@article{Moore2020, author = {Moore, Richard}, title = {The cultural evolution of mind-modelling}, series = {Synthese}, volume = {199}, journal = {Synthese}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Berlin}, issn = {1573-0964}, doi = {10.1007/s11229-020-02853-3}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:525-25865}, pages = {1751 -- 1776}, year = {2020}, abstract = {I argue that uniquely human forms of 'Theory of Mind' (or 'ToM') are a product of cultural evolution. Specifically, propositional attitude psychology is a linguistically constructed folk model of the human mind, invented by our ancestors for a range of tasks and refined over successive generations of users. The construction of these folk models gave humans new tools for thinking and reasoning about mental states—and so imbued us with abilities not shared by non-linguistic species. I also argue that uniquely human forms of ToM are not required for language development, such that an account of the cultural origins of ToM does not jeopardise the explanation of language development. Finally, I sketch a historical model of the cultural evolution of mental state talk.}, subject = {Kulturelle Evolution}, language = {en} } @article{GlauerHildebrandt, author = {Glauer, Ramiro and Hildebrandt, Frauke}, title = {No facts without perspectives}, series = {Synthese}, volume = {199}, journal = {Synthese}, number = {1/2}, publisher = {Springer Nature}, address = {Berlin}, issn = {1573-0964}, doi = {10.1007/s11229-020-02958-9}, pages = {3825 -- 3851}, abstract = {Perner and Roessler (in: Aguilar J, Buckareff A (eds) Causing human action: new perspectives on the causal theory of action, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 199-228, 2010) hold that children who do not yet have an understanding of subjective perspectives, i.e., mental states, explain actions by appealing to objective facts. In this paper, we criticize this view. We argue that in order to understand objective facts, subjects need to understand perspectives. By analysing basic fact-expressing assertions, we show that subjects cannot refer to facts if they do not understand two types of perspectivity, namely, spatial and doxastic perspectivity. To avoid conceptual confusion regarding different ways of referring to facts, we distinguish between reference to facts de re and de dicto.}, subject = {Theory of mind}, language = {en} }