@article{Moore2020, author = {Moore, Richard}, title = {The cultural evolution of mind-modelling}, series = {Synthese}, volume = {199}, journal = {Synthese}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Berlin}, issn = {1573-0964}, doi = {10.1007/s11229-020-02853-3}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:525-25865}, pages = {1751 -- 1776}, year = {2020}, abstract = {I argue that uniquely human forms of 'Theory of Mind' (or 'ToM') are a product of cultural evolution. Specifically, propositional attitude psychology is a linguistically constructed folk model of the human mind, invented by our ancestors for a range of tasks and refined over successive generations of users. The construction of these folk models gave humans new tools for thinking and reasoning about mental states—and so imbued us with abilities not shared by non-linguistic species. I also argue that uniquely human forms of ToM are not required for language development, such that an account of the cultural origins of ToM does not jeopardise the explanation of language development. Finally, I sketch a historical model of the cultural evolution of mental state talk.}, subject = {Kulturelle Evolution}, language = {en} } @article{LuthardtSchroederHildebrandtetal., author = {Luthardt, Jasmin and Schr{\"o}der, Tobias and Hildebrandt, Frauke and Bormann, Inka}, title = {"And then we'll just check if it suits us" : cognitive-affective maps of social innovation in early childhood education}, series = {Frontiers in Education}, volume = {5}, journal = {Frontiers in Education}, publisher = {Frontiers Media}, address = {Lausanne}, issn = {2504-284X}, doi = {10.3389/feduc.2020.00033}, pages = {19}, abstract = {The idea that a simple execution of an innovation invented by actors other than those who are expected to apply it is not likely to take place is a truism. We assume, however, in this paper the idea of a discursive production of knowledge on the application of an innovation across different levels of the education system. We aim to shed light on an innovation's 'journey' from educational policy over training providers to teams of professionals in early childhood education and care (ECEC). By investigating knowledge and emotions associated with the introduction of an intended innovation using the example of "stimulation interactions" in day care-centers, the paper contributes to research on the transfer of innovations in education. To better understand challenges occurring during the transfer of innovations, we triangulate methods from discourse theory (coding techniques based on GTM) and cognitive science, namely cognitive-affective mapping (according to the scholarly conventions). The data corpus includes educational plans (N = 2), in-service training programs (N = 123) and group discussions of pedagogical teams (N = 6) who participated in an in-service training on the subject, stimulating interaction. Findings underline that similar messages from the inventors on the educational policy level are received and processed heterogeneously by the teams of pedagogues as a result of their preexisting views, routine practices and experiences with intended innovations through in-service trainings. Besides, a diffuse mixture of competing and contradictory information is communicated to the professionals and, hence, collides with the in-service training providers' and educational policy actors' expectations on the processing of the intended innovation. Specific knowledge elements and their valences are diametrically opposed to each other. Dissonances like these are considered as obstacles to social innovation. The obstacles are caused by the lack of a 'common language' beyond all levels. Hence, policy-makers and in-service-training providers should anticipate the supportive as well as competing knowledge-emotional complexes of professionals and take these into account when communicating an intended innovation.}, subject = {Sozialinnovation}, language = {en} } @article{HildebrandtMusholt, author = {Hildebrandt, Frauke and Musholt, Kristina}, title = {Teaching rationality : sustained shared thinking as a means for learning to navigate the space of reasons}, series = {Journal of Philosophy of Education}, volume = {54}, journal = {Journal of Philosophy of Education}, number = {3}, publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell}, address = {Malden, Mass.}, issn = {1467-9752}, doi = {10.1111/1467-9752.12407}, pages = {582 -- 599}, abstract = {Human thought can be characterised as being situated in the 'space of reasons'. That is to say that human thought is guided by the norms of theoretical and practical rationality which, in turn, enable autonomous thinking. But how do children learn to navigate the space of reasons? Building on the work of Tugendhat and Bakhurst, among others, we argue, first, that this process involves the acquisition of propositional thought and that it is an essentially social one in which both children and adults take an active role. Second, and more specifically, by drawing on Brandom's theory of meaning, we provide a philosophical analysis of empirical findings with respect to the efficacy of 'Sustained Shared Thinking' (SST) in early educational settings. We argue that the efficacy of SST is based on its emphasising, modelling and practising those elements of communication that are essential for gaining proficiency in 'playing the game of giving and asking for reasons', namely drawing inferences between propositions and concepts and providing justifications for one's assertions. This is achieved by making explicit the inferential relationships between concepts and propositions and by the use of modal and doxastic markers that function as an invitation to a joint search for reasons.}, subject = {Denken}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{RitterMorganKim, author = {Ritter, Frank E. and Morgan, Jonathan H. and Kim, Jong W.}, title = {Practical Advice on How to Run Human Behavioral Studies}, series = {Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society}, organization = {Cognitive Science Society}, pages = {15 -- 16}, subject = {Experimentelle Psychologie}, language = {en} } @article{HildebrandtGlauerKachel, author = {Hildebrandt, Frauke and Glauer, Ramiro and Kachel, Gregor}, title = {Coming from a world without objects}, series = {Mind \& Language}, volume = {37}, journal = {Mind \& Language}, number = {2}, publisher = {Wiley Blackwell Publishing Ltd}, address = {Oxford, UK}, doi = {10.1111/mila.12313}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:525-25000}, pages = {159 -- 176}, abstract = {While research on object individuation assumes that even very young children are able to perceive objects as particulars, we argue that the results of relevant studies can be explained in terms of feature discrimination. We propose that children start out navigating the world with a feature-based ontology and only later become able to individuate objects spatiotemporally. Furthermore, object individuation is a cognitively demanding achievement resting on a uniquely human form of enculturation, namely the acquisition of deictic demonstratives. We conclude by outlining empirical expectations for operationalizations of our proposal.}, language = {en} }