@article{SchroederStewartThagard, author = {Schr{\"o}der, Tobias and Stewart, Terrence C. and Thagard, Paul}, title = {Intention, Emotion, and Action}, series = {Cognitive Science}, volume = {38}, journal = {Cognitive Science}, number = {5}, publisher = {Wiley}, address = {Malden, Mass.}, issn = {1551-6709}, doi = {10.1111/cogs.12100}, pages = {851 -- 880}, abstract = {We propose a unified theory of intentions as neural processes that integrate representations of states of affairs, actions, and emotional evaluation. We show how this theory provides answers to philosophical questions about the concept of intention, psychological questions about human behavior, computational questions about the relations between belief and action, and neuroscientific questions about how the brain produces actions. Our theory of intention ties together biologically plausible mechanisms for belief, planning, and motor control. The computational feasibility of these mechanisms is shown by a model that simulates psychologically important cases of intention.}, subject = {Sozialit{\"a}t}, language = {en} } @article{SchroederThagard, author = {Schr{\"o}der, Tobias and Thagard, Paul}, title = {Priming}, series = {Social Cognition. Suppl.: Understanding Priming Effects in Social Psychology}, volume = {32}, journal = {Social Cognition. Suppl.: Understanding Priming Effects in Social Psychology}, number = {Suppl.}, publisher = {Guilford}, address = {New York, NY}, issn = {0278-016X}, doi = {10.1521/soco.2014.32.supp.152}, pages = {152 -- 167}, abstract = {Priming influences holistic representations of social situations and subsequent actions through interactive competition among relevant concepts such as the prime, the self, a partner, or other features of the environment. The constraints among these representations stem from culturally shared affective meanings of concepts acquired in socialization. Our theory is implemented in a localist connectionist model, which in simulations reproduced major experimental results on priming. The neural plausibility of our proposal comes from semantic pointers, a neural mechanism that integrates symbolic concepts with underlying emotional and sensorimotor processes. The compositional nature of semantic pointers also explains the interaction of priming with more deliberate and intentional forms of social cognition.}, subject = {Psychologie}, language = {en} } @article{HomerDixonMilkoreitMocketal., author = {Homer-Dixon, Thomas and Milkoreit, Manjana and Mock, Steven M. and Schr{\"o}der, Tobias and Thagard, Paul}, title = {The conceptual structure of social disputes}, series = {SAGE Open}, volume = {4}, journal = {SAGE Open}, number = {1}, publisher = {Sage Publ.}, address = {Thousand Oaks, Calif.}, issn = {2158-2440}, doi = {10.1177/2158244014526210}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:525-15802}, pages = {1 -- 20}, abstract = {We describe and illustrate a new method of graphically diagramming disputants' points of view called cognitive-affective mapping. The products of this method—cognitive-affective maps (CAMs)—represent an individual's concepts and beliefs about a particular subject, such as another individual or group or an issue in dispute. Each of these concepts and beliefs has its own emotional value. The result is a detailed image of a disputant's complex belief system that can assist in-depth analysis of the ideational sources of the dispute and thereby aid its resolution. We illustrate the method with representations of the beliefs of typical individuals involved in four contemporary disputes of markedly different type: a clash over German housing policy, disagreements between Israelis over the meaning of the Western Wall, contention surrounding exploitation of Canada's bitumen resources, and the deep dispute between people advocating action on climate change and those skeptical about the reality of the problem.}, subject = {Konflikt}, language = {en} }