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Among the philosophical accounts of reference, Quine’s (1974) The Roots of Reference stands out in offering an integrated account of the acquisition of linguistic reference and object individuation. Based on a non-referential ability to distinguish bodies, the acquisition of sortals and quantification are crucial steps in learning to refer to objects. In this article, we critically re-assess Quine’s account of reference. Our critique will proceed in three steps with the aim of showing that Quine effectively presupposes what he sets out to explain, namely, reference to objects. We are going to argue (i) that sortals do not individuate, (ii) that bodies are already objects, and (iii) that the acquisition of variables presupposes a notion of identity. The result is diagnostic of a central desideratum for any theory of reference: an explanation of spatiotemporal object individuation.
It counts as empirically proven that infants can individuate objects. Object individuation is assumed to be fundamental in the development of infants’ ontology within the object-first account. It crucially relies on an object-file (OF) system, representing both spatiotemporal (“where”) and categorical (“what”) information about objects as solid, cohesive bodies moving continuously in space and time. However, infants’ performance in tasks requiring them to use featural information to detect individuation violations appears to be at odds with the object-first account. In such cases, infants do not appear to be able to develop correct expectations about the numerosity of objects. Recently, proponents of the object-first account proposed that these individuation failures result from integration errors between the OF system and an additional physical reasoning system. We are going to argue that the predictions of a feature-based physical-reasoning (PR) system are sufficient for explaining infants’ behavior. The striking predictive power of the PR system calls into question the relevance of the OF system and, thereby, challenges the assumption that infants can individuate objects early on.
While research on object individuation assumes that even very young children are able to perceive objects as particulars, we argue that the results of relevant studies can be explained in terms of feature discrimination. We propose that children start out navigating the world with a feature‐based ontology and only later become able to individuate objects spatiotemporally. Furthermore, object individuation is a cognitively demanding achievement resting on a uniquely human form of enculturation, namely the acquisition of deictic demonstratives. We conclude by outlining empirical expectations for operationalizations of our proposal.
From Places to Moments
(2026)
Perner and Roessler (in: Aguilar J, Buckareff A (eds) Causing human action: new perspectives on the causal theory of action, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 199–228, 2010) hold that children who do not yet have an understanding of subjective perspectives, i.e., mental states, explain actions by appealing to objective facts. In this paper, we criticize this view. We argue that in order to understand objective facts, subjects need to understand perspectives. By analysing basic fact-expressing assertions, we show that subjects cannot refer to facts if they do not understand two types of perspectivity, namely, spatial and doxastic perspectivity. To avoid conceptual confusion regarding different ways of referring to facts, we distinguish between reference to facts de re and de dicto.
The current understanding of cognitive development rests on the premise that infants can individuate objects early on. However, the so-called object-first account faces severe difficulties explaining extant empirical findings in object individuation tasks while alternative, more parsimonious explanations are available. In this paper, we assume that children start as feature-thinkers without being able to individuate objects and show how this ability can be learned by thinkers who do not already implicitly possess the notion of an object. Based on Tugendhat's ideas on the relation between singular terms and object reference, we argue that spatial indexicals comprise the fundamental means of object individuation and describe how feature thinkers might acquire the complex substitutional system of spatial indexicals. In closing, two accounts of object cognition that do not rely on symbolic capacities, namely Pylyshyn's FINST indexes and Burge's perceptual objectivity, are critically discussed.
Demonstratives (“this”/“that”) express a speaker-relative distance contrast and need to be substituted for each other systematically: depending on their relative position, what one speaker refers to by saying “this” another speaker has to refer to by saying “that.” This substitution aspect of demonstratives poses additional difficulties for learning demonstratives, because it requires recognizing that two speakers have to refer to the same thing with different words, and might be one reason for the reportedly protracted acquisition of demonstratives. In an online study conducted in German, it was investigated whether children in the estimated upper age range of demonstrative acquisition (5 to 7 years) understand demonstratives' substitution aspect with familiar (“dies”/“das”) and novel (“schmi”/“schmu”) demonstratives, and whether they understand novel words (“schmi”/“schmu”) when used non-demonstratively as labels (N = 73; between-subject). Children's accuracy was compared with adult performance (N = 74). The study shows that children between 5 and 7 years of age perform less accurately than adults in all conditions. While adults' performance was highly accurate in all conditions (between 75% and 92% correct), children performed below chance in both demonstrative conditions and above chance in the labeling condition. This suggests that children do not understand demonstratives in the presented setup. More detailed analyses of children's response patterns indicate that they instead treat words as mutually exclusive labels in any condition.
Küsse dein Gehirn!
(2021)
Im Sommer 2021 erschien die bundesweite Studie „Beteiligung von Kindern im Kita-Alltag“, die Fachhochschule Potsdam und die Universität Graz hatten sie im Auftrag des Bundesfamilienministeriums erstellt. Ein Team aus Wissenschaftlerinnen hatte Alltagssituationen in 89 Kitas und Krippen offen gefilmt und ausgewertet.
Vor allem beim Essen beobachteten die Forscherinnen immer wieder „grenzüberschreitenden Körperkontakt“ und nicht angemessenes Verhalten der pädagogischen Fachkräfte: Sie schoben etwa den Stuhl samt Kind so nah an den Tisch, dass das Kind den Oberkörper kaum bewegen konnte. Andere stellten den Teller auf dem Lätzchen ab, ebenfalls um zu verhindern, dass sich die Kinder beim Essen zu viel bewegen. In rund 30 % der zehnminütigen Essenssequenzen beobachteten die Forscherinnen solche Vorfälle ein- bis viermal. In 16 % der Situationen sogar noch öfter. Lediglich in einem Fünftel der ausgewerteten Spielsituationen und 11 % der Essenssequenzen beobachteten die Forscherinnen überhaupt kein grenzüberschreitendes Verhalten.
