs wurden leitfadengestützte Interviews mit pädagogischen Fachkräften (N = 18) aus sechs verschiedenen Einrichtungen analysiert. Die CAMs zeigen, dass die befragten Fachkräfte hauptsächlich auf sozial-emotionale Aspekte von Interaktionen rekurrieren und ihre täglichen Interaktionen mit den Kindern selbst positiv bewerten. Konkretes Wissen zu lernanregenden Interaktionsformaten benennen sie hingegen kaum. Ein Vergleich der Einstellungen der Fachkräfte deutet auf teamspezifische Besonderheiten hin. In einigen Einrichtungen sind die Einstellungen der Fachkräfte deutlich homogener als in anderen. Die Ergebnisse werden in ihrer Bedeutung für Fortbildungsangebote diskutiert und CAMs als gewinnbringende Methode zur Eruierung teamspezifischer Fortbildungsbedarfe und als Fortbildungsmethode selbst vorgeschlagen.
Perner and Roessler (in: Aguilar J, Buckareff A (eds) Causing human action: new perspectives on the causal theory of action, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 199–228, 2010) hold that children who do not yet have an understanding of subjective perspectives, i.e., mental states, explain actions by appealing to objective facts. In this paper, we criticize this view. We argue that in order to understand objective facts, subjects need to understand perspectives. By analysing basic fact-expressing assertions, we show that subjects cannot refer to facts if they do not understand two types of perspectivity, namely, spatial and doxastic perspectivity. To avoid conceptual confusion regarding different ways of referring to facts, we distinguish between reference to facts de re and de dicto.