TY - CHAP A1 - Kevin, Lamshöft A1 - Hildebrandt, Mario A1 - Altschaffel, Robert A1 - Keil, Oliver A1 - Hempel, Ivo A1 - Dittmann, Jana A1 - Neubert, Tom A1 - Vielhauer, Claus T1 - Resilience against and detection of information hiding in nuclear instrumentation and control systems within the scope of NSS 17-T T2 - Kerntechnik 2022, Leipzig, 21. - 22. Juni 2022 Y1 - 2022 UR - https://www.kerntechnik.com PB - INFORUM Verlags- und Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH CY - Berlin ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Hildebrandt, Mario A1 - Altschaffel, Robert A1 - Lamshöft, Kevin A1 - Lange, Mathias A1 - Szemkus, Martin A1 - Neubert, Tom A1 - Vielhauer, Claus A1 - Ding, Yongjian A1 - Dittmann, Jana T1 - Threat Analysis of Steganographic and Covert Communication in Nuclear I&C Systems T2 - Konferenz: International Conference on Nuclear Security: Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts (ICONS), Vienna, Austria, 2020/ Konferenzband: International Conference on Nuclear Security: Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts N2 - Steganographic and covert communication is increasingly used for hiding attacks. Often information hiding is used by attackers in advanced persistent threats in order to operate without being noticed. Attackers might use it to hide data exfiltration or control channels for persistent malware. The paper analyzes potential threats to operational technology by investigating different communication protocols towards their suitability as cover channels. Using a generalized network architecture model and the communication flows of nuclear power plants, the attack potential using information hiding is exemplary assessed. An example for a supply chain attack for command injection is given on the foundation of the OPC UA protocol and an off-theshelf programmable logic controller. Subsequently, recommendations for a strategic and operational preparation for operators towards the prevention and detection of information hiding attacks are derived. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350966454_Threat_Analysis_of_Steganographic_and_Covert_Communication_in_Nuclear_IC_Systems PB - IAEA CY - Vienna, Austria ER -